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1. INTRODUCTION 
This report is a summary and integration of the research findings of the European 
Research project PRIVATISATION OF PUBLIC SERVICES AND THE IMPACT ON QUALITY, 
EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY (PIQUE).1 The project lasted from 2006 to 2009 and 
was funded under the European Commission's 6th Framework Programme. Research 
was conducted in six public service sectors – electricity, postal services, local public 
transport and health services/hospitals – and four countries – Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The report summarises the main 
results from a series of larger reports produced during the project’s lifetime and 
thereby reflects the different phases and workpackages of the project. The chapters 
are based on a series of policy papers that were produced to inform policy makers 
and stakeholders about the project’s main research findings. Accordingly, it is 
written to be accessible for an audience that goes beyond academic circles. The 
detailed reports that the Policy Papers are based on are also available and can be 
downloaded from the project website). 
The report starts with a chapter summarising the results of a study on liberalisation 
and privatisation processes and forms of regulation in the four sectors and six 
countries investigated. Based on a series of company case studies, the next chapter 
analyses how companies react to liberalisation and privatisation. The following 
sections deal with the impact of privatisation and liberalisation processes on labour 
relations as well as on employment and productivity. This is followed by a chapter on 
the results of a representative survey on users’ perceptions. The report is 
complemeted by a chapter integrating the various findings and drawing overall 
conclusions as well as a section outlining policy recommendations. 
The PIQUE project was carried out by a consortium of six partners. The project was 
co-ordinated by  
 Forschungs- und Beratungsstelle Arbeitswelt (FORBA) in Vienna, Austria. 
Further partners included 
 Working Lives Research Institute (WLRI) at London Metropolitan University, UK 
 Higher Institute for Labour Studies (HIVA) and Public Management Institute of the 
Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium 
 Institute of Sociology, Warsaw University, Poland 
 Institute for Economic and Social Research (WSI), Hans-Böckler Foundation, 
Germany 
 Department of Work Science, Göteborg University, Sweden. 
During the three years of the project’s duration a large number of researchers 
contributed to the research carried out in the project and made the project an 
ultimate success. Among them are Monica Andersson-Bäck, Nils Böhlke, Torsten 
                                             
1  Project contract number: CIT5-2006-028478 
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Brandt, Laura Coppin, Kathrin Drews, Jörg Flecker, Jesper Hamark, Christoph 
Hermann, Ines Hofbauer, Steve Jefferys, Yilmaz Kilicaslan, Thomas Lindner, 
Wieslawa Kozek, Julia Kubisa, Justine Sys, Ulrike Papouschek, Anna Paraskevopoulou, 
Richard Pond, Beata Radzka, Justine Sys, Ali Cevat Tasiran, Christer Thörnqvist, 
Thomas Vael, Sem Vandekerckhove, Steven Van Roosbroek, Guy Van Gyes and Koen 
Verhoest. 
As important for the success was an effective and smooth project organisation 
overseen by Christine Wagner of FORBA, as well as the consistent support of Dominik 
Sobczak, the project’s Scientific Officer at the European Commission. 
The project has received unexpected attention and input from stakeholders and 
policy makers. We are particular grateful to the participants of the four PIQUE 
workshops carried out in order to discuss project results and policy recommendations 
(in Brussels, Berlin, Leuven and Warsaw) and to the participants of the final project 
conference in Vienna. We hope that this report will help them to pursue their tasks. 
We would also like to take the opportunity to thank all the people who allowed us to 
interview them for the company case studies and the users’ survey which formed an 
important part of the project. We would also like to thank all those who established 
contacts with interviewees and provided useful background information on different 
sectors and industries, as well as the survey institutes who carried out the telephone 
survey. 
For more information on the project and to download the detailed project reports 
please visit http://www.pique.at 
 
 
 
Vienna, May 2009 
 
Christoph Hermann & Jörg Flecker 
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2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
While during the post-war decades public services were mainly provided by the state, 
recent decades have seen a wave of liberalisation and privatisation of public services 
in the European Union. So far, evaluations of these processes have largely focussed 
on price development and, in some cases, on the compliance of privatisation with 
specific quality standards. These assessments rarely took into account the impact of 
liberalisation and privatisation on employment and productivity in a cross-country 
and cross-sector perspective. The PIQUE project has attempted to close this gap by 
investigating the relationship between employment, productivity and the quality of 
public services in the process of liberalisation and privatisation. The project’s main 
hypothesis is that decent employment and working conditions impact positively on 
productivity and service quality while the provision of decent employment and 
working conditions depends on the regulation of liberalisation and privatisation 
processes and the resulting market and ownership structures. 
To test this hypothesis the project has pursued a number of research objectives: 
 A description and analysis of liberalisation and privatisation processes, changes in 
market and ownership structures and forms of regulation 
 An assessment of the impact of liberalisation and privatisation on the quantity 
and quality of employment, on the development of productivity and on public 
service labour relations 
 An understanding of how companies respond to liberalisation and privatisation; 
what are main strategies and organisational reforms, and what are the 
consequences for employment and working conditions as well as productivity and 
service quality 
 An exploration of the perspective of public-service users, including users’ 
perception of liberalisation, privatisation, competition and choice, perceptions of 
quality and the role of public service obligations. 
Research was conducted in four sectors – electricity, postal services, local public 
transport and health services/hospitals – and six European countries – Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Both sectors and 
countries have been selected because they represent a wide variety of sector- and 
country-specific peculiarities and the challenges typical of the liberalisation and 
privatisation of public services across Europe. To tackle the research questions, the 
project used a broad variety of methods in the different workpackages, including 
quantitative as well as qualitative methods. 
For the production of a series of reports on changing ownership and market 
structures as well as forms of regulation in the countries and sectors covered by the 
project the partners reviewed existing literature and reports, analysed documents 
and occasionally conduced expert interviews when information was otherwise not 
accessible. To analyse and compare the information, a series of multidimensional 
graphs were developed summarising the changes in ownership status of the 
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incumbent, ownership status of all providers, number of providers and market 
concentration. The same information was also presented in tables on the 
development of ownership and market structures. Due to a lack of exact and 
comparable data for specific sectors and countries, classifications were based on 
estimations of the national research teams. Research on the impact on industrial 
relations operated with similar methods, including reviews of existing literature and 
reports, and additional expert interviews. Here, too, information from the national 
reports was compiled in comparative tables. 
A series of case studies was conducted to analyse the impact of liberalisation and 
privatisation at the company level and to better understand the consequences for 
work, employment and service quality. Case studies are empirical inquiries that 
investigate contemporary phenomena within their real-life context (Yin 2003) and 
which focus on understanding the dynamics present within single settings (Eisenhardt 
1989). Both the processes and the consequences of liberalisation are rather complex, 
and the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. 
Therefore, case studies using different sources of evidence and in particular 
qualitative research methods were expected to be the appropriate research approach 
to gain novel insights. The research on company responses to liberalisation and 
privatisation was based on a total of 23 company case studies: Six case studies from 
the electricity sector, eight from postal services (five incumbents and three 
competitors), five from the hospital sector and four from local public transport. 
The case studies themselves are based on a total of about 185 qualitative interviews 
conducted with managers, work council and trade union representatives and workers. 
The number of interviews per case study ranges between eight and 14 interviews. 
Exceptions are the three case studies with new competitors in the post sector which 
were initially not foreseen in the work plan and therefore are based on fewer 
interviews. The method of the problem-centred interview was used. Common 
guidelines had been developed for three different categories of interview partners 
(management, works council representative or trade unionist and workers). The 
interviews were conducted in 2007 and 2008. In two case studies – Austrian General 
Mail and British Londondrive – management declined to take part in the research. 
While in the case of General Mail management’s perspective was accounted for 
through interviews with two ex-managers, the findings of the Londondrive case study 
are solely based on interviews with trade union and works council informants and 
workers. In addition to interviews the case study material included academic 
literature, press coverage of the companies, company documents, and company 
internet presentations. All case studies have been anonymised even though it is 
sometimes impossible to conceal the identity of the case study company. This is 
obviously the case in sectors where there had been only one monopoly provider 
before liberalisation and privatisation such as in postal services. 
The workpackages dealing with consequences on employment and productivity were 
primarily based on the secondary analysis of existing data. In the case of employment 
comparable EU wide data were used as well as national data if available stretching 
from 1995 to 2005. Data referred to the following NACE codes: 401 (Electricity), 641 
(Post and courier activities), 6021 to 6023 (Other scheduled passenger land transport; 
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taxi operation; other land passenger transport), 85 (Health and Social Work) as well 
as 8511 (hospital activities). Eurostat data was taken from the Structural Business 
Statistics (SBS), national data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and other sources. 
For Austria and Germany LFS data was used, for Belgium data from the Data 
Warehouse Social Security, for Sweden data from Register Based Labour Market 
Statistics, for Poland data from the Central Satistical Office (Employment in National 
Economy) and for the UK from the Annual Business Inquiry. 
Productivity data was taken from the EC-funded EUKLEMS project 
(http://www.euklems.net). The data is standardised and for some categories 
streches back to 1970 (for Poland figures in most categories are only available from 
the mid-1990s). However, this data was only available for broader sectors such as 
electricity and gas (in some cases electricity, gas and water where data goes back 
further), post and telecommunication, inland transport, and health and social 
services. Nevertheless, results still provide some indication of significant changes in 
productivity that can be linked to liberalisation, privatisation and marketisation 
processes. Furthermore, the focus of the project was on major changes in 
productivity, not just short-term fluctuations, and these are more likely to be 
apparent even in the data for these broader sectors, unless there are specific 
countervailing tendencies operating in other sub-sectors within the industry. 
Productivity trends were compared with respect to other sectors in the same country 
as well as the same sectors in different countries. The analysis was complemented by 
a decomposition of productivity trends (increase in value added or a decrease in 
hours worked). 
Research on users’ attitudes towards liberalisation and privatisation was based on a 
representative telephone survey conducted in the winter of 2007-2008. The sample 
population included all private persons aged between 18 and 79 living in a private 
household in one of the included countries; with furthermore a land-line telephone 
number and the capability to express themselves in the (country) language of the 
questionnaire. An additional pre-survey representativeness measure consisted of 
quotas. These were assigned according to gender, age, education, and urban-rural 
area. As a result, in each country at least 1,000 respondents were interviewed based 
on this random sampling. In the questionnaire, questions were asked about the 
general satisfaction with quality and price; the impact of liberalisation and if/how 
the specific service has to be provided in a universal way. Another extensive battery 
of questions assessed customer satisfaction with particular public services in more 
detail. The respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction with the quality 
performance of individual service dimensions. This quality satisfaction part was 
complemented by questions on recently experienced quality problems. In a final 
part, questions were asked about the evolution in price and quality. 
2.1. References 
Eisenhardt Kathleen M. (1989): Building theories from case study research, in: Academy of 
Management Review, vol. 14, n° 4, 532-550. 
Yin Robert K. (2003): Case Study Research: Design And Methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
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3. VARIETIES AND VARIATIONS OF PUBLIC SERVICE 
LIBERALISATION AND PRIVATISATION 
Christoph Hermann 
Forschungs- und Beratungsstelle Arbeitswelt, Vienna 
Koen Verhoest 
Instituut voor de Overheid, K.U. Leuven 
This chapter is based on the synthesis report on 24 sector studies on liberalisation 
and privatisation processes and forms of regulation for the sectors of electricity, 
postal services, local public transport and healthcare/hospitals in the six countries 
involved in the project. 
3.1. Processes of liberalisation and privatisation 
Liberalisation and privatisation can be expected to have profoundly altered the 
structure of public-service sectors in Europe and new regulations imposed by 
European sector directives must have created pressure for Member States to 
converge to a common model of governing the now liberalised public service markets 
and companies. If we look at the four sectors covered in the PIQUE Project – 
electricity, postal services, local public transport and health care – there are 
certainly strong indicators for change and for convergence, but similarly striking are 
the continuous differences both in the structure as well as in the regulation of public 
services in the six countries included in our comparison – Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Sweden, Poland and the UK. 
Differences already emerge if we look at the timeframe of the liberalisation and 
privatisation processes. In several sectors the timeframe reaches from the late 1980s 
to the present (an exception in this regard are postal services where liberalisation 
did not start before the early 1990s). In three out of the four sectors, the UK was the 
country where liberalisation started first, often coupled with privatisation. This may 
not surprise given the legacy of the Thatcher government, which profoundly changed 
Britain in the early 1980s. Interestingly, however, the UK was often followed by 
Sweden, where a conservative government ruling the country from 1991 to 1994 
initiated a number of radical public-sector reforms. As a result, the UK and Sweden 
were typically ahead of the liberalisation time frame set by the respective European 
Directives (in those sectors where such Directives were adopted). Poland also 
experienced an early process of liberalisation due to political change in the late 
1980s and the shift from a planned to a market economy. However, in Poland 
liberalisation and privatisation processes evolved rather slowly lagging behind rather 
than preceding the respective EU regulation. 
In the remaining three countries – Austria, Belgium and Germany – liberalisation 
processes were mostly induced externally and followed more or less the time frame 
set by the European Union starting in the late 1990s, with reforms in electricity and 
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postal services, with the important qualification that all three countries forged 
ahead in partly privatising their national postal companies after 2000. Interestingly, 
in the two sectors without an EU Directive establishing a common liberalisation 
roadmap, local public transport and health care, the situation was not so much 
different. Here, too, the UK and Sweden were running ahead of the other countries, 
although the reform of the Swedish health-care sector was much less radical than in 
the UK and Germany. In the remaining four countries, liberalisation and privatisation 
processes in local public transport and health care started comparably late and they 
are far from being completed. In the case of health care, furthermore, changes are 
better described as economisation, as in most countries there is hardly any 
competition between hospitals and only in one country was privatisation carried out 
systematically and at a substantial level. 
3.2. Towards more competitive market structures? 
Liberalisation aims at building competitive market structures, in which many 
providers compete with each other on an integrated and easily accessible market. 
Competitive market structures imply low levels of market concentration, since 
providers with large market shares have the possibility to build up entry barriers for 
new competitors by manipulating prices and the quality of services. Although in 
several sectors a formal liberalisation process has been initiated or completed, the 
evolution towards highly competitive market structures has not or only very partially 
been achieved in most sectors and countries studied. As liberalisation is intended to 
enhance competition, one might expect an increase in the number of providers in the 
newly liberalised public-service sectors. This is certainly the case in countries and 
sectors where there was only one provider before liberalisation. But experience 
shows that this is not necessarily the case, for in the other sectors liberalisation had 
mixed effects. 
A decrease in the number of companies is particularly noticeable in sectors and 
countries in which regional or local monopolies were prevalent. In electricity 
generation, for example, the conversion of regional to national markets has led to a 
reduction of the number of suppliers in some countries as larger companies have 
bought up their smaller competitors (and the number can be expected to fall further 
if the objective of creating a European-wide market is ever to be met).2 In Germany 
there are now four instead of eight major generating companies. As a result of these 
concentration processes, the number of network transmission and distribution 
operators has also decreased. Even the number of companies active in supply has 
declined, as 200 municipal companies have disappeared from the market. In Belgium 
the country’s largest electricity corporation also took over the retail business of 
some of the municipalities with which it previously had formed joint public-private 
companies. In Sweden, too, a number of local electricity companies, which had 
                                             
2  For some countries, statistics may show an increase in the number of generating companies but this 
is mainly the result of an increase in small eco-electricity producers. As these can only survive due 
to heavy subsidies they are not considered here as relevant competitors. 
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previously cooperated with state-owned Vattenfallsverket in regional ‘clubs’, were 
taken over by large foreign-owned corporations, which entered the market after 
liberalisation. In Sweden and the UK, furthermore, the number of bus companies 
providing local public transport has also decreased as a result of liberalisation, while 
in Austria and Germany the large number of companies in this sector is the result of 
the reluctance to increase competition. 
In other sectors and market segments, liberalisation led to an increase in the number 
of providers. As mentioned above, in Poland and the UK this was not difficult given 
the fact that there was only one provider before liberalisation. But Poland stands out 
as it has an unusual large number of suppliers in electricity generation and several 
hundred independent companies have obtained a licence for electricity trading (yet 
there are signs that Poland is in the middle of a consolidation process which will end 
with a significantly reduced number of providers). Since liberalisation, there are also 
large numbers of providers in parcels and express services although it is sometimes 
not clear if they are independent companies or self-employed deliverers. The 
number of companies in the letter market has also increased, mostly in the sub-
markets, direct mail and newspaper delivery, but to a much lesser extent than in the 
parcels and express mail market. In fact, so far only a few meaningful competitors 
have emerged to challenge the position of the former monopoly suppliers. 
Even in those sectors where the number of providers has grown, this has not 
automatically resulted in strongly competitive market structures. Instead, in several 
cases although the total number of companies has increased the largest companies 
were at the same time able to expand their market shares in the newly liberalised 
markets. This was the case in electricity in Germany and Sweden, while in Austria 
and Belgium there were already high degrees of market concentration before 
liberalisation. Even in Poland and the UK, market concentration in the electricity 
industry is considerable. Out of the 70 British companies in the supply segment, six 
have a market share of more than five per cent and the three largest firms supply 
almost 65 per cent of electricity consumed in the UK. In the letter market, 
concentration has decreased but only for a few per cent. The new competitors 
account for between seven per cent of the market in Sweden and Germany, four per 
cent in the UK, two per cent in Austria and Belgium and only one per cent in Poland. 
Even in package and express services, the number of companies with significant 
market shares is limited. Instead, many of the new companies are national branches 
of large international express mail services. 
Sweden and the UK have also experienced strong concentration processes in local 
public transport. In Sweden there are nine major bus companies left, while in Britain 
there are six, with three of them controlling more than 50 per cent of the market 
(whereas in Germany there are more than 2,000 and in Austria more than 500 
independent providers in local public transport). An interesting finding in this 
connection is also that the number of companies may first increase as a result of 
liberalisation, but with the growth of competition smaller companies are taken over 
by larger ones. This is precisely the experience in local public transport in Sweden. 
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On a much smaller scale, concentration processes can also be seen in local public 
transport in Germany and Poland, whereas in Austria and Belgium concentration in 
regional transport has always been rather high. In sum, even if liberalisation has led 
to the abolition of national or regional monopolies – the exception is local public 
transport in Belgium where there are still regional monopolies – the resulting market 
structures are typically characterised by very high or rather high degrees of market 
concentration. Hence what often happened was a shift from regional monopolies to 
national oligopolies. 
The number of providers and their market shares, i.e. the degree of market 
concentration, is only one indicator of the intensity of competition in newly 
liberalised public service markets. Further elements that impact on competitive 
market structures include the number of markets and the kind of competition - 
competition for or in the market – as well as the extension of customer choice.3 
Taking into account all these elements, we developed a map of the evolution 
towards more competitive market structures in the countries and sectors included in 
this analysis. The results are presented in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Evolution towards more competitive market structures (2006) 
 Austria Belgium Germany Poland Sweden UK 
Postal 
services: 
letter and 
direct mail 
market 
Limited Limited  
Rather limited 
(fully open from 
2008 onwards) 
Very 
limited Moderate  Rather limited 
Electricity  Limited  Very limited 
Limited 
(abolition of 
regional 
monopolies but 
concentration 
of main 
producers) 
Moderate 
Moderate 
(high share of 
spot-market 
trading)  
Strong in 
generation; 
moderate in 
supply 
Local public 
transport Limited 
Very 
limited Rather limited Limited  
Strong but 
decreasing 
because of 
more market 
concentration 
Strong but 
decreasing 
because of 
more market 
concentration 
Hospitals Limited Limited Moderate Limited Very limited Very limited 
Source:  PIQUE sector reports. Due to a lack of exact and comparable data for specific sectors and 
countries, classifications are based on estimations of the national research teams. For more 
detail, see the country reports for each sector. Available to download from www.pique.at. 
                                             
3  Competition in the market describes a situation where two or more companies compete for markets 
shares, whereas competition for the market means that two or more companies compete for an 
exclusive although temporary access to the market. The latter frequently takes the form of 
competitive tendering and is relatively common in local public transport. 
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According to the countries and sectors covered in the PIQUE project only a few 
sectors show a clear shift towards highly competitive market structures. As can be 
seen in Table 3.1, Poland and the UK have highly competitive markets in electricity 
and the UK and Sweden in local public transport. Moderate progress towards more 
competitive markets was made in Sweden, the UK and Germany in postal services, in 
Germany and Poland in local public transport and in Sweden in electricity, but 
progress was rather limited, limited or very limited in the remaining sectors including 
all three sectors in Austria and Belgium, postal services except for Sweden and the 
hospital sector except for Germany. 
3.3. Towards more private ownership structures? 
Public services are usually associated with public ownership. In reality, however, 
ownership structures are much more diverse, including public and private companies, 
and in the health-care sector even private not for profit providers. Privatisation 
entails a shift of ownership from public to private asset holders. Given the diverse 
ownership structures before liberalisation, it should not be surprising that 
privatisation rarely entailed a shift from an entirely publicly owned to an entirely 
privately owned sector. In fact, the UK was the only country in our sample that 
partly followed this rather extreme path. In electricity and local public transport, all 
providers are now in private hands, while the Royal Mail is still a hundred per cent 
publicly owned and the hospital sector is also still largely in public hands, even if 
some of the new hospital buildings are legally owned by private investors. More 
frequently, instead, liberalisation entailed a shift from a full or predominantly public 
to a predominantly private ownership structure on the market. 
Examples are the electricity sector and local public transport in Sweden, letter mail 
in Germany and in several countries the parcel and express mail services. 
Furthermore, a number of countries have experimented with hospital privatisation, 
but only in Germany was this policy applied systematically. The standard mail 
services in five of the six countries are still predominantly publicly owned (the 
exception is Germany where the majority shares of the incumbent has been sold to 
private investors), as is local public transport in four countries (exceptions are 
Sweden and the UK) and electricity in two countries (Austria and Poland). Austria and 
Poland are the only countries where public companies still play a dominant role in all 
four sectors, while in the other four countries at least two sectors are predominantly 
in public hands. Even in the privatisation-prone UK, postal services and hospitals are 
still mostly publicly owned. 
Privatisation does not always have to include a full transfer of ownership rights. In a 
number of cases, instead, publicly owned companies have only been partly 
privatised, with the state maintaining a majority or minority share of the assets. This 
can take the form of selling ownership rights to a strategic partner, e.g. a foreign 
company active in the same sector or business segment, or through offering company 
shares on the stock market. While the British government typically divested public 
companies in initial public offerings, transferring all company shares to private 
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investors, other countries were much more cautious. In Austria and Poland the 
federal or regional governments have still considerable stakes in partly privatised 
electricity companies. In Austria, existing legislation forbids the federal government 
to liquidate its majority share in the country’s largest electricity generator, the 
Verbund Gesellschaft. In the postal sector, only Germany has sold a majority share of 
the former monopoly provider, Deutsche Post, while in Austria and Belgium the state 
has retained half of the stakes and a majority of the voting rights in the post 
incumbents. 
In addition to part privatisations, ownership can also be shared between the public 
and private sector in joint ventures or public private partnerships. Such joint 
ownership can be found in electricity distribution in Belgium, where the leading 
private electricity company until recently operated local distribution networks in 
cooperation with municipalities (resulting in joint public-private companies), or in 
local public transport in Germany, where some communities have invited the private 
sector to invest in their municipal transport operators. 
Independently of the ownership structure, liberalisation has caused a systematic shift 
in the legal form of public-service companies. While previously part of the public 
administration and then autonomous public companies, most of them have been 
converted into private-law companies (either as a holding, a joint-stock-company or 
a limited-liability corporation). 
Table 3.2 summarises changes in ownership structure in terms of market shares. A 
clear shift from a predominantly public to a predominantly private ownership 
structure took place in the UK and Sweden in electricity and local public transport 
and in Germany in postal services and the hospital sector. Furthermore, a substantial 
increase can be found in postal services in Austria and Belgium and in electricity in 
Austria, Germany, Poland and Sweden. In Belgium there was also a moderate 
increase in private ownership in the hospital sector but this is limited to the growing 
share of private not-for-profit hospitals. In most of the remaining sectors, there was 
an increase in private ownership but with a limited effect on overall ownership 
structures. 
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Table 3.2: Evolution towards a dominant private-ownership structure in four 
sectors (2006) 
 Austria Belgium Germany Poland Sweden UK 
Predominantly 
public ** 
Predominantly 
public ** 
Predominantly 
private 
(incumbent 
sold)  
Predominantly 
public 
Predominantly 
public  
Predominantly 
public  
Postal 
services 
(letter 
market) Substantial 
increase 
Substantial 
increase 
Strong 
increase 
Marginal 
increase  
Limited 
increase 
Limited 
increase 
Predominantly 
public 
Predominantly 
private 
Predominantly 
private 
Predominantly 
public  
Predominantly 
private  
Predominantly 
private  
Electricity  
Substantial 
increase 
Moderate 
increase 
Substantial 
increase 
(conversion of 
Eastern 
Germany) 
Substantial 
increase 
Substantial 
increase 
Very strong 
increase 
Predominantly 
public 
Predominantly 
public 
Predominantly 
public 
Predominantly 
public 
Predominantly 
private  Fully private Local 
public 
transport Limited 
increase 
Very limited 
increase 
Moderate 
increase 
Limited 
increase 
Strong 
increase 
Very strong 
increase 
Predominantly 
public* 
Predominantly 
private* 
Public equals 
private* 
Predominantly 
public 
Predominantly 
public 
Predominantly 
public 
Hospitals 
Limited 
increase 
Moderate 
increase  
Strong 
increase 
Limited 
increase 
Very limited 
increase  
Limited 
increase 
* Large or dominant share of non profit private hospitals 
** 49% of incumbent in private hands 
Source: PIQUE sector reports. Due to a lack of exact and comparable data for specific sectors and 
countries, classifications are based on estimations of the national research teams. For more 
details, see the country reports for each sector. Available to download from www.pique.at. 
3.3.1. Privatisation instead of liberalisation? 
Comparing market and ownership structures (Table 3.1 and Table 3.2) it becomes 
clear that there is no straightforward causal relationship between private ownership 
and market concentration. Instead we can find high degrees of market concentration 
in predominantly publicly owned sectors such as local public transport in Austria and 
in predominantly privately owned sectors such as electricity in Belgium. In fact it is 
hard to detect any general patterns that could explain the differences. What can 
nevertheless be concluded from the rather complex picture is that in the two cases 
in which we had a predominantly private ownership structure before liberalisation – 
electricity in Belgium and Germany – market concentration has further accelerated. 
Conversely, in the two countries with nationalised electricity industries before 
liberalisation – Poland and the UK – the authorities were more successful in 
restraining private capital interests.4 Another important finding is that the 
                                             
4  In a recent European Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the legislative package on 
the internal market for electricity and gas (SEC (2007) 1179) the Commission assumes ownership 
unbundling is the main reason that explains the different market structures in the European Union. 
Countries with ownership unbundling, according to this conclusion, have lower market concentration 
and hence more intense competition in their electricity markets. Yet the evidence given by the 
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liberalisation processes in European public services were more successful with regard 
to changing ownership structures than creating competitive market structures. 
Whereas five out of the 24 sectors included in our sample have seen a strong or very 
strong increase in private ownership until 2006, only three sectors have shown a 
strong evolution towards competitive market structures. 
Figure 3.1: Electricity sectors Belgium and the UK before and after 
liberalisation 
 
    Belgium, before liberalisation 
    Belgium, after liberalisation 
    UK, before liberalisation 
    UK, after liberalisation 
 
The figure illustrates how the UK shifted from a state-owned monopoly to a fairly 
competitive market with several providers all privately owned. Belgium always had a 
                                                                                                                                  
Commission to support this assumption is rather weak. The Commission randomly selects eight 
countries with legal unbundling and compares them to ten countries with ownership unbundling. It 
furthermore takes the market share of the largest company as indicator. This already shows that in 
seven out of the ten countries with legal unbundling the largest company still accounts for more 
than 50 per cent of the market. If it were to take the market share of the three largest companies, 
the picture would change insofar as in number of countries with ownership unbundling market 
concentration would also reach more than 80 or 90 per cent. Yet the table also shows that Poland 
and Sweden stand out as the countries with the lowest market concentration. 
Ownership 
status of all 
providers 
Market Concentration
many providers 
few providers 
.
mixed with 
market 
dominance 
for public 
providers 
one provider 
mixed with 
market 
dominance 
for private 
providers 
Number of providers 
Ownership and 
status of 
incumbent 
(former 
monopolist) 
fully 
privately 
owned 
company 
predom. 
privately 
owned 
predom. 
gov.  
owned 
several providers 
fully 
gov 
owned 
all 
public 
all 
private 
monopoly
high
considerable 
low
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predominantly private ownership structure and a high market concentration, while 
the number of providers actually decreased. 
3.4. Forms of regulation 
Liberalisation and privatisation was often promoted and always accompanied by 
major changes in the regulatory systems (in the case of Swedish post, the regulatory 
framework was actually reformed after the introduction of competition). While 
before liberalisation public ownership was the dominant form of regulation in most 
countries and sectors, liberalisation and privatisation processes have amplified 
differences in the regulatory regimes. In very general terms, the focus of regulation 
has shifted from governing the whole process of service provision to regulating 
particular aspects of the service supply chain or to partially controlling outcome. 
General trends also include the establishment of formally independent regulatory 
authorities with varying degrees of autonomy and powers to discipline or coordinate 
market participants, the granting of licences and the signing of contracts. In 
addition, there are a number of new instruments that are applied more specifically in 
one or two sectors included in our sample. One of these is the universal service 
obligation. 
3.4.1. From state ownership to enabling competition 
The electricity sector is a case in point. Regulation no longer includes planning and 
investment, and end-consumer prices are now freely set by the electricity suppliers, 
except for Belgium and Poland where electricity companies are partly still subject to 
planning and price control. Instead, the focus of regulation has been narrowed to the 
transmission and distribution segment of the electricity supply chain. Here, new 
regulations introduced by the two European electricity directives, which were 
transposed into national law, first called for the functional and then legal unbundling 
of the network systems from other supply-chain activities. While functional 
unbundling required the network operators to establish independent accounting 
systems for their network operations, legal unbundling means that network 
operations are carried out by a legally independent company, which nevertheless can 
be owned by a parent company with business activities in generation and supply. 
Unbundling is important for the authorities to determine the costs of operating the 
networks, which may otherwise be used by the network operators to cross-subsidise 
their other business activities (which again may disadvantage competitors in 
generation or supply). 
After unbundling, the transmission and distribution operators were required to grant 
access to competing firms. In most countries, the terms of access were regulated by 
the newly established regulatory bodies. Only Germany, which initially asked its 
network operators only for functional unbundling, opted for the possibility to find a 
solution based on negotiations between the parties involved. Meanwhile Germany has 
also introduced legal unbundling and regulated third-party access. In two countries in 
our sample (Sweden and UK) the transmission-network operators have not only been 
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legally unbundled, but they are also owned by independent companies, and in the 
Swedish case the independent operator is state-owned (whereas in the remaining 
three countries transmission networks are run by electricity companies that are 
either active in generation or in sale or in both). Ownership unbundling did not take 
place in distribution. Distribution-network operators with few exceptions are also 
active in other supply-chain segments. 
Part of regulating third-party access is the establishment of network tariffs. This is 
increasingly done ex-ante instead of ex-post. The reason is that, by giving the 
network operators the possibility to save the difference between the projected and 
the real costs, the new regulation creates specific incentives to reduce production 
costs (exceptions are Belgium, which has maintained an ex-post assessment process, 
and Germany, which is expected to switch to an ex-ante system by 2008). Hence 
while wholesale and retail prices are increasingly determined by supply and demand – 
obstacles in this regard include the continuous dominance of long-term contracts 
between generating and supplying companies – network tariffs are still subjected to 
strong and increasingly sophisticated regulation. This has not happened by 
coincidence. Instead, the regulation of terms and conditions of third-party access to 
transmission and distribution networks, including the establishment of network 
tariffs, is seen as crucial to enable competition in the areas of generation and 
supply. 
Yet the ability to enhance competition greatly depends on the regulatory powers of 
the responsible institutions, which in the new regulatory regime are the newly 
created electricity regulators. In this respect there are substantial differences 
between the six countries under investigation. While the British regulator Ofgem has 
repeatedly imposed large fines on electricity companies for uncompetitive behaviour, 
the Austrian regulator has problems receiving the necessary information from the 
market participants and the fines it can impose on infringing companies are rather 
insignificant. 
3.4.2. Universal service obligation 
Postal services have also experienced the creation of new semi-independent 
regulatory authorities but in most cases with less regulatory powers and a closer 
relationship with the responsible governmental departments. Only the British 
regulator, Postcom, has made itself a name for imposing a fine on the incumbent, 
the Royal Mail, for uncompetitive behaviour, and only the German regulator has put 
strong pressure on the former monopoly provider to lower prices in the reserved 
area. The Austrian regulator, in contrast, willingly approved the incumbent’s 
application to raise prices for standard mail. Most countries in our sample have some 
form of price control for letters – only the Polish Poczta Polska is free to set its own 
prices while they must somehow relate to real costs – but the procedures vary 
considerably. Austria, Germany and the UK have switched to ex-ante price 
regulation, while in Belgium and Sweden providers are allowed to increase prices in 
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line with the growth of the consumer price index, with the Belgium incumbent being 
allowed to add a small supplement. 
In Belgium, Germany, Sweden and the UK the regulator has also the responsibility for 
regulating access to the incumbent’s internal services by competing companies (e.g. 
letter sorting), but the most important task is to specify and control the universal 
service obligation. Belgian electricity companies are subject to a number of public-
service obligations and the regional transport operator in Flanders is required to 
meet a number of minimum standards such as minimum frequency of services and 
maximum distances between bus stops, but in our sample it is only in postal services 
that the establishment of a universal service obligation is part of the European sector 
directive and therefore mandatory in all countries. The universal service obligation is 
imposed by legislation or as a specific postal licence held by the universal service 
provider. Belgium again stands out, as here the universal service obligation is part of 
a management contract between La Poste/De Post and the Belgian government. 
The objective of the universal service obligation is to make sure that all citizens have 
“easy access” to postal services. First Postal Directive lists a number of general 
principles but leaves it to the member sates to define the scope of the universal 
service obligation. In four out of the six countries the universal service obligation 
includes detailed provisions on the number and distribution of postal outlets. Austria 
and Sweden lack such specifications but in both countries the universal service 
providers need approval by the government or the regulator if they want to close a 
post office. However, the detailed provisions have not prevented the former 
monopoly providers, which in all countries are responsible for the fulfilment of the 
universal service obligation, from closing down a substantial part of their post-office 
networks. In Austria and Germany the universal service providers have shut down 
about 40 per cent of their post offices in recent years, while the Swedish incumbent 
has outsourced the respective services to private sector partners. Of the 2,475 postal 
outlets in Sweden, only 436 are still run by Posten AB. 
3.4.3. Licences and contracts 
While the universal service obligations impose a rather detailed control regime, 
companies outside the universal service are free to offer postal services at their own 
terms and prices. So far only the former monopoly suppliers are subject to the 
general service obligation while the new competitors in letter markets usually have 
licences (the exception here is Austria where new companies only have to submit a 
document in which they explain how they intend to establish deposit facilities and 
arrange redress and complaint procedures). Licences are also issued in the electricity 
sector and here especially for providers in the supply markets, whereas generators 
and transmission- and distribution-network operators have to meet a number of 
technical standards to receive a permit for operating their facilities. 
In the electricity and postal sectors, licences are typically granted on a permanent 
basis. In local public transport, in contrast, liberalisation has led to a shift from 
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permanent to temporary licences and contracts. Exceptions are the UK, where bus 
companies outside London have permanent non-exclusive licences and are free to 
choose the routes they want to operate. Permanent exclusive licences until recently 
have existed in Austria and Germany but, following the 2005 Communication of the 
European Commission on the Regulation of Public Passenger Transport, exclusive-
licences for bus services must be renewed after eight years. At the same time, the 
transport authorities, which since the mid 1980s have been set up in Austria, 
Germany and Sweden to coordinate different means of transport and different 
transport providers in a particular region, have started to put temporary contracts 
for particular routes or bundles of routes out to tender. 
Yet while in Sweden a radical shift to the tendering system was put into practice in 
the second half of the 1980s – Sweden is therefore often considered as role model for 
the other countries – in Austria and Germany some areas and routes have been 
subject to tendering procedures while others are still served by companies with 
route-specific licences. The result is a mixed system with a long-term tendency 
towards competitive tendering. In Germany authorities have even started to put 
regional railway services out to tender. Apart from Sweden, Greater London, with 
about 7.5 million inhabitants, has also introduced a city-wide tendering system in 
which Transport London puts individual routes out to tender with competing private 
bus companies. 
Making the cheapest bid is ultimately the most important reason for being awarded a 
contract, but quality issues like the technical equipment and general condition of the 
bus fleet and the experience of drivers also play a role. In some cases, past 
performance is also taken into consideration by transport authorities when awarding 
new contracts, but tendering must be in line with public procurement legislation. 
One consequence of the shift to a tendering regime is that efforts to control outcome 
have greatly increased. 
In Belgium, contracts also play a crucial role in regulating local public transport. Yet 
in contrast to the above contracts, these are not put out to tender. Instead, they are 
management contracts concluded between the regional governments and the 
regional transport providers. As such, the regional governments give the regional 
operators exclusive access to the transport markets in their respective areas. On the 
other hand, management contracts impose a number of duties on the contractors, 
including the above-mentioned survey on passenger satisfaction. Yet while the 
regional providers enjoy exclusive access to the regional transport markets, they 
themselves use competitive tendering to outsource parts of the services to private 
bus companies. 
Tendering and outsourcing have also become increasingly important instruments in 
the regulation of the hospital sector. Yet while in the UK an independent health-care 
regulator has been established, health care differs from the other three sectors 
included in this analysis insofar as regulation in health care has remained 
comprehensive, including a large number of technical and professional standards. 
Most changes in the regulatory framework have taken place in the financing of 
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hospitals rather than in the provision of treatments – although changes in financing of 
course had an impact on care provision. 
There are three major trends that can be observed in one or the other form in the six 
countries under investigation. First, the share of private health-care funding has 
increased through the growing share of private health insurance and the introduction 
of co-payments, which can be understood as specific form of user-fee. Secondly, due 
to the growing split between health-care funding and provision, funding organisations 
are increasingly acting as purchasers, amplifying pressure on hospitals to deliver 
services at the lowest possible costs. In this respect the introduction of flat-rate 
reimbursement rates for operations which are paid by the funding organisations 
independently of the real costs of the treatments (so-called DRG systems) has 
created special incentives to release patients as quickly as possible from the 
hospitals. Hospitals responded to these developments by creating internal markets 
with prices attached to the various treatments, which are then charged to other 
departments or divisions in the same hospital. 
3.5. Conclusions 
With liberalisation the objective of regulation shifted from overseeing the process of 
service provision to enabling competition. In certain market segments the loss of 
regulatory oversight has been compensated for by increasing efforts to control 
outcome. More often, however, outcome is left to the ‘free play’ of market forces. 
One example is electricity prices which in most countries are now determined by 
market forces rather than government intervention. This is problematic insofar as our 
analysis has shown that, in terms of the creation of highly competitive market 
structures, the outcome of liberalisation and privatisation was rather modest to say 
the least. In the absence of comprehensive regulation and competitive markets, the 
companies have gained freedom to set prices and service quality at their own 
discretion. This is the more problematic as liberalisation was actually much more 
successful in changing ownership structures and in expanding the share of private 
ownership. 
While there is a universal service obligation in the postal sector the other three 
sectors included in our analysis lack such a commitment. Perhaps these sectors for 
historic reasons have not a countrywide provider that can make sure that all citizens 
have access to the respective service, but as public service providers they could 
nevertheless be legally required to maintain a minimum amount and quality of 
services easily accessible for citizens in a particular region or locality. The Belgian 
(regional) government(s) imposes such requirements to service providers through a 
number of public service obligations. Even local public transport is regulated in this 
way in the Flemish region, mainly because social and environmental policy 
objectives. However, rather than leaving it to the Member States to make sure that 
citizens have access to affordable high-quality public services, the European Union 
should consider making public service obligations an overarching principle of its 
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liberalisation policies. For this matter, a directive that clarifies the nature and role 
of public services in Europe would certainly be helpful. 
Because the liberalisation process was only modestly successful with respect to 
enhancing competition, it bears certain risks to leave service provision only to the 
market. Instead of focusing on particular aspects of the supply chain, regulation 
should cover various aspects of service provision in order to make sure that services 
are easily accessible, affordable and of high quality and they will remain in this state 
for future generations (which requires a minimum amount of investments). If the 
liberalisation process is to be taken further, member states should not only aim for a 
more balanced regulation, but they should grant their regulatory bodies sufficient 
power to enforce compliance to such regulatory norms and standards, including the 
power to sanction non-compliers and incumbents. However, such strong regulatory 
bodies both need sufficient mutual coordination as well as sound accountability 
arrangements. 
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4. HOW COMPANIES REACT TO THE LIBERALISATION 
AND PRIVATISATION OF PUBLIC SERVICES 
Jörg Flecker and Christoph Hermann 
Forschungs- und Beratungsstelle Arbeitswelt, Vienna 
What strategies do companies adopt in view of liberalisation? What restructuring 
processes are triggered by changes in market regulation and ownership? How is 
employment, how are working conditions changing and what are the impacts on 
service quality? A series of 23 company case studies in four sectors and six countries 
was carried out within the PIQUE project to answer these and related questions. 
In this chapter, we summarise the main findings of the company case studies, which 
focused on service providers in the electricity and local public transport sectors, in 
postal services and in hospitals in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Poland, Sweden and 
the UK (for details see Flecker et al. 2008). Cases-study companies include former 
monopoly providers and new competitors, fully or partly publicly owned companies 
operating in liberalised markets as well as old and new private providers. The case 
studies themselves are based on a total of about 185 qualitative interviews 
conducted with managers, works-council and trade-union representatives as well as 
workers. The information gathered from the interviews and additional sources results 
in a complex picture of company reactions to the introduction of competition and the 
expansion of private ownership in public-service markets, or, as in health services, 
the marketisation of service provision. We summarise the findings in terms of 
company strategies and organisational change, employment, industrial relations and 
human-resource management as well as work organisation, working conditions, 
productivity and service quality. 
Table 4.1: Overview of case study sample 
Electricity 6 case studies 3 in Belgium 1 each in Austria, Poland and the United Kingdom; 1 
municipal provider which is still 100% publicly owned, the other 
majoritarian foreign and private owned as part of European energy 
multinationals 
Postal 
Services 
7 case studies 4 former monopolists (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Poland, Sweden) and 3 
new competitors (Austria, Germany, Sweden) 
Local 
Public 
Transport 
4 case studies 2 municipal transport companies (Germany, Sweden), 2 privatised bus 
companies (Poland, United Kingdom) 
Hospitals 5 case studies 1 public hospital (United Kingdom), 2 private not for profit hospitals 
(Belgium, Austria) and 2 privatised hospitals (Germany, Sweden) 
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4.1. Company strategies and organisational change 
4.1.1. Mergers, acquisitions, privatisation, internationalisation and 
diversification 
With liberalisation, markets were gradually opened to competition. While in 
electricity all customers can now choose between two or more providers, in postal 
services the former monopolists still enjoy a limited monopoly (for mail weighing 50 
grams or less) in Austria, Belgium and Poland (whereas postal markets in Germany, 
Sweden and the UK are fully liberalised). In local public transport the situation is 
different, as here corporations mostly do not compete for customers but for several-
year service contracts. In the hospital sector, too, hospitals only compete for 
patients under exceptional circumstances. Yet hospitals are increasingly subjected to 
economisation processes brought about by changes in funding schemes and stagnating 
or only slowly growing public budgets. Regardless of the duration and intensity of the 
liberalisation process, overall market changes in the liberalised public-service sectors 
in which the case-study companies operate have been limited. Exceptions include 
parcel and express services in the postal-service sector as well as the German letter 
market, where a new competitor challenged the position of the former monopolist 
but has meanwhile run into serious economic difficulties. Even in Sweden, where the 
postal market was fully liberalised more than 15 years ago, the former monopolist 
still holds more than 90 per cent of the letter market. Liberalisation, in general, 
seems to only rarely lead to a competitive market (Hermann/Verhoest 2008). 
While market changes were limited, public-service companies frequently changed 
ownership through privatisation and mergers and acquisitions. This is partly reflected 
in the sample of case-study companies. In the electricity sector, all but one of the 
companies covered by the case-study analysis have changed ownership and, as a 
result, all but one are now predominantly foreign owned. If the ongoing merger 
between the Danish and the Swedish post office is successful, only one out of four 
incumbent postal-service providers included in the analysis will still be fully publicly 
owned. While the examples from the electricity and postal sectors can be 
generalised due to the limited number of companies in these sectors, in local public 
transport and the hospital sector generalisations are more problematic. However, 
both sectors saw a shift from public to private ownership. 
Two of the case-study companies in local public transport were privatised as 
management and employee buy-outs, with one of them later purchased by a foreign-
based multinational. In the hospital sector, where hospitals are confronted with 
increasing financial pressures, two hospitals were privatised, one of which is now 
owned by a foreign investor, the other by a national private hospital chain with 
overseas investments. The other two hospitals were part of a merger or integrated 
into a larger hospital group. 
Apart from mergers and acquisitions, which in the extreme case lead to the creation 
of national and increasingly even European public-service oligopolies, the former 
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monopoly providers have responded to liberalisation by internationalisation, i.e. 
investing outside their home markets, and by diversification, i.e. investing in related 
business activities. The two strategies are particularly prevalent in the electricity 
market and in postal services. One of the postal companies included in the sample 
prides itself on being the world’s leading logistics and postal-services company and 
raises a large part of its revenue outside its home market. The new competitors in 
postal services are also frequently foreign owned and several of them combine mail 
delivery with the delivery of newspapers. Electricity companies often diversify their 
business by combining the provision of electricity with the provision of natural gas. 
4.1.2. Price policy and cost pressure 
Another set of measures introduced by public-service companies in liberalised 
markets centres on the relationship between the company and its customers. 
Companies in liberalised public-service markets have allocated increasing resources 
to advertising and the improvement of customer relations. However, while the role 
and scope of call centre services has been greatly extended, other forms of customer 
contact, such as walk-in customer-service centres, have been cut back if not 
altogether eliminated. Some of the case-study companies in the electricity sector 
have resorted to new and rather aggressive sales techniques and one company has 
been fined for trying to persuade customers to change suppliers. In addition to 
investing in advertising and introducing new sales techniques, public-service 
companies have also responded to market challenges by advancing customer 
differentiation. Large customers can negotiate specific terms of service delivery, 
including individual prices, while small customers are treated according to general 
standards and charged standard tariffs. As a result, large customers may benefit from 
price reductions, while small customers have more than once suffered from price 
increases after liberalisation and privatisation. Customer differentiation is less 
important in local public transport and hospitals. 
While electricity and postal-service customers can choose between different 
providers – and the price of the respective service certainly plays an important role 
in these decisions – in local public transport and the hospital sectors price 
competition plays only a marginal role if any. Providers in these sectors have very 
limited influence on prices. Prices are set by transport or health authorities. 
However, in both sectors there is competition in the sense that providers attempt to 
undercut competitors when competing for bids in public tenders or in the case of 
hospitals by pushing costs for individual treatments below the lump-sum rates paid 
by the funding organisations. 
Regardless of the market situation and the nature and degree of competition, all 
case-study companies report growing cost pressure from the market, the regulator, 
the funding authority, or, as several trade union and works-council representatives 
have emphasised, the profit interests of the new private shareholders. And despite 
the fact that some companies have still managed to increase prices in liberalised 
public-service markets, all of them have responded to liberalisation and privatisation 
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by cutting costs. This has mainly been done on three levels: investment in cost-saving 
technology, reorganisation (concentration and outsourcing) and the reduction of 
labour costs by means of staff cuts, lower wages and increasing workloads. 
4.1.3. Organisational changes 
In addition to changing their legal forms and becoming private-law companies, most 
companies introduced far-reaching organisational changes after liberalisation and 
privatisation. Some of them were driven by the implementation of new technology, 
others by regulatory requirements and again others by the objective of cutting costs. 
As a result, there are two major tendencies that in one form or another have 
affected most of the case-study companies: the concentration of structures and 
activities and the outsourcing of certain parts or functions either by contracting with 
external suppliers or by setting up independent subsidiaries. The latter is particular 
widespread in the electricity industry, where the regulator has required providers to 
set up independent business units for generation, distribution and supply. 
Several electricity companies, as a result, have set up independent sales 
departments and call centres, while one company was virtually split into two equal 
parts. In a similar way, municipalities have responded to legal concerns about the 
funding of municipal transport systems by converting parts of the service into 
independent companies (e.g. bus service). The result was the creation of sometimes 
rather complicated business structures with cross-shareholding among various actors. 
In postal services, it is the new competitors that often rely on extensive networks of 
subsidiaries and partners in order to reach into areas where they do not have their 
own delivery network. In Germany, a major competitor of the incumbent postal 
company was in fact made up by a total of 91 independent firms. 
As we will describe in the following section, organisational changes not only 
responded to regulatory needs; instead companies have deliberately exploited new 
regulations in order to escape ‘expensive’ public-sector collective agreements under 
the pretext of growing competition. In fact, reorganisation was to a large extent 
driven by the search for lower labour costs. Apart from creating independent 
subsidiaries, companies have also outsourced service functions to external 
contractors that can provide the service cheaper than the company could do with its 
own staff. As we will describe in the following section, the splitting up of companies, 
the creation of independent subsidiaries and outsourcing has created frictions within 
a previously rather homogeneous public-sector workforce and significantly increased 
administrative work (documentation, reporting, etc.). 
In electricity, construction work and services such as metering have been outsourced. 
In the case of a new competitor on the Belgian retail market, virtually all activities 
are outsourced except for management and a core administrative unit. In postal 
services, former monopoly providers have outsourced transport between sorting and 
distribution centres to private haulage companies and, in several cases, at least parts 
of their post office network. The most extreme case is Sweden, where the incumbent 
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has outsourced most of its retailing tasks to supermarkets, petrol stations and 
convenience stores, while it continues to operate a small number of ‘post stores’ 
mainly for banking transactions. According to a report by the German postal 
regulator, Deutsche Post used more than 1,800 subcontractors in 2005, including taxi 
drivers commissioned to empty letter boxes. For the incumbent postal-service 
monopolist in Austria, outsourcing was not so much introduced to save costs – the 
impact on costs is in fact debatable – but to increase pressure on the core workforce. 
In hospitals, too, a large variety of activities and functions have been outsourced to 
external providers reaching from cleaning and catering services to building 
maintenance and IT. The picture is similar for local public transport, with 
outsourcing mainly concerning services such as cleaning, security, catering, ticket 
inspection and the operation of vending machines. Public-service providers thus 
adopt widespread restructuring practices as many services have been outsourced in 
the private sector and in public administration. 
While outsourcing is still an important trend in public-service companies, some 
service providers have also started to insource activities. Examples include the 
electricity case-study companies in the UK and Austria and the Belgian hospital. 
While the British electricity provider brought services back in because contractors 
frequently did not live up to the standards expected by the company and 
management feared that the loss of skills for tasks performed by contractors would 
have negative long-term consequences, in Austria management reduced the number 
of external contractors because it needed to keep its non-sackable workforce busy. 
The Belgian hospital included in the case-study sample insourced services such as 
cleaning and catering. Reasons included economies of scale, which could be 
exploited after the merger and the cooperation with a public (re)employment 
programme that provided subsidised workers for these services. 
Of course, outsourcing and the creation of independent subsidiaries can be seen as a 
form of decentralisation, but decentralisation as a deliberate strategy to reduce 
costs was pursued only in a few cases, including a German hospital where it was 
linked to extensive benchmarking by management. More often, public-service 
companies have responded to liberalisation by centralisation and concentration. As 
mentioned above, several electricity companies have closed down walk-in service 
centres and instead concentrated customer relations services in centrally operated 
call centres. In order to increase efficiency, postal companies have dramatically cut 
the number of sorting and distribution centres. In Germany, of the 700 sorting 
centres that existed before liberalisation only 59 are left; in Austria the number was 
reduced from 36 to six, while the number of distribution bases was cut from 1,880 to 
320. In both countries, furthermore, the number of post outlets has been reduced by 
about 40 per cent since the start of the liberalisation process. In the hospital sector, 
concentrations mainly take the form of hospitals being merged or integrated into a 
large hospital group or departments spread out over a number of buildings being 
centralised in one large facility. 
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Concentration processes were partly linked to a reduction of hierarchical structures. 
Several companies have introduced ‘flatter’ hierarchies, with the result that 
individual managers assume more and direct responsibility. The new competitors in 
particular tend to have less penetrating hierarchical structures combined with new 
and less bureaucratic working cultures. However, while hierarchical structures have 
become ‘flatter’ and permeable, at the same time public-service companies have 
stepped up control efforts through the introduction of new IT-based control and 
reporting systems. The introduction of new technology played a major role in the 
restructuring of public-service providers. This is not only true for electricity, where it 
changed billing and administration and the way companies interact with their 
customers, and post services, where IT is used to reorganise delivery routes and to 
track parcels and registered mail. The introduction of IT has also changed the 
organisation of hospitals: the introduction of digital patient files in the German case-
study hospital, for example, has changed administrative work and led to a 
reorganisation of the administrative system. 
4.2. Employment, industrial relations and HRM 
4.2.1. Employment 
The objective of reducing costs has often had a major impact on employment. 
Instead of improving efficiency by expanding the amount of output with a constant 
labour force, public-service providers in liberalised markets cut back on their staff 
numbers (Jefferys et al. 2008). Changes in employment levels vary according to 
sector and country. In electricity and in postal services, considerable job losses 
occurred at the incumbent monopolists, often combined with changes in employment 
status and forms of contract, while newly established competitors by definition 
gained employment. Of course, the overall net employment effects can only be 
assessed at macro level, but the case studies confirm that in electricity and postal 
services outsourcing to other sectors and the creation of new jobs by new 
competitors can hardly account for the job losses recorded by the former monopoly 
suppliers – especially if calculated on a full-time basis. 
In the electricity sector,the case studies reported employment reductions of 
between 25 and 50 per cent since privatisation or since the mid-1990s. In spite of the 
enormous scale of job losses, compulsory layoffs were avoided. ‘Downsizing’ was 
achieved through non-replacement of retirees, voluntary redundancy packages and 
early retirement. In electricity, employment was reduced in generation, 
maintenance and administration whereas employment expanded in trading, retailing, 
controlling and IT. This resulted in a shift from blue-collar to white-collar 
employment. Qualitative employment changes also include a move from civil-servant 
to private-sector employee status in the British case and the frequent use of 
temporary workers in the Belgian case. Job cuts led to frequent overtime for the 
remaining workforce in the electricity industry in the British and in the Belgian cases. 
While in the UK this can also be attributed to the parallel reduction of working hours 
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from 39 to 37 hours per week, in Belgium overtime grew in spite of an extension of 
the working week from 36 to 38 hours. In part, more flexible working-hours 
arrangements were introduced to extend operating times in customer services. 
The postal-service sector, too, saw a substantial reduction in employment levels at 
the incumbent monopolists before and after liberalisation and privatisation. In 
Austria, Belgium, Germany and Sweden, between 15 and 37 per cent of the jobs at 
the former monopolists have disappeared. Poland forms an exception here because 
competition in the Polish letter market is still insignificant, with full liberalisation 
postponed until 2013. Again, not only were employment levels reduced, but also the 
contractual forms changed, with a marked increase of part-time and fixed-term jobs 
and other forms of atypical employment. The shift in employment to newly 
established competitors accelerated this development. While postal companies in 
most countries have increased the number of part-time workers, other forms of 
atypical employment, such as marginal or self-employment, are country-specific. 
However, if not prevented by labour regulations, the new competitors tend to rely 
particularly heavily on non-standard forms of employment. Hence while in Germany 
the new competitors employ about 60 per cent of their workforce on marginal part-
time contracts or ‘mini jobs’, only four per cent of the incumbent monopolist’s 
employees have such a contract. In Austria, on the other hand, more than 90 per 
cent of the workforce of the new competitors in the letter market are self-employed 
and paid piece rates, and as such lack any form of labour or social protection. 
The case studies on hospitals show a varied picture: employment partly increased 
and partly decreased in these organisations. In contrast to case studies on former 
monopolists in the electricity or postal-service sector, which in many cases still 
account for the major part of the respective markets, case-study findings on changes 
in employment levels of individual hospitals do not permit generalisations. The 
picture is also varied with regard to qualitative employment changes: job gains in the 
Austrian case are mainly due to the growth of part-time employment and thus the 
increase in employment in terms of full-time equivalents was marginal. In contrast, 
in the Swedish and in the Belgian cases the number of part-timers has actually 
decreased in recent years. The German case study shows that the most far-reaching 
changes in employment do not necessarily happen after privatisation: while 
‘downsizing’ continued under the new ownership, the biggest cuts in employment 
occurred prior to privatisation. 
In the local public transport cases, the picture is similar. There have been job cuts in 
some of the cases and employment growth in others. Companies increased 
employment numbers where overall traffic grew, such as in the Swedish case, and 
where companies successfully tendered for bus-service contracts, such as in the 
Polish case. While part-time work only plays a marginal role in local public transport, 
companies resort to split work days and flexible working-hour arrangements to 
increase flexibility and cut costs. In addition, the introduction of competitive 
tendering has fuelled an increase in fixed-term employment contracts adjusted to 
the length of the contract between the employer and the tendering authority. This 
  27
can, for example, be found in the Polish case. However, decreasing employment 
security is partly mitigated by a lack of drivers. 
4.2.2. Industrial relations 
With few exceptions, the restructuring of public services following liberalisation and 
privatisation has led to a fragmentation of labour relations and employment 
conditions. This means that bargaining systems are divided and coverage becomes 
less comprehensive, the number and variety of actor increases and the wage 
differentials grow. Differences emerge on a sectoral level between competing 
companies – often between the former monopoly providers and the new competitors 
– and within former monopoly providers between the core organisation, newly 
created subsidiaries and outsourced jobs, as well as between the longstanding 
workforce and newly hired workers. In some sectors and companies the changes 
amount to the creation of two-tier or multi-tier labour relations systems 
(Brandt/Schulten 2008). 
In the electricity industry growing fragmentation is linked to the restructuring of 
value chains. As a result of electricity-sector regulation, companies are being 
demerged and activities outsourced. Legally independent subsidiaries figure under 
different and from the workers’ point of view often less favourable collective 
agreements or under specific regulations within the same agreements. In Belgium, 
call centre agents employed by independent call centres are excluded from the 
comparably favourable electricity agreement, while newly hired staff mostly 
employed in the new retail subsidiaries earn between 22 and 34 per cent less than 
the established workforce in production and distribution. In the Austrian case the 
wage difference between ‘old’ and ‘new’ staff is 13 per cent. In the British case, 
wages are the same, but workers hired after privatisation are not entitled to the 
comparably generous pre-privatisation company pension scheme. Poland stands out 
in this respect because the established workforce earns less than the newly hired 
workers. While ‘older’ staff will most likely not find a new job if they leave the 
company, ‘younger’ workers are profiting from an increasingly tight Polish labour 
market. 
In postal services, the German case also reveals differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
employees. Workers hired according to the new postal-service collective agreement 
earn up to 30 per cent less than those still covered by the old regulation. However, 
in the post sector differences between former monopoly providers and new 
competitors are more important, because the corporate strategy of the new 
competitors is often based on lower labour costs. This is particularly apparent in 
Austria and Germany, where the incumbents and new competitors are covered by 
different agreements or, in the German case, by none at all. Before the introduction 
of a sector-wide minimum wage, wages paid by the new competitors in Germany 
were only about half of those paid by the former post monopolist. In Austria new 
competitors largely operate with self-employed workers, who also earn half the pay 
of the incumbent’s permanently employed staff. While in Germany and Austria 
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liberalisation in the postal-service sector has fuelled wage dumping and part of the 
service has become a low-wage sector, no such development was observed in 
Sweden, Belgium or Poland. In Sweden, the former monopoly provider and the new 
competitor are covered by different agreements but they provide similar standards. 
In the health sector, too, bargaining and wage determination have been fragmented 
in some of the countries. This applies to Austria, where the wages in private for-
profit and non-profit hospitals are about 20 per cent below those paid by public 
hospitals, and to the German case, where workers in auxiliary services such as 
cleaning, kitchen and laundry are not covered by a collective agreement and medical 
staff had to fight to maintain their wage levels after the company withdrew from the 
federal employers’ association. Similarly, in the Swedish case the unions only 
obtained a collective agreement that provides the same standards as in other still 
publicly owned hospitals after a period of difficult and intensive negotiations. In 
contrast, in the Belgian case study some workers actually profited from the merger 
of two hospitals as their wages were upgraded to the higher levels in place at the 
other hospital. However, in the cases covered in the research, only the UK has a 
single pay system negotiated at national level and applying to all directly employed 
NHS hospital staff. Only newly appointed staff at outsourced companies have 
different terms and conditions. 
In local public transport, privatisation and the introduction of competitive tendering 
have clearly challenged the existing industrial-relations systems. In the German case, 
the industry-level collective agreement still covers nearly all municipal transport 
companies of the federal state where the case study took place. However, subsidiary 
companies and private companies are not covered. This implies high wage 
differentials for bus drivers, depending on the status of their employer. As in the 
electricity sector, former monopolists use the establishment of independent 
subsidiaries to lower their wage costs. In contrast, Poland lacks industry-level 
collective bargaining. However, in the case under investigation the union is 
optimistic on reaching a new company agreement. Yet the tendering system puts 
pressure for wage moderation on the union and it has resulted in a change from 
open-ended employment to fixed-term contracts in line with the duration of the 
contract. As elsewhere, London bus drivers, who had worked under the same terms 
and conditions before privatisation, now face highly varying wages and employment 
conditions depending on the company they work for, because bargaining takes place 
solely at company level. Both in the British and the Swedish cases the cost-cutting 
effect of the tendering systems became very clear and unions have repeatedly called 
strikes for higher wages and against the cancelling of work breaks. 
The fragmentation of bargaining systems is in many cases underpinned by pronounced 
differences in unionisation rates. As a rule, union density among the former 
monopoly providers’ workforces is much higher than among the new competitors. In 
Germany about 80 per cent of the incumbent postal-service company’s staff are 
unionised while hardly more than ten per cent of the competitors’ mainly 
precariously employed workers are union members. In several cases, union density is 
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also markedly lower at the newly established subsidiaries and among the 
subcontractors providing outsourced services. Furthermore, privatisation and the 
continuous reduction of staff numbers present major challenges to the public-sector 
unions. In the UK, privatisation in more than one case was perceived as an explicit 
strategy to weaken the unions. But in other countries unions are also competing to 
win members among shrinking workforces. Consequently, liberalisation and 
privatisation have in some cases led to a decrease in strikes and other forms of 
industrial action, while in others the frequency of conflicts has actually increased. 
Overall, the case studies illustrate the growing diversity of employment conditions, 
which partly leads to a marked inequality between workers doing the same or similar 
jobs. The diversity in part goes back to strategies of reducing wages and worsening 
conditions for newly engaged workers – sometimes for an extended probation period 
but usually on a permanent basis, partly it is the result of fragmented industrial 
relations systems. As the case-study findings indicate, both are the result of 
liberalisation and privatisation processes and the reactions of the companies to the 
new business environment. The fragmentation of bargaining occurs where the 
splitting up of companies, outsourcing and other forms of restructuring value chains 
is accompanied by, or happens in the context of a decentralisation of industrial 
relations and by a substitution of company for industry-level agreements. Among the 
rare examples of workers’ resistance against increasing wage differentials is a 
campaign that led to the introduction of a compulsory minimum wage in the postal 
sector in Germany. Another example is a campaign that attempts to establish the 
similar pay and employment conditions across all London bus companies. Given the 
tendering system, the diversity there is not only a matter of inequality but also of 
job security. 
4.2.3. Human-resource management 
The restructuring of companies and their changing business strategies went hand in 
hand with a reform of human-resource management (HRM). Before liberalisation and 
privatisation, HRM in some cases meant little more than the administration of civil-
servant employment regulations. Some companies hence only introduced special HRM 
departments and policies during the process of liberalisation and privatisation. As 
such, HRM policies relate to personnel development and training, management 
control and staff motivation. As a result, training was partly enforced, though not 
equally for whole workforces, partly it was cut as a direct consequence of 
privatisation and the restructuring of work. At the same time, payment systems have 
become more performance-related. Promotion is also increasingly based on 
performance assessments rather than seniority. In at least one case, management 
has attempted to improve control by introducing a system of management by 
objectives, which, in the final phase, will include individual objectives for each staff 
member. As a result, changes in the HRM systems serve to further reinforce the 
growing differences in employment conditions. 
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Some of the hospitals under investigation also put additional emphasis on HRM. The 
Austrian and the Belgian case studies reported the implementation of human-
resource development guidelines and an improvement of training and job-mobility 
opportunities. In the Austrian case, such activities are limited to the highly-qualified 
core staff. In the UK case, by contrast, training is also available to outsourced staff, 
although to a lesser extent and, according to some interview partners, at a lower 
quality. The German privatised hospital focuses training activities on diagnosis-
related documentary work because the classification of diagnoses is seen as an 
important area in which the profit of the company can be increased. 
Unequal access to training was also found in the electricity industry. The Polish case 
study reports that mainly managers and younger employees have access to training 
while older workers are excluded. In the UK case, privatisation has had an overall 
negative effect on training provision, because training was among the first areas in 
which the new private owners cut costs. In the British case study this has led to a 
severe skill shortage, because the skilled staff members are now approaching 
retirement age and there is no appropriate replacement for them. In response the 
company has recently started to put more effort into training young workers, but the 
number of apprentices still falls considerably short of the pre-privatisation figures. 
The Swedish case study in local public transport revealed a link between the 
tendering system and the reduction of bus drivers’ training. In the Polish case, by 
contrast, the employer stepped up training in an effort to tackle a mounting shortage 
of bus drivers, many of whom had left to work in the UK or other western European 
countries after Poland’s accession to the EU. The company, together with the local 
employment agency, organised special driving lessons to encourage women to 
become bus drivers as well. In addition, it hired a group of bus drivers from the 
Ukraine. 
As in the electricity sector, in postal services a substantial part of human-resource 
management activities is aimed at cutting employment by means of non-replacement 
of retired workers, voluntary retirement and redundancy payments. In several cases, 
the terms and conditions of such schemes are negotiated between management and 
the unions within the framework of wider employment pacts. In the Austrian case, 
employees who decline to leave the company but whose work is no longer needed 
are transferred to an internal employment organisation called a ‘career and 
development centre’. In the eyes of the trade union representatives interviewed, 
workers who end up in this organisation are deprived of any prospects and instead 
are forced to do nothing while waiting for retirement. 
With declining career prospects, in particular for postmen and –women, and a growth 
in part-time work, the internal labour market is losing importance, which also 
impacts on the forms of management control, with piece rates and close surveillance 
gaining ground (see below). What is more, the vanishing of the public-sector ethos 
also requires companies to increase control. A perhaps extreme example is a German 
case in which the company established a special security department to investigate 
the theft of postal items. In contrast to improved training in other industries, 
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deskilling and downgrading of delivery jobs seems to prevail in postal services. Pre-
sorting and the use of GPS (global positioning system) devices are turning the 
occupation of skilled postmen or -women into temporary jobs for easily replaceable 
young workers, with labour turnover in the case of the Swedish competitor reaching 
as much as 50 per cent of the staff per year. 
4.3. Work organisation and working conditions 
The reduction in employment as a consequence of liberalisation and privatisation 
makes itself felt in the ways work is carried out. In many cases, lower staff levels 
result in work intensification. In addition, work intensity has been stepped up 
through the introduction of new control mechanisms and the extensive use of 
benchmarking that is the comparison with comparable units or services within the 
same companies or with competitors. Managers in several case studies pointed to the 
underperformance and lax working conditions before liberalisation and privatisation 
and the need to improve individual output. Workers and works-council 
representatives, on the other hand, argued that intensification and flexibilisation 
have seriously undermined the quality of public-service jobs. Innovations in work 
organisation rarely released workers from increased workloads and instead often 
growing work pressure. 
In postal services, case studies in all countries reveal increasing levels of work 
intensity and deteriorating working conditions. As the Austrian case, for instance, 
shows, the measures taken by the management of the former monopoly company 
include assigning time values to individual tasks in a Taylorist tradition combined 
with Japanese-style teamwork, with delivery teams becoming responsible for 
covering the routes of absent colleagues. The regulatory barriers to this had been 
eliminated in recent years, however, leading to work intensity approaching the 
workers’ physical limits and to shifts exceeding eight hours. In the Polish case too, 
delivery workers in many districts have problems to finish the job within their eight-
hour day. There, the incidence of sick leave is on the increase. In spite of 
deteriorating working conditions at the incumbent monopolies, case-study evidence 
from Austria, Germany and Sweden suggests that working conditions are even worse 
at the new competitors. This relates to the pace of work, unpaid overtime, night 
work and flexible working hours. 
Restructuring in postal services relies heavily on new technology: highly automated 
sorting centres, technology to optimise delivery routes, portable communication 
devices, new software for universal post office counters and new monitoring and 
reporting systems – all these innovations have not only helped to reduce employment 
levels but also markedly changed the working environment. The Belgian case study 
illustrates how work is being simplified and becoming mentally less demanding while 
physical burdens increase: the sorting centres have taken over all sorting tasks, with 
mobile IT devices prescribing the delivery route. 
 32
Increased workloads due to understaffing are also reported from the electricity 
industry. Respondents in the Austrian, UK and the Polish case studies in particular 
stressed the increasing intensity of work. Apart from staff reductions, the pressures 
come from the reorganisation of electricity companies. Workers at the Austrian 
company, for example, complained that unbundling led to an increase in 
bureaucratic work. The splitting-up of companies results in additional paperwork: 
maintenance work or other activities need to be charged as these are now carried 
out for a separate company. 
Changes in work organisation may go in different directions, however, as examples 
from the electricity industry show: while previously specialists were sent in to carry 
out different jobs, now maintenance workers in the Austrian case have become 
generalists and carry out 95 per cent of the tasks. In the UK, by contrast, 
management increased the degree of specialisation, leaving workers with little 
understanding of areas outside their immediate tasks. The most far-reaching change 
in work organisation took place in newly created departments in customer relations. 
Call-centre agents typically use standardised scripts to communicate with customers 
and they work under considerable time pressure, which is exacerbated by the 
widespread use of electronic control systems. However, workers at external call 
centres are said to be worse off in terms of workload and labour conditions. 
Work intensification is also a general feature of the changes in work organisation 
introduced in virtually all of the hospitals included in the survey. In some cases the 
main reason is the patients’ declining length of stay, due to which the more 
demanding admission and discharge procedures make themselves felt more strongly. 
In others, altered processes and workflows have led to a faster pace of work. In the 
German privatisation case, the nurse-to-patient ratio went down and administrative 
tasks were transferred from administrative staff to the nurses, further increasing 
their already high workload. In the Belgian case, too, staff report an increase in non-
patient-care-related tasks, which had led to growing job dissatisfaction. In the UK 
case, the hospital’s reliance on a private finance initiative to raise funds to 
modernise the hospital has required cost cuts at all levels within the hospital, which, 
in turn, has meant increasing workloads for large parts of the hospital staff. 
Cost cutting is also a prominent issue in local public transport. In the Swedish and UK 
cases, a clear link was revealed between the tendering system and work pressures. In 
Sweden, companies offer their services at the lowest possible cost, hoping to be able 
to exploit economies of scale in the long term. Companies tend to eliminate all slack 
in order to win a contract. In practice, this means that not the slightest problem 
must occur if they are to fulfil their obligations. For the drivers, who have always 
worked in a stressful environment, the result is even more stress at work and more 
sick-leave. In the UK case, too, companies pass the pressure to increase productivity 
on to their drivers and tend to contact people earlier than previously if they are off 
sick. 
Apart from enhancing work intensity, restructuring mainly impacts on working hours: 
across the different sectors and countries, the case studies showed increasingly 
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flexible working hours and a rise in overtime. Flexible working hours are among the 
main measures to cut costs. In local public transport working-time flexibility and 
split work days are used to adapt the drivers’ working hours to capacity needs. The 
breaks are paid in part, but at a different rate. In Poland, for example, interrupted 
working hours fall under a national regulation according to which workers have to be 
paid 50 per cent of the minimum hourly pay rate for the breaks between driving 
hours. Yet bonuses are not paid for such standby periods. The German case study on 
local public transport illustrates how bad working conditions in terms of flexible 
working hours with long breaks are passed on within outsourcing relationships: the 
workforce of outsourced companies has to serve the ‘bad lines’ with irregular, 
flexible working hours and long breaks between driving times. 
In postal services, company strategies have led to new working-time arrangements. 
In particular, part-time work is used as a means to increase flexibility. Thus, in the 
German case-study company the daily delivery time was brought forward by making 
the delivery districts smaller. This, in turn, leads to an increased demand for part-
time workers and, possibly, to a phasing out of full-time employment in delivery. 
Flexible working hours are also an important issue in the electricity industry. In 
particular, extending the operating hours of customer services into the evenings and 
weekends boosted the demand for flexible working hours. More flexibility is also 
achieved through increased overtime, which was reported in several case studies. 
The Polish case reported that emergency field staff, in particular, are expected to 
work as long as it takes to restore power. Of course, the number of repair workers 
has been reduced as a result of liberalisation and privatisation. 
Overall, the case-study evidence makes it possible to trace changes in work 
organisation and working conditions back to restructuring processes triggered by the 
liberalisation and privatisation of public services. One of the companies’ main aims is 
to cut costs. This is achieved by investing in new technology, by growing workloads 
brought about by job cuts and changes in work organisation and by reducing labour 
costs by means of more flexible working-hour schemes. Additional impacts on work 
organisation include the increase of ‘bureaucratic’ work entailed by unbundling in 
the electricity sector, the introduction of tendering systems in local public transport 
and the standardisation of work in postal services and in electricity call centres. 
4.4. Productivity and service quality 
Most case studies report an increase in productivity. The result of continuous and 
substantial reductions in the number of employees is that fewer staff create roughly 
the same output previously produced by a significantly larger workforce (although 
the measurement of output is not without problems in public services). In hospitals 
and partly also in local public transport the objective can also be to fulfil an ever-
greater demand with the same number of workers. However, liberalisation and 
privatisation-related productivity gains recorded at the company level do not 
necessarily result in productivity growth for the entire sector, let alone for the whole 
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economy. The duplication of activities such as the creation of alternative delivery 
networks in postal services or of retail structures in electricity may slow down 
productivity growth, although the effect is difficult to measure. 
Productivity increases have rarely been an objective in themselves in the 
restructuring processes following liberalisation and privatisation. Instead, 
productivity gains are the by-product of a general attempt to cut production costs. 
This has two consequences: Firstly, public-service providers in liberalised markets 
often combine a rise in productivity with lower labour costs by paying lower wages or 
using atypical forms of employment (often in combination with outsourcing and the 
creation of independent subsidiaries). In labour-intensive services such as the postal 
sector, wage cuts may ultimately be more important to ensure survival in the 
liberalised markets than investment in greater efficiency, which was of course also 
made (if wage cuts are not prevented by comprehensive and sector-wide collective 
regulations). 
Secondly, many cases showed improvements in quality through speeding up 
processes, using new technology or enhancing responsiveness in customer care. 
However, measures to enhance quality seem to be confined to areas where they do 
not conflict with the aim of cutting costs and employment, while quality aspects that 
require additional labour resources have often been compromised as a result of 
liberalisation and privatisation. Hence electricity providers may extend the operating 
hours of their centrally operated call centres while at the same time they close down 
their traditional walk-in centres, where customers could talk to agents face-to-face. 
They have also reduced the number of repair workers, which increases the waiting 
period for power to be reinstalled after major breakdowns following storms or other 
disasters. In postal services, the incumbent monopolists have put substantial effort 
into speeding up delivery processes and delivering much of the mail only one day 
after posting. At the same time, however, they have significantly reduced the 
number of post offices and the number of agents working in the post offices, making 
it more difficult and time-consuming for private customers to use the service 
(postmen, also, no longer have time to talk to residents). 
Because they are highly labour-intensive services, the tension between increasing 
productivity and improving service quality is particularly apparent in hospitals and 
local public transport. True, there has been investment in new buildings, equipment 
and, in the case of transport, in new vehicles, but the intensification of work has also 
had negative effects on the quality of service. In several of the hospital cases, 
respondents voiced concerns that shorter patients’ staying times and increased 
numbers of operations not only increase the risks of malpractice but also leave less 
time to spend with individual patients (the German case reports a marked decrease 
in the nurse-to-patient ratio). In local public transport, productivity gains have 
mainly been achieved by the introduction of flexible working hours. In general, this 
means greater workloads for drivers. The passengers may not notice a difference, but 
increasing drivers’ workloads can have a negative impact on safety. 
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In some cases the negative impact on quality may only become apparent in the long 
term. In two of the electricity case studies, workers and worker representatives 
maintained that in the long term lower investment (as a result of profit interests or 
regulatory requirements) in network infrastructures will lead to a deterioration of 
the network quality and therefore of the security of supply. In one case study, this 
view was shared by management. 
4.5. The role of regulation 
Regulation in more than one case had a significant impact on company reactions to 
liberalisation and privatisation and the outcome in terms of employment and quality. 
Therefore there are also country-specific differences although providers in liberalised 
and privatised public-service markets tend to adopt similar strategies. As mentioned 
above, the mandatory splitting-up of the electricity supply chain gave electricity 
companies the opportunity to establish independent subsidiaries and to thereby 
circumvent existing electricity sector agreements. Additional regulation could have 
prevented the misuse of such requirements for undercutting wages. In postal services 
it is primarily new competitors that pursue a low-cost strategy based on the payment 
of low wages. The Swedish case shows that in countries where employment 
regulations prevent such a strategy, competitors are forced to adopt alternative 
schemes that are compatible with minimum standard of employments and working 
conditions. The recent introduction of a minimum wage for the entire postal-service 
sector in Germany also underlines the importance of regulation. Apart from 
comparable employment and working conditions, detailed quality regulations and 
standards can also strongly impact on company strategies and practices as the 
example of the Belgian hospital case study shows. The hospital case studies more 
generally indicate that sufficient funding and the quality and extent of regulation is 
more important than the question of whether a hospital is publicly or privately 
owned. 
4.6. Conclusions 
The case studies on the impact of the liberalisation and privatisation of public 
services provided detailed insights into company strategies, organisational change, 
employment consequences, industrial relations, working conditions and service-
quality aspects. The findings show that companies have taken different approaches in 
tackling the liberalisation and privatisation of public services and the threat of 
competition. Reactions included mergers and acquisitions, investment outside their 
home markets and the diversification of supply; the diversification of customer 
relations, including new pricing policies that favour some groups of customers over 
others; a reduction of production costs through concentration, outsourcing and the 
introduction of new technology; a reduction of employment and the payment of 
lower wages (through lower wages for new employees, the creation of independent 
subsidiaries and outsourcing) as well as an intensification of work; training has been 
stepped up for some groups of workers while it has been cut for others. 
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Overall, the case studies show that in many cases the main company objective, i.e. 
the reduction of production costs, has been reached at the cost of workers, many of 
whom have experienced liberalisation and privatisation primarily as a worsening of 
employment and working conditions. This has been achieved by a far-reaching 
fragmentation of labour standards. In some sectors and countries, such as postal 
services in Austria and Germany, liberalisation and privatisation even threaten to 
transform a public service into a low-wage sector. While most case-study companies 
have increased productivity, usually as a result of staff cuts, the consequences for 
the quality of services are mixed: there has been some improvement in areas where 
it was possible to combine quality gains with investment in new and often labour-
saving technology (e.g. the next-day delivery of post items). However, quality 
aspects that depend on substantial labour input, such as patient care or bus driving, 
have suffered as a result of liberalisation and privatisation. 
In sum, the main objective of companies in liberalised and privatised markets is to 
make profits and they do so, among other things, by cutting costs. Not surprisingly, 
in their efforts to reduce costs, companies adopt practices, such as outsourcing, that 
have often been used – or are current management fashions – in the wider economy. 
Frequently this has been combined with improvements in productivity and, in some 
cases, in quality. Often, however, cost reductions have been based on worsening 
employment and working conditions, which more than once have had a negative 
effect on quality. Overall, the changes have clearly contributed to increases in 
societal inequality, both among European citizens, who are affected by customer 
differentiation and discriminatory price policies, and workers, who receive 
increasingly different wages for doing the same job. 
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5. THE IMPACT OF LIBERALISATION AND 
PRIVATISATION ON LABOUR RELATIONS 
Torsten Brandt and Thorsten Schulten 
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut in der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung 
(WSI), Düsseldorf 
This chapter is based on a comprehensive research report on “liberalisation and 
privatisation of public services and the impact on labour relations”, which includes a 
comparative study on the postal, hospital, local public transport and electricity 
sectors in six countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Poland, Sweden and the UK). 
5.1. Introduction 
The promotion of liberalisation (and more indirectly also privatisation) of public 
services has been one of the core political projects of the European Union since the 
1990s. It has been justified by the expectation that the creation of new markets 
would lead to greater efficiency and would promote both more economic growth and 
social wealth. Since 2000, the advanced liberalisation policy of growing parts of 
public services has also become a core element of the Lisbon strategy, which aims 
“to make the European Union the most competitive and dynamic economic area in 
the world – an economic area which is able to link sustainable economic growth with 
more and better jobs and a stronger social cohesion”. 
While liberalisation, above all, is about the introduction of competition in formerly 
protected markets, the question of what parameters companies should compete on 
has widely been neglected in liberalisation and privatisation discourses. Although 
there are many different forms of competition, companies can essentially follow two 
different strategies: they can either compete on quality and innovation, which 
includes elements such as innovative products, high service quality, efficient and 
productive organisation of work and production (including a well trained and 
motivated workforce) etc., or they can compete on labour costs, by lowering wages, 
extending working hours or using special forms of employment linked with lower 
labour costs (e.g. self-employed workers, subsidised employment). The first 
approach can be described an innovation and quality-driven competition model that 
follows a high-road strategy to corporate success. The second approach tends to 
ensure a downward spiral with deteriorating wage and employment conditions 
resulting in a low-road economic survival strategy. Of course, if allowed to do so, 
companies will always try to lower their wage costs, especially in labour-intensive 
sectors with a high proportion of labour costs. Regulations, including industry-wide 
collective agreements that prevent companies from adapting a low-road strategy, 
are therefore all the more important. 
The impact of liberalisation and privatisation on labour relations is thus of vital 
importance for the question of what strategy public-service providers follow in 
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liberalised markets. As the services under discussion are public services, which means 
that they are essential for the well-being of many citizens, competition should not 
only focus on lowering prices, but also on facilitating innovation, improving quality 
and expanding accessibility. In order to avoid competition that is primarily carried 
out at the expense of the employees, liberalised markets need a strong labour 
regulation that creates a common level playing field for all competitors and makes it 
possible to follow a high-road strategy. 
5.2. Main Findings 
Liberalisation and privatisation have far-reaching consequences for the established 
labour-relation regime (LRR), defined as coherent set of institutions (statutory 
regulations, collective bargaining and employee representation) regulating labour 
relations in a particular sector. With the creation of new markets and the 
transformation of former public entities into profit-oriented organisations, the 
companies affected are put under significant competitive pressure. Since many of 
the affected sectors, such as postal services, public transport or hospitals, are 
labour-intensive with labour costs making up two-thirds of total production costs, the 
reduction of labour costs is a core element in improving competitiveness. Labour 
costs can be reduced by rationalising production processes (substituting machines for 
workers) or by lowering wages, extending working hours or using cheaper forms of 
employment. In order to save labour costs, liberalised and privatised companies have 
tried to withdraw from the traditional more expensive LRR of the public sector and 
set up new forms of regulation. As a result we have seen the emergence of new LRRs 
which often have no or only weak links to the old LRR of the public sector. This 
includes far-reaching changes in collective bargaining, wage levels, and employment 
conditions. 
5.2.1. The traditional labour-relations regime of the public sector 
There are at least five main characteristics of the traditional LRR of the public 
sector: A first major characteristic has been the relatively strong position of trade 
unions in the public sector, with a trade union density considerably above the 
average rate of organisation. Trade unions traditionally have had a strong influence 
both at political as well as at workplace level, which ensured that the public 
employers would sit down at the negotiation table even if many public-sector unions 
did not have formal bargaining rights. In some countries, public-sector unions also 
enjoyed additional co-determination rights that went beyond those granted in 
private-sector enterprises. Due to the extraordinary strength of their unions, public-
sector workers were able to gain various additional benefits. 
A second characteristic of the traditional public-sector LRR has been the relatively 
centralised collective bargaining structure. Hence, while in several European 
countries wages and working conditions were formally imposed by statutory 
regulations rather than collective agreements (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Poland and in 
Germany civil servants), through informal but comprehensive and highly centralised 
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bargaining processes the unions nevertheless had a strong impact on the norms and 
standards that govern employment in the public sector. In several countries 
centralised collective bargaining has covered the entire public-service sector, 
including a wide range of sub-sectors. 
Individual wage agreements, in contrast, have been virtually absent in the public 
sector. Wages were exclusively negotiated on a collective level and laid down in 
detailed wage schemes. The assignment to particular wage groups was based on 
objective criteria such as certified qualifications and seniority rather than on 
individual experience and the demand for specific skills. Performance-criteria or 
performance-based supplements, widely applied in private-sector companies, played 
no or only a marginal role in public-sector wage relations. Instead, wage differentials 
were based on seniority and on specific supplements attached to certain workplaces 
or tasks rather than on individual performances. Due to the absence of individual 
wage agreements and performance-based supplements, income inequality was much 
less pronounced in the public sector than in private companies. 
The relatively low degree of wage dispersion has been a third major characteristic of 
the public sector LRR. While more qualified employees have usually earned less than 
their colleagues in private industry the opposite has often been the case for less 
qualified employees. The public sector therefore became a reservoir for decent jobs 
for low- and medium-qualified workers. The absence of performance criteria also had 
an important effect on working conditions. Working conditions were seen as an 
essential part of a complex set of formal und informal rules that governed the 
provision of public services. These rules, among others things, were meant to ensure 
that economic pressure would not compromise the quality and security of services 
and that each client would get exactly the same treatment. They also gave the 
public sector LRR an explicitly political character. Public-sector workers were 
subsequently less motivated by expected wage increases than by what is known as 
the public-sector ethos. On the other hand, the absence of individual incentives also 
meant that sometimes public sector workers had a lack of motivation. 
A fourth main feature of the traditional public sector LRR has been the long-term 
nature of the employment relationship and the subsequent extraordinary degree of 
employment stability. Many public-sector workers had civil- servant status or the 
equivalent, in the sense that they could be dismissed only in very exceptional 
circumstances. In some cases, job protection went as far as requiring management to 
obtain the consent of the respective employee and/or works-council representative 
to re-assign workers to new posts within the same organisation or company. The high 
level of job security persuaded workers to take up public-sector jobs even if public-
sector wages could hardly keep-up with those in the private sector. 
Fifth and finally, the public sector was also seen as an important instrument of 
employment policy. Until the 1980s, many European governments used the extension 
of public services to compensate for cyclical job losses in the private-sector 
economy. Later on, the public sector in several countries became a forerunner in 
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offering relatively well-paid part-time jobs and so became an attractive employer, in 
particular for women. 
To sum up, the strength of public-sector unions and the comprehensive and 
centralised bargaining structures led to a relative stability and predictability of 
working hours, a high degree of wage equality and employment security, shorter 
working hours and lower retirement ages. 
5.2.2. The emergence of a new labour-relations regime in the liberalised and 
privatised sectors 
Liberalisation and privatisation of public services have fundamentally challenged the 
traditional LRR in the public sector. In liberalised markets, former public companies 
and monopoly suppliers have been forced to transform their entire organisation into 
a private for-profit business and have to compete with new private companies. The 
affected sectors and companies have been put under increasing competitive pressure 
to reduce labour costs, and they consequently try to transfer this market pressure to 
the workforce. As a result, new LRRs have emerged in liberalised and privatised 
sectors with no or only very weak links to the traditional public-sector LRR. 
Although there are some significant national differences and variations, the main 
characteristics of these new LRRs can be described as follows (Table 5.1): Regarding 
collective bargaining, liberalisation has usually led to a two-tier system with 
relatively stable bargaining structures at the level of the incumbent and a rather 
decentralised and fragmented bargaining structure with a low bargaining coverage at 
the level of the new competitors. One of the first things former public-sector 
companies often do after privatisation is to withdraw from the central public-sector 
collective agreement in order to establish their own bargaining structures (mostly in 
the form of new agreements at company level). Furthermore, after liberalisation new 
competitors emerged, which in several sectors and countries are covered by no or 
different collective agreements and which profit from lower employment standards 
(lower wages and longer or more flexible working hours). 
This two-tier system corresponds with a union density that is relatively high within 
the former public monopolists but often rather low within the new competing 
companies, so unions often simply do not have the organisational power to push for 
new collective agreements. Following this, the newly liberalised markets often lack 
any sector-wide regulation or coordination of labour issues that might limit or even 
prevent competition on wage costs. 
However, liberalisation and privatisation has not only enforced a decentralisation and 
fragmentation of collective bargaining at sectoral level but has also led to a growing 
fragmentation of labour regulation within companies. Whereas under the public 
sector LRR the employees were treated as a relatively homogeneous workforce, 
within privatised companies there is a growing division between “old” and “new” 
employees and between the core and peripheral workforce. Long-standing employees 
are still covered by civil-servant statutes while more recently hired workers are 
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employed as private-sector workers based on the private-sector employment 
statutes. As such they not only enjoy lower employment security but in many cases 
also receive lower salaries for the same job than they would have under the civil-
servant regulations. Additional segmentations follow from the increase in 
contracting-out practices, which typically increase in liberalised and privatised 
companies and which often go along with new or even no collective agreements for 
the workers affected. The result is a two-tier workforce with significant differences 
regarding pay and working conditions. The same holds true for the level of job 
security, which remains relatively high for the shrinking core workforce of the 
incumbent, but is rather low for peripheral workers. 
Table 5.1:  Labour relations before and after liberalisation 
LRR after liberalisation 
 
Public sector 
LRR (before 
liberalisation) 
Incumbent (former 
monopolists) New competitors 
Collective bargaining Centralised wage setting Bargaining at company level 
Decentralised, 
fragmented or no 
agreements 
Bargaining coverage High High Low 
Union density High High Low 
Work status 
Civil servants 
and public 
employees 
Decrease in civil servants and 
increase in private sector 
employees 
Private-sector 
employees, self- 
employed 
Workforce 
Relatively 
homogeneous 
workforce 
Two-tier workforce  
(strong division between core and peripheral workers) 
Job security High 
Relatively high for the shrinking 
core workforce, increasing 
number of employees with 
temporary contracts 
Low 
Competition on 
wages and working 
conditions 
Low High 
Source: Torsten Brandt and Thorsten Schulten, Liberalisation and privatisation of public services and the 
impact on labour relations, December 2007. PIQUE Research Report. Available to download from 
www.pique.at. 
5.2.3. Sector- and country-specific developments 
The extent to which liberalisation and privatisation lead to competition on wages and 
labour costs with potentially negative effects on working and employment conditions 
depends basically on two factors. First, it depends on the degree of real market 
competition in the respective sectors. As has been shown in other papers in the 
PIQUE Project, liberalisation and privatisation have not always automatically led to 
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more competition, and in some sectors and countries competition is de facto still 
rather limited.5 However, companies in the affected sectors often already use the 
potential of higher competition to put pressure on wages and working conditions. The 
second factor, which strongly influences the degree of competition on labour costs, 
is nature of the national LRRs and their abilities to create a sector-wide regulation on 
working conditions in order to create a common level playing field. 
Table 5.2 gives an overview about competition on labour costs in liberalised and 
privatised sectors and existing differences between incumbents/public companies 
and new competitors. It is noticeable that in countries with more centralised and 
comprehensive collective bargaining systems, such as Belgium or Sweden, the degree 
of competition on labour costs is still rather low, since a strong sector-wide 
regulation and/or coordination is able to ensure that wages and working standards 
are quite similar. In contrast, in countries with more decentralised collective 
bargaining systems, such as Poland or the UK, moderate or even strong competition 
on labour costs has emerged in many sectors. Finally, in Germany and to a lesser 
degree also in Austria, liberalisation and privatisation have contributed to a 
significant decentralisation and fragmentation of collective bargaining, leading to a 
moderate or even strong competition on labour costs. The most extreme case is the 
German letter market, where wage differences between the incumbent and the new 
competitors are up to 60%. 
Table 5.2:  Competition on labour costs in liberalised and privatised sectors 
Sector 
Country Post services 
(letter market) Electricity 
Local Public 
Transport Hospital 
Austria Strong Low Moderate Moderate 
Belgium Low Low Low Low 
Germany Strong Moderate Strong Moderate 
Poland Moderate Low Strong Low 
Sweden Low Low Moderate Low 
United 
Kingdom Low Moderate  Moderate Moderate 
Source: Torsten Brandt and Thorsten Schulten, Liberalisation and privatisation of public services and the 
impact on labour relations, December 2007. PIQUE Research Report. Available to download from 
www.pique.at. 
                                             
5  Christoph Herrman and Koen Verhoest, Varieties and Variations of Public Service Liberalisation and 
Privatisation, PIQUE Policy Paper No. 1, February 2008. 
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5.2.3.1. Postal services 
In most countries the liberalisation and privatisation of postal services led to a 
massive reduction in employment. The former state-owned postal companies are 
typically no longer part of the public-sector agreements. Instead, the former 
monopoly providers now have their own company agreements. Labour relations in the 
newly established postal companies vary from country to country. In countries that 
traditionally have a rather comprehensive collective bargaining system with a strong 
regulation at sectoral level (e.g. Belgium or Sweden) the liberalisation of postal 
services has had rather different effect than in countries with a more decentralised 
and fragmented bargaining system. In the Swedish postal sector there are different 
company agreements for the incumbent and the main new competitor, which are, 
however, closely coordinated by the trade unions and therefore contain no major 
differences in substance. In contrast to Belgium and Sweden, all the other countries 
have a rather fragmented bargaining structure with agreements at company level 
only or no agreements at all. Without sectoral regulation there is a strong potential 
for wage dumping. Such practices can be found in the German letter market, where 
employees with the new competitors have substantially lower wages and more 
flexible working hours, but also in Austria, where the majority of the workforce in 
the new competitors are self-employed and therefore lack the coverage of any form 
of employment standards or protection. In Germany there are also growing 
differences within public companies, with new entrants being offered worse 
employment conditions than the more senior staff. As a highly labour-intensive 
industry, there is a strong downward competition on labour costs within the German 
postal sector. 
Table 5.3: Collective bargaining in the postal sector (letter market) 
 Austria Belgium Germany Poland Sweden UK 
Incumbent Company agreement 
Company 
agreement 
Company 
agreement 
Company 
agreement 
Company 
agreement 
Company 
agreement 
Competitors 
Various 
sectoral and 
company 
agreements. 
No 
bargaining 
for self-
employed 
deliverers 
Sectoral 
agreement 
No 
agreements; 
sectoral-level 
minimum 
wage 
regulation 
No 
agreements 
Company 
agreements 
Some 
company 
agreements 
Source: Torsten Brandt and Thorsten Schulten, Liberalisation and privatisation of public services and the 
impact on labour relations, December 2007. PIQUE Research Report. Available to download from 
www.pique.at. 
5.2.3.2. Local public transport 
All these countries have seen some formal and (partial) privatisations of local public-
transport companies and outsourcing measures. There has also been a tendency for 
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privatised companies to withdraw from public-sector collective agreements. Private 
transport companies (e.g. in Germany, Poland or the UK) have tried to gain 
competitive advantages over their public competitors through a strategy of wage 
dumping on the basis of no collective agreements or separate ones that provide much 
lower wages and working conditions. Wage dumping is also possible on the basis of 
collective agreements (e.g. in Germany). Again, in countries with a more 
comprehensive collective bargaining system, such as Belgium or Sweden, such a 
strategy has been limited by strong sector-wide regulation. In Belgium the 
consideration of labour conditions has partly been included in the public tenders, and 
in Sweden self-employed drivers are not covered by collective bargaining and special 
labour regulations. 
In the local public-transport sector, liberalisation and privatisation has not only led 
to a fragmentation of bargaining structures and pronounced differences between 
public and private providers. In addition, there are also growing differences within 
public companies, with new entrants being offered worse employment conditions 
than the more senior staff. 
Table 5.4: Collective bargaining in the local public-transport sector 
 Austria Belgium Germany Poland Sweden UK 
Incumbents 
Sectoral 
and 
company 
agreements 
Sectoral 
and 
company 
agreements 
Company 
agreements 
Company 
and sectoral 
agreements 
Competitors Sectoral agreement 
Company 
and 
sectoral 
agreements Company 
or no 
agreements 
Company 
or no 
agreements 
No 
bargaining 
for self-
employed 
Company 
agreements 
Source: Torsten Brandt and Thorsten Schulten, Liberalisation and privatisation of public services and the 
impact on labour relations, December 2007. PIQUE Research Report. Available to download from 
www.pique.at. 
5.2.3.3. Electricity 
Liberalisation measures have, for the most part, led to a decline in public ownership 
and higher market concentration by large private suppliers. Reorganisation measures 
and mergers have led to massive job reductions. Nevertheless, compared to the 
other sectors, in the electricity sector changes in bargaining structures have been 
rather modest. These changes are mostly the result of the outsourcing of certain 
services. In addition, there is a tendency for wage differentials to increase, with 
wages being still comparably high in the production segments but lagging behind in 
the retail part of the electricity supply chain. In sum, however, bargaining structures 
remain largely intact and bargaining coverage is still extensive. 
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Table 5.5: Collective bargaining in the electricity sector 
 Austria Belgium Germany Poland Sweden UK 
Incumbent 
Unilateral 
state 
regulation 
National 
agreements 
Sectoral 
and 
company 
agreements 
Sectoral 
and 
company 
agreements 
Sectoral 
and 
company 
agreements 
Competitors 
Company 
and sector 
agreements 
Company  
agreements 
Company 
agreements 
Sectoral 
and 
company 
agreements 
Sectoral 
and 
company 
agreements 
Company 
agreements 
Source: Torsten Brandt and Thorsten Schulten, Liberalisation and privatisation of public services and the 
impact on labour relations, December 2007. PIQUE Research Report. Available to download from 
www.pique.at. 
5.2.3.4. Hospital sector 
In the hospital sector liberalisation has taken the form of a general 
commercialisation of health services. So far, Germany is the only European country 
that has shown a strong tendency towards the full material privatisation of public 
hospitals and their sale to private for-profit hospital corporations. All private German 
hospital companies have withdrawn from the public-sector collective agreements and 
made their own arrangements. In other countries the dominant form of privatisation 
the hospital sector is still the contracting out of services such as cleaning, catering, 
laundry, security or administrative services. For the employees in these sectors, 
outsourcing usually means that they are no longer covered by the public-sector 
agreements and have to accept a significant deterioration of wages and working 
conditions. However, labour relations in public hospitals are usually still part of the 
public-sector labour-relations regime. There are sectoral agreements for private 
hospitals in Austria, Belgium and Sweden. In the other countries, private hospitals 
are either covered by company agreements or not covered at all. Depending on the 
national labour market situation, wages and working conditions in private hospitals 
can be either lower or higher than in public clinics. 
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Table 5.6: Collective bargaining in the hospital sector 
 Austria Belgium Germany Poland Sweden UK 
Public 
hospitals 
Unilateral 
state 
regulation/ 
company 
agreements 
National 
public 
sector 
agreement 
National 
public 
sector 
agreement  
Unilateral 
state 
regulation 
National 
public 
sector 
agreement 
National 
agreement 
Private for 
profit 
hospitals 
Sectoral 
agreements - 
Company 
or no 
agreements 
Company 
or no 
agreements 
Sectoral 
and 
company 
agreements 
Company or 
no 
agreements 
Source: Torsten Brandt and Thorsten Schulten, Liberalisation and privatisation of public services and the 
impact on labour relations, December 2007. PIQUE Research Report. Available to download from 
www.pique.at. 
5.3. Conclusions 
The liberalisation and privatisation of public services has led to a fundamental 
transformation of the established labour-relations regimes in the public sector with 
far-reaching consequences for employment and working conditions. The 
consequences are most obvious in those liberalised sectors that have already 
achieved a high degree of market competition and where wage costs are a crucial 
element in the competitive position of the individual company. The German letter 
market is a prime example where the competitive strategy of new competitors is 
mainly based on wage dumping and relatively poor working conditions. In most other 
sectors and countries the competition on wage costs is still less pronounced, due to a 
much lower degree of market competition. However, this may change in the future. 
From an employee’s point of view there is a strong belief that liberalisation and 
privatisation primarily threaten established standards and lead to a significant 
deterioration of pay levels and working conditions. The PIQUE Project may indeed 
have found some evidence for such a view. Especially the new competitors, which 
emerged after liberalisation, often provide much worse working conditions than the 
incumbent or the remaining public companies. Under competitive pressure the latter 
also started to change their working conditions, e.g. through the establishment of 
two-tier wage structures and a growing divisions between a core and a peripheral 
workforce. 
With the trend towards decentralisation and fragmentation, collective bargaining has 
often lost its capacity to create a level playing field and to take wages and working 
conditions out of competition. In order to avoid a downward competition at the 
expense of the employees and to focus on a more innovation and quality-oriented 
model of competition, there is a pressing need for social (re-)regulation in liberalised 
and privatised sectors. Since the policy of the European Union has a major impact on 
the liberalisation process, social regulation requires political action at both national 
and European level. 
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5.3.1. Social regulation at national level 
At national level there are already a number of “good practices” that have been 
established to limit wage competition. In Belgium and Sweden the trade unions have 
mostly been able to guarantee similar working conditions for employees at the 
incumbents and the new competitors through the established systems of sectoral 
coordination, even if both are covered by different collective agreements. In 
Germany and Austria the trade unions are also trying to coordinate their bargaining 
policy at sectoral level while using the public-sector conditions as a benchmark. 
However, due to the lack of union members in the newly established companies this 
has not always been very successful.  
A strategy for a sector-wide social regulation could be supported by the state through 
the extension of collective agreements, the determination of sector-wide minimum 
wages and standards or through the linking of public procurement and collectively 
agreed standards. The latter has been the case, for example, in the Belgian local 
public-transport sector, where public tenders include a special clause referring to 
certain working conditions in the public sector, which have to be guaranteed by the 
private contractor too. In Germany, various federal states (Länder) have legal 
provisions under which public contracts can be awarded only to companies that have 
declared that they use a certain collective agreement. Similar forms of regulation 
linking public procurement with the promotion of certain social standards can be 
found in Austria, Sweden and the UK. 
In contrast to many other EU member states, none of the countries covered in the 
PIQUE project has a strong mechanism to extend collective agreements to the whole 
sector. However, in autumn 2007 the trade unions and some employers (mainly those 
related to the incumbent) in the German letter market signed a collective agreement 
on minimum wages, which the Ministry of Labour later extended to the whole sector 
– in the face of protests from the main competitors. 
A further major challenge related to liberalisation and privatisation is to overcome 
regulations that create a two-tier workforce. The latter is systematically 
undermining the basis for solidarity among employees and creates a permanent 
threat even to the relatively well-situated core workforce. It has also clearly 
negative consequences for the motivation and productivity of the employees. In the 
UK, for example, the unions have been running a “fair wage campaign” to end two-
tier workforce systems in the hospital sector and have demanded the same wages 
and working conditions for hospital employees working in the National Health Service 
as well as for hospital employees working for private sub-contractors. As part of the 
2005 “Warwick Agreement” the unions and the Labour government reached a 
commitment in principle to end the two-tier workforce in public services. In the 
same year the unions and the Department of Health concluded an agreement with 
private contractors that employees such as hospital cleaners, porters and catering 
staff would, in future, receive the same pay and working conditions as NHS staff. 
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Another strategic point of regulation might be the policy of the regulatory agencies, 
which could also contribute to strengthening social regulation in liberalised markets 
and to providing “fair competition” that is not run at the expense of the employees. 
The German post law, for example, contains a “social clause” according to which 
companies will only receive a licence to provide postal services if they guarantee the 
conventional working conditions in the sector. The intention of this clause was to 
avoid wage dumping, although in practice it has not been used by the German 
regulatory agency. 
5.3.2. Social regulation at European level 
Since there is a growing awareness of the (potentially) negative effects of 
liberalisation and privatisation for employees, the social regulation of liberalised 
markets has also become an important policy issue at European level too. Considering 
the recent EU regulation on public transport in 2007, for example, there is a 
provision according to which public authorities are free to impose certain social 
standards in order to “ensure transparent and comparable terms of competition 
between operators and to avert the risk of social dumping.”6 There is a similar 
passage in the new EU directive on postal services, which explicitly emphasises that 
“social considerations should be taken into account when preparing the opening up of 
the postal market.”7 Moreover, according to the EU directive on public procurement, 
public authorities are always free to define certain social standards in public 
tenders.8 
In contrast to these provisions, which explicitly enable social regulation in liberalised 
markets at national level, some recent decisions of the European Court of Justice 
(the Laval, Viking and Rüffert cases) have argued that certain national regulations on 
the protection of workers violate the principle of economic freedom as laid down in 
the European Treaty. The ECJ judgement in the Rüffert Case, for example, stated 
that the legal provisions in Germany, which link the award of public contracts to the 
use of collective agreements, infringe the freedom to provide services. 
In order to avoid the negative consequences of liberalisation and privatisation, the 
EU should not undermine the national competences for social regulation. After the 
recent ECJ judgements it seems to be necessary to clarify the basic interpretation of 
the European Treaty in order to ensure that economic freedom is not placed above 
                                             
6  Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on 
public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 
1191/69 and 1107/70, OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, 1-13. 
7  Directive 2008/6/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 February 2008 amending 
Directive 97/67/EC with regard to the full accomplishment of the internal market of Community 
postal services, Official Journal of the European Union L 52, 27 February 2008, OJ L 52, 20.02.2008, 
3-20. 
8  Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and 
public service contracts, OJ L 134, 30.4.2004,114–240. 
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social protection, for example through the introduction of a “Social Progress Clause” 
as recently proposed by the European Trade Union Confederation.9 
Finally, there should be a regular monitoring of the impact of liberalisation and 
privatisation on labour relations and working conditions at EU level. Here is also an 
important role for the European social dialogue between trade unions and employers’ 
associations in the affected sectors, which could help to identify good national 
practices for the social re-regulation of liberalised markets. 
To sum up, liberalisation and privatisation have so far promoted a model of 
competition that is largely based on the reduction of wage costs and not on the 
improvement of quality and innovation. As long as liberalisation is widely associated 
with the deterioration of working conditions it will continue to lack support and 
legitimacy among large sections of the employees affected. The alternative is a 
social (re-)regulation of liberalised markets that protects and improves working 
standards and so puts the focus on a high-road strategy in order to achieve both 
better work and better services. 
 
                                             
9  European Trade Union Confederation, ETUC response to ECJ judgements Viking and Laval. 
Resolution adopted by the Executive Committee of the ETUC at its meeting of 4 March 2008 in 
Brussels. 
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6. PRIVATISATION OF PUBLIC SERVICES AND THE 
IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY 
Steve Jefferys, Richard Pond, Yilmaz Kilicaslan and Ali Cevat Tasiran 
Working Lives Research Institute, London Metropolitan University 
Wieslawa Kozek and Beata Radzka 
Institute for Sociology, University of Warsaw 
Christoph Hermann 
Forschungs- und Beratungsstelle Arbeitswelt, Vienna 
This chapter is based on two research reports – one on the impact of liberalisation 
and privatisation on employment and the other one on the impact on productivity. 
6.1. The issues 
Some very strong claims are made of the enhanced benefits to the public services 
enjoyed by European citizens as a result of privatisation and liberalisation. The 
introduction of competition and the allocation of resources by markets and in the 
interests of private shareholders are claimed to improve efficiency of service 
delivery, allow service delivery to take place at a lower cost, and hence to improve 
productivity and allow for better service quality at the same level of inputs. 
These productivity gains are supposed to be transformed into higher levels of outputs 
and greater societal wealth, thereby raising overall living standards and enabling 
higher consumption levels and greater consumer choice. The growth of the market 
sphere is in turn supposed to lead to higher employment. The European Commission 
therefore asserted in its 2003 Green Paper on Services of Public Interest that the 
impact of market opening on net employment in the network industries has been 
broadly positive: ‘Job losses, particularly amongst former monopolies, have been 
more than compensated for by the creation of new jobs thanks to market growth.’ 
In a similar vein, Copenhagen Economics (2005) argues that market opening in the 
EU-15 network industries has succeeded in increasing productivity. As network 
industries provide crucial inputs for production in all other sectors of the economy, 
market opening, according to this view, has led to significant spill-over effects to the 
rest of the economy, contributing significantly to the overall economic gains in terms 
of welfare, consumption and employment. The authors estimate that the knock-on 
effect of lower input prices from electricity and telecommunications will create an 
additional 500,000 jobs in Europe. There have, however, been few critical 
assessments of the validity of such assumptions.10 The PIQUE project aims for such an 
evaluation with respect to employment, productivity and – at a later stage – service 
quality. Yet it also goes beyond the aforementioned claims by looking beyond 
network industries and including other public-service sectors in the analysis. In 
                                             
10  Notable exceptions are Mehmet Ugur (2007) as well as Raffaele Doronzo and Massimo Florio (2007). 
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addition, PIQUE attempts, as far as the data allow us to do so, to be more specific 
and to account for the different timing of liberalisation and privatisation processes in 
the different countries – this is especially important for productivity, where short-
term changes have to be disentangled from long-term trends - and for the different 
degrees of competition and changes in ownership structures. 
 In some cases, such as the UK electricity sector, there was a clear timetable for 
both privatisation and liberalisation and it is possible to identify distinctive pre- and 
post-privatisation and -liberalisation periods, even if there may still be some debate 
over the timescale over which these processes can have an impact on employment 
and productivity. In other sectors and countries – local transport in Austria and 
Germany for example – the process has been much less clear-cut and it is difficult to 
argue that there has been any significant moves towards a more privatised or 
liberalised sector, certainly when looking at the sector as a whole from a national 
perspective. As Policy Paper 1 tries to summarise, in these countries there has been 
a ‘limited’ or ‘very limited’ move to more competitive markets accompanied by 
limited or moderate increases in private ownership (see Table 6.1). 
The hospital sector is one where it is also very difficult to identify a key point in time 
when privatisation or liberalisation has been introduced or implemented in any kind 
of systematic way on a national basis. There have certainly been trends to make 
greater use of the private sector in some areas, with the outsourcing of non-clinical 
services, such as cleaning and catering, but only in Germany has there been a 
significant and identifiable trend to privatisation of hospitals themselves (we 
therefore occasionally use the terms ‘commodification’ and ‘marketisation’ rather 
than ‘liberalisation’ and ‘privatisation’ to indicate a significant shift in the 
development). It is also important to note that even where there has been a formal 
process of liberalisation – such as the implementation of legislation to allow new 
companies to enter a market – this does not necessarily mean that there has been a 
real transformation from a single supplier to a competitive market. In several 
instances, the key privatisation periods took place in the mid to late 1990s. There 
are exceptions, principally of the electricity sector in the UK, where the most rapid 
changes took place between 1990 and 1996, and of local transport in the UK and 
Sweden, where the main developments took place in the mid-1980s (bus transport in 
Sweden and outside London in the UK). 
For employment, Eurostat data and national data for the sectors and countries under 
investigation allow us to analyse roughly a ten-year period reaching from the mid-
1990s to 2005. For productivity data is only available for somewhat broader sectors 
but in turn available data reach as far back as 1970. 
6.2. The countries and sectors 
There are also some differences in the general economic performances of the target 
countries that may have had important consequences for the liberalisation process. 
Since 1995 all six countries have seen steady economic growth with annual 
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percentage increases in real GDP averaging between 1.5% (Germany) and 4.6% 
(Poland). Austria and Belgium both saw GDP growth average 2.2% while it was higher 
in the UK (2.8%) and Sweden (3.0%). From 1995 five of the six countries experienced 
overall employment growth ranging from 3.8% in Germany to 12.2% in the UK, with 
Sweden (7.3%), Austria (7.6%) and Belgium (9.9%) in between. Poland was the only 
country to register a fall in employment (-4.7%). Across European economies in 
general there has been a trend towards greater use of part-time employment. 
Austria, Belgium, Germany and Sweden saw an increase in the part-time rate of 
between 4% and 8% since the mid-1990s.The UK stands out as having a part-time rate 
of around 25% in the past ten years, while in Poland the proportion of part-time has 
been comparable low with about 11%. 
The experience of liberalisation and privatisation varies from country to country and 
from sector to sector. Here we show a summary chart outlining the major tendencies 
across the six countries broken down by major liberalisation and privatisation 
processes, with significant dates included where they can be identified. We then 
describe the detailed developments and employment outcomes in each of the four 
sectors, electricity, post, local transport and health. 
Table 6.1: Sector trends in liberalisation and privatisation in six EU 
economies 
  Austria Belgium Germany Poland Sweden UK 
Lib Limited 
(1999) 
Very limited 
(2000) 
Limited 
(1999) 
Strong 
(1999) 
Moderate 
(1996) 
Strong 
(1990) 
Electricity 
Priv Substantial 
increase 
(1988) 
Moderate 
increase 
(nrd) 
Substantial 
increase 
(1985) 
Substantial 
increase 
(2008) 
Substantial 
increase 
(1995) 
Very strong 
increase 
(1990) 
Lib Limited 
(1998?) 
Limited 
(1998) 
Rather 
limited 
(1989) 
Very limited 
(1991) 
Moderate 
(1991) 
Rather 
limited 
(1998) 
Postal 
services: 
letter and 
direct 
mail 
market 
Priv Substantial 
increase 
(2006) 
Substantial 
increase 
(1998) 
Strong 
increase 
(1989) 
Marginal 
increase 
(nrd) 
Limited 
increase 
(1994) 
Limited 
increase 
(2001) 
Lib Limited (nrd) Very limited 
(2002) 
Rather 
limited (nrd) 
Limited (nrd) Strong 
(1985) 
Strong 
(1985) 
Local 
public 
transport 
Priv Limited 
increase 
(nrd) 
Very limited 
increase 
(2002) 
Moderate 
increase 
(nrd) 
Limited 
increase 
(nrd) 
Strong 
increase 
(1985) 
Very strong 
increase 
(1985) 
Lib Limited (nrd) Limited (nrd) Moderate 
(nrd) 
Limited (nrd) Very limited 
(nrd) 
Very limited 
(nrd) 
Hospitals 
Priv Limited 
increase 
(nrd) 
Moderate 
increase 
(nrd) 
Strong 
increase 
(nrd) 
Limited 
increase 
(nrd) 
Very limited 
increase 
(nrd) 
Limited 
increase 
(nrd) 
Lib = Liberalisation; Priv = Privatisation; nrd = no relevant date 
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6.3. Employment in the liberalised sectors 
The evidence presented below focuses on the development of employment numbers 
in the sectors included in the PIQUE project. In order to ensure comparability, data is 
primarily drawn from Eurostat and here from structural business statistics (SBS). 
These data are available covering the sectors looked at in the PIQUE project.11 The 
disadvantages of this data are that the information on forms of employment is 
limited and that data are not available for all countries for the same years, although 
in most cases they cover the mid-1990s to 2005 (this is why we compare yearly 
averages rather than total employment reduction in the tables below). Eurostat-SBS 
data has therefore been complemented by additional data from national data 
sources. If available for the sectors under investigation we use national Labour Force 
Survey Data, but for some countries we rely on alternative national data sources.12 
Due to different methods of collecting data, LSF data tend to show lower 
employment numbers than SBS-data. But with few exceptions (e.g. postal sector in 
Germany) they still show the same development.13 In the case of electricity, we use a 
study on employment effects commissioned by the European Commission (ECOTEC 
2007). 
6.3.1. Electricity 
Despite significant variations between countries and between data sources, the 
electricity sector has experienced a substantial loss of employment since the mid-
1990s. Within the EU-15 total losses amount to 246,000 jobs between 1995 and 2004 
(Ecotec 2007). In relative terms the reduction between 1995 and 2004 amounts to 
between a quarter and a third of the previous employment levels (if we stretch the 
period to the early 1980s, the fall in employment in the UK would even amount to 
50%). Losses of 30% and more were recorded in Germany (Ecotec), Sweden (Ecotec), 
between 20% and 30% in Austria (Eurostat-SBS, national data source and Ecotec), 
Belgium (Eurostat-SBS and Ecotec) and the UK (national data source and Ecotec). 
Poland stands out in this comparison as the country with the smallest decrease in 
employment (9% between 1995 and 2004). 
                                             
11  Electricity (NACE 401), Post and courier activities (641), Other scheduled passenger land transport; 
taxi operation; other land passenger transport (6021 to 6023), Health and Social Work (85) and 
hospital activities (8511). 
12  Austria & Germany: Labour Force Survey; Belgium: Data warehouse Social Security; Sweden: 
Registerbaserad arbetsmarkandsstatitik (Register based labour market statistic); Poland: Central 
Satistical Office (Employment in National Economy); UK: Annual Business Inquiry. 
13  While SBS data is based on interviews with company representatives, LFS data is based on interviews 
with workers. 
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Table 6.2: Employment change in electricity 
 Eurostat-SBS* National data sources** ECOTEC (1995-2004) 
 Yearly averages % Yearly averages % Yearly averages % Total reduction% 
Austria -2.4 -2.3 -2.6 -24 
Belgium -2.4 - -2.4 -22 
Germany -2.8 -0.6 -3.7 -34 
Poland -1.1 -2.3*** -1 -9 
Sweden -0.8 -1.4 -3.6 -33 
UK -1.6 -3 -3.1 -28 
EU-15   -3.4 -31 
*Eurostat-SBS : AU & BE: 1995-2005; PO & UK: 1996-2004; SE: 1997-20004; GE: 1998-2004. 
**National Data Sources: AU Labour Force Survey - 1995-2006; BE Data Warehouse Social Security – 
1997-2004; GE: Labour Force Survey - 1995-2005; SE: Register based labour market statistics – 
1995-2006; Poland: Central Statistical Office – 1996-2006; UK: Annual Business Inquiry - 1998-
2005. 
***Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply. 
With the exception of Poland all countries have experienced an increase in part-time 
employment. In Austria the part-time rate increased from 3.5% to 9.4%, but in all 
countries the proportion of part-time in the electricity sector is still well below the 
percentages for each economy as a whole. In Poland the proportion of part-time 
workers in the sector actually fell according to Eurostat data between 1996 and 
2004/5. 
A report by Ecotec Consulting (2007) carried out for the European Commission has 
revealed a shift in job patterns with a decline in technical and maintenance staff 
(often through outsourcing) and an increase in legal, marketing and sales staff as 
companies devote more resources to winning customers from other companies. This 
partly explains the increase in the proportion of women in the industry in some 
countries, from 24% to 27% in the UK and from 24% to 28% in Sweden, for example. 
6.3.2. Postal services 
In postal services there is also a strong tendency towards employment reductions 
since the mid-1990s but the picture is less clear than in electricity. There are 
countries with a sharp fall in employment, some with a less strong but still significant 
reduction and at least one country with a substantial increase in employment. 
Reductions of 20% and more have been recorded in Austria and Sweden (according to 
Eurostat-SBS data and data from national sources). Germany has experienced a 
substantial reduction according to national labour force survey data covering the 
period from 1995 to 2005 (-15%) but an equivalent increase according to Eurostat-SBS 
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data for the shorter period from 2000 to 2004(+15%).14 In Belgium employment 
reduction was somewhat less than 10% and in the UK there is an employment 
increase of more than 10% (in both cases according to Eurostat-SBS data and data 
from national sources). For Poland data is only available for the broader post and 
telecommunication sector but, despite a dramatic increase in telecommunication 
activities caused by a spread of mobile phones and Internet, employment according 
to the Polish Central Statistical Office still decreased by 11% between 1996 and 2005. 
Table 6.3: Employment change in postal services 
 Eurostat-SBS* National sources** National sources** 
 Yearly averages % Yearly averages % Total reduction (1996/7/8-2004/5) 
Austria -3 -2 -15 
Belgium -1 -1 -8 
Germany +3.9 -1.3 -12 
Poland*** -1.7 -1.2 -11 
Sweden -2.3 -2.0 -20 
UK + 2.4 +1.7 12 
*Eurostat-SBS: AU 1998-2005; BE 1996-2005; GE 2001-2004; PO 1995-2005; SE 1993-2004; UK 1997-
2004. 
**National sources: AU Labour Force Survey – 1995-2005; BE: Data Warehouse Social Security - 1997-
2004; GE Labour Force Survey – 1995-2005; PO: Central Statistical Office – 1996-2005; SE: 
Register based labour market statistics – 1995-2006; UK: Annual Business Inquiry -1998-2005. 
***Post and telecommunication sector. 
In addition to employment cuts, countries for which data is available also show a 
substantial increase in atypical forms of employment. The largest increase in part-
time employment was recorded in Germany. Here the number of part-time workers 
in postal services has more than doubled since 1995. A lot of the newly created part-
time jobs are furthermore marginal part-time positions including only a few hours of 
work per week. Data from the German post regulator for the German letter market 
show that while the majority of the workforce employed by the incumbent Deutsche 
Post AG still has a full-time job (33.3% are part-time and 4.1 marginal part-time), its 
competitors mainly employs part-time workers (more than 80%) and among them the 
majority (59.4%) as marginal part-time workers (Brandt/Drews/Schulten 2007). 
Hence while the total number jobs in the German letter market was more or less 
stable between 1999 and 2004, the amount of employment measured in full-time-
equivalents has actually decreased by 10% over the same period (ibid). Germany is 
followed by Belgium, where the number of part-time workers has doubled, and the 
                                             
14  According to Labour Force Survey data employment still decreased by 3 percent. While the Labour 
Force Survey shows a persistent downward trend, the Structural Business Survey shows significant 
fluctuations with substantial increases and significant reductions over the four-year period covered 
by the data. 
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UK, where it increased by 45%. In Austria the growth in part-time jobs reached 28%. 
In Poland the increase in the broader post and telecommunication sectors amounted 
to 73%. 
For Austria and Germany there is also data available for the proportion of self-
employment. In Germany the number of self-employed workers in postal services 
grew by more than two and a half times between 1995 and 2005. In Austria the 
number increased by four and a half times over the same period. Despite the 
dramatic increase in part-time jobs and self-employment, the resulting proportion of 
atypical forms of employment lies within the range of the proportion for the national 
economies pointing to an adjustment of public sector employment relations to 
private sector conditions (Schulten/Brandt/Hermann 2008). 
Table 6.4: Part-time and self-employment change (%) in postal services 
 Part-time employment Self-employment 
% Increase 
1995/6-2004/5 
Change per year Increase 
1995-2005 
Change per year 
Austria 28 2.5 350 35.0 
Belgium 50 7.1   
Germany 109 10.9 171 17.1 
Poland* 73 8.1   
UK 45 6.4   
Source:  Austria & Germany: Labour Force Survey; Belgium: Data Warehouse Social Security; Poland: 
Central Satistical Office (Employment in National Economy) UK: Annual Business Inquiry. *Data 
for Poland refers to the Post and telecommunications sector. 
6.3.3. Local public transport 
In contrast to electricity and postal services, employment in local public transport 
has tended to show increases over the past ten years. According to Eurostat data, 
yearly employment growth since the mid 1990s was between 2% and 4.5%;15 
according to national data sources, the increase is somewhat smaller, ranging from 
0% to 3.5%.16 The national data sources also reveal a major increase in part-time 
employment. The number of part-time employees doubled in Austria and Germany 
and part-time growth was 37% in Belgium.17 However, in all countries the level of 
part-time working as a proportion of total public transport employment is still low 
compared to the national average level. 
                                             
15  Austria 1995-2006; Belgium 1995-2005; Germany 2001-2005; Sweden 1996-2004; UK 1998-2005. 
16  Austria 1995-2006; Belgium 1997-2004; Germany 1995-2005; Sweden 1995-2006; UK 1998-2005. 
17  For time periods covered by national data see footnote 7. 
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6.3.4. Health care/hospitals 
As in local public transport, employment growth in health care and social work has 
generally been positive, ranging from 17% to 36% since the mid-1990s. The exceptions 
are Sweden, where employment increased only gradually in the past ten years, and 
Poland, where it fell by 35% over the same period. However, if we look at national 
data on hospital employment, the numbers were more or less stable in Austria while 
they declined substantially in Sweden (-18% between 1995 and 2005) and significantly 
in Germany (-7% between 1995 and 2005) and Poland (-6% between 2001 and 2005). 
The share of part-time work in health care and social work ranges between 20% to 
50% of total employment across the six countries and is therefore not only much 
higher than in the other three sectors looked at but in several countries also lies 
above the national averages. The exception again is Poland, where part-time work is 
still relatively rare. Self-employment grew rapidly in Austria, moderately in the UK, 
Germany and in Poland, while in Sweden and Belgium it has remained on a low level. 
Temporary employment is highest in Sweden and Germany; with Poland starting to 
catch up in recent years. Temporary employment in the health and social work 
sectors of Belgium, UK and Austria, in contrast, is relatively low and stable. 
6.4. Drivers of employment creation 
There are many drivers of employment growth, and while outsourcing has certainly 
had an impact on the employment structure in public services, the positive 
employment effects of resulting lower input prices on the wider economy are 
difficult to prove. There are several reasons for this. 
First because, rather then falling steadily and uniformly in response to liberalisation 
and privatisation, energy prices – a key ingredient of consumer prices - have 
fluctuated significantly over the past ten years. So while there may have been 
savings for large customers and for small enterprises and some private households, 
electricity prices have also increased in part as a result of the rent taking 
consequences of liberalisation and privatisation. The positive impact of lower prices 
for large costumers can thus be offset through many private households having less 
money to spend, thereby rendering neutral the net effect on employment. 
Second, there are many other factors that have an impact on employment levels 
aside from liberalisation and privatisation, including general economic growth, the 
impact of new technology, and political decisions at national and European level and 
regulatory developments. The impact of new technology is particular important. This 
has been especially true of electricity and postal services, but also in local public 
transport and hospitals, where technological innovation has enabled employers to 
save jobs. It is particularly difficult to disentangle the impact of new technologies 
and the impact of liberalisation and privatisation in the sectors studied here. 
We cannot therefore attribute all the employment losses recorded in some of the 
sectors under investigation to liberalisation and privatisation (we would need 
sufficiently long data from before and after liberalisation and privatisation to get a 
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clearer picture). We can, however, conclude that liberalisation and privatisation in 
these sectors have certainly not led to employment growth as argued by 
liberalisation and privatisation supporters. 
6.5. Drivers of labour productivity 
One argument for privatisation and liberalisation is that this marketisation drives 
rising productivity as a result of the combination of the discipline of competitive 
markets with the pressures on profit-making organisations to deliver ever greater 
returns to their shareholders. Privatisation and liberalisation involve a shift in 
priorities with cost reduction and profit-maximisation emerging as central goals, in 
contrast to a set of broader social and political objectives that might characterise 
nationalised companies, municipally-owned and run services or those run by other 
public and/or voluntary sector organisations. In the short term, then, the impact of 
privatisation and/or liberalisation is likely to increase gross value added and labour 
productivity as former publicly owned providers are given more freedom over their 
human resource policies as well as how, where and when they finance new 
investments.18 
Productivity can be measured in a number of ways. It is the level of output produced 
for a given level of inputs. Labour productivity is one of the most common ways of 
looking at productivity, analysing changes in output in terms of labour inputs. The 
definition of output itself can vary. In the PIQUE report on productivity the focus was 
on the internationally comparable data developed by the European Commission-
financed EU KLEMS project where output is defined as gross value added. Labour 
productivity in a given sector is therefore the level of gross value added divided by 
the number of hours worked. 
Labour productivity levels vary, then, according to the movement of the two 
variables: the level of value added and the number of hours or size of the workforce. 
Rising labour productivity can be the result of higher outputs from the same number 
of workers working the same number of hours, or of the same level of outputs being 
generated by workers working a lesser number of hours. 
The major reductions in employment in the electricity sector thus increased labour 
productivity in the short term. It certainly appears that this labour shedding was 
enabled by the marketisation process. However, what is more interesting is to ask 
whether private ownership and open markets produced an appreciable shift in 
productivity trends over the medium and longer term. If this were so, a further 
question would then arise as to whether any shift in productivity growth were enough 
to compensate for what might be seen as any potential negative outcomes in terms 
of employment levels, working conditions and quality of service. 
The EU KLEMS data used in this labour productivity analysis cover electricity (or 
electricity, gas and water) and the broader industrial sectors of inland transport and 
                                             
18  Value added refers to the additional value created in the production process. 
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post and telecommunications. Although these latter two are wider than the focus of 
the PIQUE project, they are the best available in terms of long-term, comparable 
statistics and do provide some indication of developments in as far as the aim was to 
try to identify significant shifts in productivity growth, shifts that would be expected 
to register in data for the broader industrial sectors. 
In the electricity and gas sectors in the six countries average annual labour 
productivity increases between 5-6% over the three decades for which data is 
available. It is important to bear in mind that the electricity sector has seen some of 
the more significant changes in technology of the sectors covered in the PIQUE study, 
although not in all countries. In Poland there has been virtually no shift away from 
coal-fired electricity production; while there have been some changes, in the 
balance of fuel sources in Austria, hydro-electric power is still the main source. In 
contrast all the other countries have seen major shifts in production with Sweden, 
Germany and Belgium all increasing significantly the share of nuclear power in 
electricity production from the mid-1970s. 
The high Belgian labour productivity rates in the 1970s are explained by the shift 
from coal to nuclear. These major changes will have contributed to higher 
productivity in these countries over the period but all pre-date any moves towards 
privatisation or liberalisation. However, in the UK the big technological change 
followed privatisation as companies chose to concentrate new investment in gas-
fuelled power stations and the share of production coming from gas rose from less 
than 2% in 1990 to 35.5% in 2006. While a publicly-owned industry might have moved 
in the same direction, the speed and scale of change in the UK were almost certainly 
enabled by investment decisions being made in a privatised, competitive 
environment. In the UK the strongly cyclical variations in labour productivity up to 
1989 reflected wider national economic performance, investment shifts and 
industrial conflicts while the higher levels in the 1990s reflect the shift from coal to 
gas in the context of marketisation. 
In Austria and Sweden, in contrast, the cases of higher and lower than the ‘norm’ 
productivity since roughly 1999-2000 both appear to follow or accompany the 
marketisation process. In Poland this is also the case. A provisional conclusion here is 
that technological changes to the sector have had the biggest impacts on labour 
productivity and that an examination of the comparative productivity rates suggests 
little support for the universal thesis that marketisation itself has helped drive longer 
term higher productivity. 
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Figure 6.1: Comparative labour productivity in the electricity and gas sector, 
1971-2004 
Electiricity and Gas
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AUT= Austria, BEL= Belgium, GER=Germany, POL=Poland, SWE=Sweden, UK= United Kingdom. 
Calculations based on EU KLEMS (2007). 
In inland transport annual comparative labour productivity rates in 1971 ranged 
between -0.1% and +8% and in 2004 between -0.4% and +5%. The overall trend is thus 
downwards over time. In this sector, too, it is quite difficult to read out the different 
contributions of local bus and underground public transport services from those of 
the railways, road haulage and the growing taxi industry. The brief ‘above the trend’ 
exceptions of Belgium from 1987 to 1991, Germany from 1993 to 1996 and the UK 
from 1996 to 2001 occurred many years before commodification in the case of 
Belgium, many years afterwards in the case of the UK, and were only located close to 
a commodification transition moment in Germany. While in Austria the below the 
trend results of 1993 to 1996 preceded its transition moment by several years. Here 
too the evidence that commodification and the different forms of resource allocation 
it involves have played a role in raising long-term labour productivity above the 
international trend is non-existent or weak. 
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Figure 6.2: Comparative labour productivity in the Inland Transport sector, 
1971-2004 
Inland Transport
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AUT= Austria, BEL= Belgium, GER=Germany, POL=Poland, SWE=Sweden, UK= United Kingdom. 
Calculations based on EU KLEMS (2007). 
In the post and telecommunications sector there was a fairly stable level of annual 
labour productivity increases at around 4% in the 1970s and 1980s, but then in the 
following fifteen years levels generally moved upwards to roughly 8% a year. These 
general increases can be assumed to be largely the result of the revolution in 
telecommunications that dramatically increased that part of the sector’s revenues. 
Belgian productivity rates both exceeded the trend in 1988-1991 and fell well below 
it from 1992 to 1998. In the UK above the trend results from 1991 to 2000 also appear 
to be linked to developments in telecommunications rather than in the postal 
service. Yet by the end of the period, almost regardless of the different national 
pathways towards commodification in both telecoms and postal services, the levels 
of annual labour productivity appear to converge. A tentative conclusion here is that 
labour productivity in this sector is significantly driven by common, globalised 
technologies rather than by the processes of commodification. 
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Figure 6.3: Comparative labour productivity in the post and 
telecommunications sector, 1971-2004 
Post and Telecommunicaiton
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AUT= Austria, BEL= Belgium, GER=Germany, POL=Poland, SWE=Sweden, UK= United Kingdom. 
Calculations based on EU KLEMS (2007). 
Reviewing the evidence by country over the long term (from 1970) raises doubts 
about clear differences between ‘before and after’ marketisation periods. In Austria 
the annual rate of increase in labour productivity (measured by the real value added 
per hour worked) in all four sectors was higher in 1971 (1977 start date for electricity 
and gas) than it was in 2004. In the electricity sector, however, falling productivity 
levels from 1986 turned around between 1995 and 2001 before plunging again 
between then and 2004. In post and telecommunications, in contrast, the same 1995 
commodification transition moment was followed by a sharp decline in productivity 
to 1999 and then an equally sharp increase before settling close to the historic level 
of between 6% and 8% per year in 2003 and 2004. Labour productivity in inland 
transport appears to have declined nearly continuously up to the transition moment 
of 1999, and then after a brief recovery to have resumed its downward direction. The 
labour productivity levels in the health and social work sector19 were generally lower 
than in the three others, and hovered around no net increase throughout the period. 
                                             
19  Labour productivity is much more difficult to assess in health and social work across all countries 
because of the difficulties in establishing estimates of value added that are independent of the 
inputs. Annual productivity changes are thus almost always shown at or close to 0. We will not, 
therefore, comment separately upon this sector in the other different countries described below. 
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Figure 6.4:  Evolution of Austrian sector labour productivity, 1971-2004 (three-
year averages) 
Austria
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EG= Electricity and Gas, IT= Inland Transport, PT= Post and Telecommunications, EGW = Electricity, Gas 
and Water Supply, NSW= Health and Social Work. Authors’ calculations from EU KLEMS (2007). 
In Belgium the long run view shows that while three sectors display lower annual 
productivity increases at the end of the period than at the beginning, the post and 
telecommunications sector ends the thirty-year period somewhat higher. The very 
high levels of electricity and gas productivity at the start of the period are clearly 
linked to the transition to nuclear power, but the commodification transition year, 
1999, does not appear to have (at least to date) triggered a trend change. In post 
and telecommunications a period of rising labour productivity prior to the transition 
moment of 1991 was followed by a decline before a nearly continuous recovery set in 
from 1996. In inland transport the very limited commodification initiated in 2002 is 
perhaps too recent to expect any evidence of change in long-term trends and there is 
not any. 
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Figure 6.5:  Evolution of Belgian sector labour productivity, 1971-2004 (three-
year averages) 
Belgium
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EG= Electricity and Gas, IT= Inland Transport, PT= Post and Telecommunications, EGW = Electricity, Gas 
and Water Supply, NSW= Health and Social Work. Authors’ calculations from EU KLEMS (2007). 
In Germany20 the overall levels of labour productivity in the four target sectors show 
a similar pattern to that of Belgium: annual labour productivity growth is higher at 
the end of the period in post and telecommunications, while in the other three 
sectors it is lower. In electricity and gas rising productivity from 1992 remains at or 
above the commodification transition period 5% level until 2001 before falling to 
between 2% and 4% from 2002. In post and telecommunications, in contrast, annual 
productivity increases were continuously above the 1990 transition year level right 
through until the series end in 2004. In inland transport a rise in annual labour 
productivity up to the 1995 transition year was followed by a major decline and a 
recent small recovery. 
                                             
20  The data series only go for post-unification Germany to 1990 for inland transport and to 1992 for 
electricity and gas. The data before 1990 refers to West Germany alone. 
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Figure 6.6:  Evolution of German sector labour productivity, 1971-2004 (three-
year averages) 
Germany
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EG= Electricity and Gas, IT= Inland Transport, PT= Post and Telecommunications, EGW = Electricity, Gas 
and Water Supply, NSW= Health and Social Work. Authors’ calculations from EU KLEMS (2007). 
The much shorter timescale (from 1997) for Polish data makes it impossible to draw 
any firm conclusions across the three sectors, with only electricity looking to be on 
an upward trend by the end of the period. 
In Sweden the thirty year overview also suggests a rising annual labour productivity 
trend in post and telecommunications with similar or slightly lower rates between 
the beginning and the end of the period in the other sectors. In electricity and gas 
the commodification transition year 1996 was followed by strong productivity 
increases between 1999 and 2001, but then by falling labour productivity between 
2002 and 2004. In post and telecommunications, by the transition year of 1991 
annual labour productivity growth had nearly tripled from around 2% a year in the 
ten years before 1986. Thereafter it stayed above 6% from 1994 onwards. In inland 
transport the 1985 commodification transition period heralded a 20-year period in 
which annual labour productivity increases ranged between nought and 4% a year, 
compared to the 1981-1984 years when labour productivity actually fell. 
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Figure 6.7:  Evolution of Swedish sector labour productivity, 1971-2004 
(three-year averages) 
Sweden
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EG= Electricity and Gas, IT= Inland Transport, PT= Post and Telecommunications, EGW = Electricity, Gas 
and Water Supply, NSW= Health and Social Work. Authors’ calculations from EU KLEMS (2007). 
In the UK the levels of annual labour productivity increase in the four sectors reveal 
the same pattern: with the exception of post and telecommunications, the other 
sectors display higher annual rates of productivity growth at the beginning of the 
period than they do at the end. In electricity and gas the 10% per year levels of the 
early 1970s are achieved again immediately following the commodification transition 
year of 1990, but then from 1998 fall back to the 1975-1990 average 5% level. In post 
and telecommunications an average productivity rise of around 4% per year prior to 
1989 is followed in the decade from 1991 by levels often more than three times as 
high.21 The postal services commodification transition year of 2001 follows two years 
of declining sector labour productivity, and in turn is followed by a recovery of 
productivity between 2002 and 2004. Local public transport’s moments of 
commodification are shown in 1985, and there is no clear change in labour 
productivity before and after that. However from 1994 there is a period in which 
labour productivity in the sector recovers the levels of the 1970s before falling back 
again in the early 2000s. 
                                             
21  Driven largely by job-shedding in British Telecommunications PLC, but also by the increasing value of 
the market. The decisive commodification moment in UK telecoms occurred in 1984 when BT was 
privatised. 
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Figure 6.8:  Evolution of UK sector labour productivity, 1971-2004 (three-year 
averages) 
UK
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EG= Electricity and Gas, IT= Inland Transport, PT= Post and Telecommunications, EGW = Electricity, Gas 
and Water Supply, NSW= Health and Social Work. Authors’ calculations from EU KLEMS (2007). 
6.6. Decomposing labour productivity 
Our final review of the evidence involves decomposing the identified labour 
productivity into its two component parts: an increase in value added or a decrease 
in hours worked. How and why productivity increases is, of course, just as important 
as the magnitude of any increase. A common method of measuring productivity is to 
divide output by the size of inputs to find the amount of output produced by each 
unit of inputs. We have defined labour productivity above, therefore, as the amount 
of value added produced by the labour input measured as the number of worked 
hours spent in productive activity. Labour productivity, then, is determined by both 
output and labour input: an increase in output will increase productivity, while a rise 
in employment will lower productivity. It is therefore possible to have a net 
productivity increase/decrease without a change in the volume of labour (and 
number of hours worked). To examine the sources of productivity change it is 
therefore necessary to decompose productivity growth into its two component parts. 
Our detailed analysis of productivity decomposition is provided in Table 6.5 below. 
This compares the growth of productivity, value added and employment in the pre- 
and post-privatisation/liberalisation periods. In some countries and sectors it is 
difficult to identify precise marketisation transition years, so, as with Figure 6.1 - 
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Figure 6.8 we have heuristically selected the most relevant date for privatisation or 
liberalisation in order to be able to compare the pre- and post-
privatisation/liberalisation (pre-P/L and post-P/L) periods. The figures in Table 6.5 
are calculated by taking the mean values of variables of interest in the pre- and the 
post-P/L periods. The post-privatisation or -liberalisation period clearly runs up to 
the end of the data series, so to make the comparison more coherent we have 
selected an equal number of years prior to the marketisation transition year on which 
to base the pre-P/L period. 
In Austria both the electricity and gas and post and telecommunications sectors 
showed productivity increases before and after the designated commodification year. 
In the pre-commodification period, almost 100% of productivity growth recorded was 
derived from growth in value added. In the post-commodification period, on the 
other hand, 20% of the productivity growth has come from falling employment. In 
this sector labour productivity growth is positive for virtually the whole of the period 
from 1976 to 2003 with only two years of nil growth in 1977 and 1981. There was no 
sharp increase in labour productivity growth, however, until the mid-1990s, when 
such an increase coincided with the only sustained period of employment decline 
over the period. This fall in employment could be associated with the opening of the 
electricity market to competition but the available data is for too short a period to 
provide conclusive evidence of an upward shift in productivity growth. 
The figures for the Austrian post and telecoms sector are similar. In the pre-
commodification period, while productivity growth resulted wholly from value added 
growth, in the post-commodification period employment cuts contributed 19% of the 
total 53% rise in labour productivity, roughly 40% of productivity growth. The Post 
and Telecommunications sector shows a sustained growth in value added and labour 
productivity right up until 1998, when there are two years of nil growth in value 
added and labour productivity declines as employment increases. Value added 
growth subsequently recovers while labour productivity growth shoots up as 
employee numbers are cut more sharply than any other time in the 30-year period. 
In Belgium positive productivity and negative employment growth were recorded in 
both pre- and post-commodification periods in electricity and gas. However, while 
value added was nearly the sole cause of productivity gains before 1995, subsequent 
employment cuts generated over 70% of productivity growth. 
In Germany in the period before 1994 employment in the Electricity, Gas and Water 
sector remained nearly stable while labour productivity was generated by increased 
value added. Thereafter, in contrast, job cuts in the broader sector made up half of 
the 53% rise in labour productivity, and the same proportion of the slightly larger 56% 
rise in labour productivity in electricity and gas on their own. A similar picture occurs 
in both inland transport and post and telecommunications: before their respective 
commodification years there was growth in both labour productivity and 
employment, while subsequent job cuts made up 100% of labour productivity gains in 
inland transport and 25% of gains in post and telecoms. Value added growth in post 
and telecoms shows a sustained period of growth towards the end of the period – at 
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or around 6% from 1998 while labour productivity growth has stayed above 4% since 
1990 and reached 10% in the middle of the decade, when it coincided with several 
years of employment decline. 
In Poland, where comparable data is only available after 1995, more than 50%, 30% 
and 10% of productivity in Electricity and Gas, Inland Transport, and Post and 
Telecommunications industries respectively were due to sector employment 
reductions. 
In Sweden the picture in the electricity, gas and water sector is one of substantial 
labour productivity growth driven largely by labour force reductions in the period 
prior to 1996, followed by employment increases that are largely responsible for falls 
in labour productivity, since value added also declines slightly. In Post and 
Telecommunications growth in labour productivity was at or above 4% a year for most 
of the 30-year period, with notable falls below this level only in 1976 and 1992-93. 
Labour productivity growth has been at or above 5% since 1997, and the cuts in 
employment that were an important factor in this growth in the early 1990s and 
again at the end of the period, contributed roughly one quarter of this in the post-
commodification period. 
In the UK the electricity and gas and the inland transport sectors recorded positive 
growth rates in productivity and negative growth rates in employment both before 
and after commodification. In the Electricity and Gas sector the contribution of 
employment decreases to productivity growth was 50% before the commodification 
year and 64% afterwards. Its annual growth in value added is steady after 1990, but 
mainly at a low level – around 2% ranging up to 4%. This compares to significant 
fluctuations in the pre-1990 period. Labour productivity growth is at a higher level 
after 1990 (averaging 6.7% a year compared to 3.9% between 1975 and 1989) largely 
as a result of sharp falls in employee numbers (exceeding 4% a year in the seven 
years 1991-1997). 
What conclusion can we draw from these labour productivity decomposition analyses? 
Our hypothesis was that if the new methods of resource allocation within a sector 
that had experienced marketisation were stimulating increased efficiencies, then 
they would increase the output or service provision at a faster rate than before 
commodification. What we find is that out of the fifteen sectors in five countries 
(excluding Poland, which does not have ‘before commodification’ data with which to 
make the comparison), just one third (five) display higher value added growth in the 
post-commodification period, while over two thirds (eleven) show higher levels of 
employment decrease. 
We can see, therefore, that the main driver of post-marketisation labour productivity 
increases was a relative employment decrease, rather than an increase in the long-
term value added created within the sector. This finding corresponds with the 
decline in employment presented in the first part of this paper. 
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Table 6.5: Labour productivity decomposition (%) before and after key 
commodification dates 
 
 Pre-Commodification  Post-Commodification 
 
C
ou
nt
ry
 
 
Sector  Period 
L/Pro
d 
V/Add EMP  Period 
L/Pro
d 
V/Add 
EM
P 
 
 EG  1985-94 33 34 1  1995-04 61 47 -14 
 IT  1993-98 -23 -17 6  1999-04 -6 0 5 
 PT  1992-97 61 59 -3  1998-04 53 33 -19 
A
us
tr
ia
 
 
 
 EG  1993-98 40 28 -12  1999-04 45 13 -32 
 IT  1999-01 14 46 32  2002-04 -24 -22 2 
 PT  1977-90 55 50 -5  1991-04 38 37 -1 B
el
gi
um
 
 
 
 EGW  1983-93 30 30 -1  1994-04 53 27 -26 
 EG  1983-93 n.a. n.a. n.a.  1994-04 56 28 -28 
 IT  1985-94 10 15 5  1995-04 14 0 -14 
 G
er
m
an
y 
 PT  1975-88 21 30 9  1989-04 70 52 -18 
 
 EG   n.a. n.a. n.a.   41 16 -26 
 IT   n.a. n.a. n.a.   85 53 -32 
 PT   n.a. n.a. n.a.   110 97 -13  P
ol
an
d 
 
 
 EGW  1987-95 24 5 -19  1996-04 -11 -2 9 
 IT  1971-84 19 27 8  1985-04 22 21 -1 
 PT  1977-90 42 51 9  1991-04 68 50 -18  S
w
ed
en
 
 
 
 EG  1975-89 39 20 -19  1990-04 67 24 -43 
 IT  1971-84 39 14 -25  1985-04 26 21 -5 
U
K
 
 PT  1997-00 143 173 31  2001-04 35 32 -3 
Note:  Period shows the years for which the mean growth levels of labour productivity, value added, and 
employment are calculated and shown as percentage change. 
Legend:  L/Prod = Labour productivity, V/Add = Value added, and EMP = Employment. 
Industries: EGW= Electricity, Gas, and Water Supply, EG= Electricity and Gas, IT= Inland Transport, PT= 
Post and Telecommunications. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on EU KLEMS (2007). 
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6.7. Conclusions 
The commercialisation, liberalisation and privatisation or marketisation of public 
services aims to introduce the benefits of competition to the resource allocation 
process. However, there are some major doubts as to the feasibility of dismantling 
monopoly public services whose characteristics include the necessity to provide 
national services. Evidence from the UK electricity sector, where we noted that 
privatisation went furthest and most rapidly, is that after an initial expansion from 
one provider to dozens, a major concentration process has ensued. These market 
reforms did not automatically result in a sustainable competitive market structure. 
Out of the 70 British companies in the supply segment, only six have a market share 
of more than 5% while three of them supply almost 65% of the electricity consumed 
in the UK. 
Thus although in this case formal liberalisation and privatisation processes were 
completed, this did not necessarily lead towards a significantly more competitive 
market structure. More generally, across most of the sectors and countries studied 
we conclude that these market reforms have not uniformly delivered the transparent 
competitive environments that the textbook examples suggest are necessary for the 
consumer to maximise benefits from the transition. 
In addition to different outcomes with respect to the extent of private ownership and 
competitive market structures, liberalisation and privatisation processes also vary in 
time. For productivity it was particular important to get an indication of medium and 
long-term trends to see to what extent changes at or around the time of 
liberalisation and/or privatisation could be identified as marking a break in those 
trends. This approach was also important for establishing whether the impact of 
private ownership and/or increased competition had shifted industries onto higher 
growth trends and had not simply produced short-term fluctuations in productivity. In 
this context our research revealed a paucity of publicly available datasets that would 
be required to validate the claims of significant public benefits of marketisation. 
There is clearly a significant adjustment process here with a social cost to 
privatisation and liberalisation that we cannot assume is simply compensated for by 
increases in employment across the wider economy, particularly as it is difficult to 
prove the theory that more competition in one sector can lead to positive 
employment effects in other sectors. Any general claims about the positive economic 
effects of privatisation and liberalisation should be tempered with an 
acknowledgement of these social costs and a better attempt made at a broader 
evaluation of these processes that takes account of a wider range of factors and 
assesses developments over the medium to long term and not just in the light of 
short-term radical restructuring. 
The balance of evidence suggests that liberalisation and privatisation have been 
primarily associated with employment reductions rather than with employment 
creation and that, at the same time, employment within the target sectors has 
become increasingly part-time, often having greater recourse than when they were 
publicly delivered services to self-employed, and perhaps also temporary, workers. 
Further, we could not find evidence suggesting that marketisation itself has driven 
any significant long-term upward shifts in the levels of added value produced in the 
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target sectors. Instead, it appears that the drivers of increased added value primarily 
arise by changes in technologies and the rate of growth (and demand level) in the 
overall economy. Yet if liberalisation and privatisation had a significant impact on 
productivity, the more efficient resource allocations mainly stem from job 
reductions. 
Where evidence existed or could be inferred on productivity it was not conclusive. It 
shows that the implementation of privatisation and liberalisation does not 
automatically lead to marked shifts in long-term productivity trends although there 
are cases, such as electricity privatisation and liberalisation in the UK, where the 
data do reveal significant short-term changes. The evidence from other countries and 
sectors is less compelling but this may also be due to the fact that the processes of 
privatisation and liberalisation have not been carried out so comprehensively or 
there is a very limited period of time over which to assess their impact. 
This means that generalised statements about the potential positive impacts of 
liberalisation on productivity should be strongly qualified not only in relation to the 
different effects that might arise from variations in country characteristics but also 
in as far as any real productivity changes can be disentangled from simple cuts in 
employee numbers and/or technological change. It may also be that changes in 
employment might be the more immediate results of organisations reacting to a 
perceived need to cut costs as a short-term response to increased competition and 
do not reflect the longer-term need to provide effective and efficient services with a 
well-trained and well-rewarded workforce. This is a potential contradiction in 
employer strategies that will be explored in more detail in the company case studies 
that form another part of the PIQUE project. 
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7. LIBERALISING SERVICES OF GENERAL ECONOMIC 
INTEREST: THE CITIZEN-USER PERSPECTIVE IN SIX 
EU COUNTRIES 
Guy Van Gyes, Thomas Vael and Sem Vandekerckhove 
Hoger Instituut voor de Arbeid (HIVA), K.U. Leuven 
This chapter summarises the main results of a citizen-users survey on postal services, 
electricity supply and local public transport carried out in six EU countries. It is 
based on the full-length report “Liberalisation in services of general economic 
interest - A bottom up citizens' perspective: Analysis of the PIQUE survey”. 
7.1. Introduction 
7.1.1. Marketisation and the ‘choice’ paradigm 
For the past twenty years, the European Union, but also many national governments, 
have embraced the belief that the dynamics of competition – sometimes referred to 
as the ‘disciplines of the marketplace’ or ‘marketisation’ – will improve quality and 
efficiency in public services. Since the second half of the 1980s, a number of public 
service sectors have gradually been opened up to competition following a series of 
European Directives, which pushed for this kind of liberalisation. Of the sectors 
included in the survey, the electricity sector has been fully liberalised and for postal 
services the remaining barriers for new competitors will be lifted in 2011 (Poland 
2013). In local public transport and the hospital sector the situation is more varied. 
The European agenda for liberalisation has been accompanied with a strong trend 
towards privatisation at the national level (Hermann/Verhoest 2008). The EU 
introduced even new terms such as ‘services of general interest’ or ‘services of 
general economic interest’, to replace the notion of ‘public services’. Perhaps this 
move signifies more than just a change of names, since the change has been 
accompanied by a new set of policies towards public services. The European policy 
perspective on services of general economic interest (SGEI) can briefly be 
summarised with the following statement: ‘We do it to fulfil citizens’ demands with 
an open and competitive market as main instrument’. Hence it is about ‘serving the 
public’. This line of policy is of course what is defined as one of the key elements of 
new public management, namely the promotion of consumer sovereignty and choice 
in the provision of public services. 
7.1.2. Survey design 
This European bottom-up policy perspective of ‘the happy citizen-consumer by 
regulated market solutions’ in relation to services of general economic interest 
formed the conceptual framework of a citizens’ survey carried out in six countries 
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(Austria, Belgium, Germany, Poland, Sweden and United Kingdom) on three public 
services (postal services, local public transport, electricity supply).22 
The following main research questions were tackled in the survey: 
 Still serving the public? The PIQUE survey investigated citizens’ and users’ 
satisfaction with the services and wanted to shed light on what kind of service 
improvements users wanted. 
In a first step a general questions about user satisfaction with price and quality 
were surveyed. In a second step this question about user satisfaction was 
deepened by analysing a) which quality dimensions are important in this general 
attitude of satisfaction, b) how these dimensions are rated negatively or 
positively, and c) how (possible) quality problems in this regard lead to complaint 
behaviour on the part of the citizens. 
 Public support for policies? The second part of the survey had a different focus. 
Here the policy approach of marketisation and consumerism, as promoted by the 
EU (and others), was tested by exploring how citizens’ perceive these changes. 
The recent Eurobarometer (and other international) surveys “do not teach us 
much about citizens’ attitudes towards the baseline values of these services and 
are restricted to perceptions of performance and satisfaction”. The second part 
of the survey thus attempted to close this gap by analysing citizens’ attitudes 
towards liberalisation, privatisation and universal service obligations. In addition 
the data collected by the survey was analysed with regard to individual 
preferences. Based on previous work from Bouckaert et al. (2003), we make a 
distinction between ‘performance’ and ‘identity’ theories. While the first 
approach refers to the experience with actual performance, the latter stresses 
societal factors, ideological beliefs and political values.  
 Consumer choice? In its ‘marketisation’ and ‘liberalisation’ approach to public 
services, the European Union assumes that citizens act as consumers. “Choice” is 
introduced partly as a response to the new attitudes adopted by modern citizen-
consumers, partly as a means to force suppliers to improve service performance. 
In short, choice in public services is understood as consumer preference and not 
as public services enabling citizens to make choices about their lives. Consumer 
values at least partly replaced public values or social objectives as a policy 
paradigm. Results are presented about whether citizens want to choose between 
public services offered by competing providers or not. 
7.1.3. Methodological note 
A citizens’ survey was organised by telephone in the winter of 2007-2008. Not only 
users of the particular service were questioned. The sample population included all 
private persons aged between 18 and 79 living in a private household in one of the 
included countries; with furthermore a land-line telephone number and the 
                                             
22  The survey also included a limited set of questions on hospitals, which are not taken into 
consideration in this policy paper. 
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capability to express themselves in the language of the questionnaire. An additional 
pre-survey representativeness measure consisted of quota. These were assigned 
according to gender, age, education, and urban-rural area. As a result in each 
country at least 1,000 respondents were interviewed based on this random sampling. 
7.2. Still serving the public? 
As part of the horizontal evaluations of the EU policies on SGEI, citizen-consumer 
satisfaction opinions were collected in a series of Eurobarometer studies between 
1997 and 2007. The first goal of the PIQUE survey was to deepen this Eurobarometer 
approach. 
7.2.1. Satisfaction with prices and service quality 
As a starting point, we mapped the general satisfaction on price and quality for each 
of the services. 
Table 7.1: Satisfaction with the PIQUE services: % fairly or very satisfied 
Quality AT BE DE PL SE UK Total 
Post 75% 74% 79% 66% 62% 82% 73% 
Transport 59% 73% 48% 57% 59% 67% 60% 
Electricity 91% 84% 88% 85% 86% 88% 87% 
Price AT BE DE PL SE UK Total 
Post 62% 55% 58% 61% 57% 77% 62% 
Transport 33% 61% 23% 34% 36% 54% 40% 
Electricity 45% 51% 30% 20% 38% 72% 42% 
Source: HIVA-K.U.Leuven, PIQUE survey data. 
As we see in the table, citizen assessments varied depending on the sector, the 
country and some of the background characteristics. 
In general, the satisfaction with prices is always lower than the satisfaction with 
quality. We found large differences between the sectors, with overall the highest 
quality satisfaction in electricity supply and the highest price satisfaction in postal 
services. 
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Table 7.2: Citizens’ view on changes in price and quality over the last 5 years 
How has the quality of mail delivery 
changed over the last 5 years AT BE DE* PL SE UK Total 
Became better 14% 25% 20% 45% 10% 10% 21% 
Stayed the same 59% 53% 60% 44% 50% 54% 53% 
Became worse 27% 22% 20% 11% 40% 35% 26% 
Did the price of sending a letter increase 
more than the price of other things over 
the last five years? 
AT BE DE PL SE UK Total 
Yes 25% 40% 16% 31% 23% 40% 29% 
No 75% 60% 84% 69% 77% 60% 71% 
How has the quality of local public 
transport changed over the last 5 years AT BE DE PL SE UK Total 
Became better 35% 54% 23% 52% 22% 35% 37% 
Stayed the same 45% 31% 43% 28% 49% 38% 39% 
Became worse 19% 15% 34% 20% 30% 26% 24% 
Did the price of local public transport 
increase more than the price of other 
things over the last five years 
AT BE DE PL SE UK Total 
Yes 51% 42% 64% 47% 39% 63% 52% 
No 49% 58% 36% 53% 61% 37% 48% 
How has the quality of electricity changed 
over the last 5 years AT BE DE PL SE UK Total 
Became better 14% 13% 9% 25% 16% 14% 15% 
Stayed the same 83% 78% 83% 72% 80% 75% 78% 
Became worse 3% 9% 8% 4% 4% 10% 6% 
Did the price of electricity increase more 
than the price of other things over the last 
five years 
AT BE DE PL SE UK Total 
Increased 39% 57% 68% 70% 74% 63% 62% 
Didn’t increase 61% 43% 32% 30% 26% 37% 38% 
This price sensitivity is also manifested in the citizens’ view on recent changes of 
quality and prices in the three sectors investigated. 
All these general perceptions of satisfaction show significant differences between 
countries, but they also differ by sector and with regard to price and quality. 
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7.2.2. The impact of liberalisation and privatisation on user satisfaction 
Table 7.3: Satisfaction with the PIQUE services: comparison of the most and 
the least liberalised and privatised countries 
  Postal Services Local Public Transport Electricity 
   Quality Price  Quality Price  Quality Price 
Liberalisation Most S 62% 57% UK  67% 54% PL  85% 20% 
 Least PL  66% 61% BE  73% 61% AT BE DE  88% 42% 
 Sign.  n.s. n.s.  n.s. n.s.  n.s. * 
Privatisation Most D  79% 58% UK  67% 54% UK  88% 72% 
 Least PL  66% 61% 
AT 
BE  
66% 47% AT PL  88% 33% 
 Sign.  * n.s.  n.s. n.s.  n.s. * 
Source:  HIVA-K.U.Leuven, PIQUE survey data, n.s.= not significant. 
We have not found clear evidence of a preferable market situation. As Table 7.3 
shows, only three differences between the most and the least liberalised and 
privatised countries turned out to be significant. Furthermore, each of them had 
Poland in the comparison, which is possibly an outlier due to the socio-economic 
catching-up process in the post-Communist period. The clearest effects were 
obtained in the price-component of the electricity market. Here, people in the 
countries with the highest degree of liberalisation are more dissatisfied with the 
price, whereby privatisations seem to have the opposite effect. However, in general 
we have to conclude that on the basis of our data, people can be equally satisfied or 
dissatisfied with liberalised or privatised public service markets. 
7.2.3. Main quality components 
To gain more in-depth insight about the issue of user satisfaction with the quality and 
price of public services, we examined which quality dimensions are important and 
which complaints were expressed in specific countries and/or by specific groups. 
Table 7.4: Important quality dimensions for improvement of SGEI’s 
Postal Services Local Public Transport Electricity Supply 
Delivery time (AT, BE, PL) 
Reliability (UK, BE) 
Service Post Offices (SE) 
Timetable information (AT, BE, 
PL, PL, UK) 
Connection options (AT, BE, GE) 
Punctuality (GE) 
Passenger comfort (PL) 
Quality of customer service (BE, 
GE, SE, UK) 
Reliability of supply (PL) 
Harassment by competing 
suppliers (BE, UK). 
Source:  HIVA-K.U.Leuven, PIQUE survey data; see detail tables in annex. 
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This exercise allowed us to point to policy priorities for improving the service. We 
were able to select quality components and complaints that give a good fit to the 
general satisfaction with the quality of the services. By looking at the amount of 
improvement needed and the frequency of complaints on the one hand, and the 
relative importance of these issues on the other, we identified the quality aspects 
that are most important for the service providers to focus on if they want to improve 
the satisfaction of the service’s users in the future (briefly summarised in Table 7.4). 
In general, we could conclude that it is especially time and time-related reliability 
questions that are key quality priorities in postal services and local public transport, 
whereas in electricity the quality of costumer service plays an important role. 
Within these general perceptions of satisfaction we were able to identify the same 
set of background characteristics that influenced these differences in opinion. A 
clear division emerged in this regard: Well-educated, critical user tend to have more 
problems with the quality aspects (‘the value dimension’) while among people with 
lower income or lower socio-economic status possible dissatisfaction relates more to 
the price or cost of a service (‘the money dimension’). 
7.3. Liberalisation, privatisation and universal service obligations 
Since the Nice Council of 2001, evaluating the reform of services of general interest 
has been high on the agenda of the European Commission. According to the 
Commission, such an evaluation should also focus on how these changes are 
perceived by users (EC, 2002: 4). Despite increasing EU attention to consumer 
aspects of services of general interest, alarmingly little research exists on citizens’ 
attitudes towards reforms in these sectors. The PIQUE project contributes to 
addressing this gap by means of an analysis of citizen attitudes in six EU countries 
towards liberalisation, privatisation and universal service obligations. 
7.3.1. General attitudes 
The attitudes towards competition and privatisation were surveyed in the same way 
for all sectors. In relation to liberalisation, people were asked for each sector if they 
think competition would have a positive effect on price (first question) and quality 
(second question). They could agree or disagree with the statement on a 5-point 
scale. Respondents were also asked to express their preference for a public service 
provided by a state enterprise, a private company or a combination of both. They 
were also asked about (dis)agreement with the imposition of universal service 
obligations. 
The surveyed attitudes in this regard are presented in Table 7.5. 
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Table 7.5: Attitudes on privatisation, liberalisation and universal service 
obligations of SGEIs 
Attitude Postal services Local public transport Electricity supply 
Support for total 
privatisation 
All countries very low All countries very low All countries very low 
Support for liberalisation All countries medium All countries medium All countries medium 
Support for universal 
service obligations 
High (AT, GE, PL, SE) 
Very High (BE , UK) 
All very high except 
Sweden (high) 
All high except Belgium 
(very high), 
Source:  HIVA-K.U.Leuven, PIQUE survey data. 
A ‘moderate’ yes for liberalisation: In terms of the survey questions on attitudes 
towards liberalisation (competition), the general trend shows a small majority of 
respondents in favour of liberalisation in most countries. The support for 
liberalisation ranges between 40% and 60% (medium) in all countries. 
Table 7.6: Attitudes towards liberalisation 
 % Agree with ‘competition positive effect on … 
Country Post Price Post Quality 
Public 
transport 
price 
Public 
transport 
quality 
Electricity 
Price 
Electricity 
Quality 
AT 61% 50% 60% 60% 55% 62% 
BE 57% 54% 63% 61% 55% 56% 
DE 70% 57% 64% 62% 58% 70% 
PL 65% 54% 69% 66% 58% 68% 
SW 53% 44% 64% 61% 54% 68% 
UK 53% 41% 56% 54% 61% 57% 
Source:  HIVA-K.U.Leuven, PIQUE survey data. 
Certainly not purely private: Survey results indicate that citizens still want public 
components in the provision of public services. The huge majority of respondents opt 
for a ‘mix of both’ constellation, while only small minority favours purely private 
public services. 
Universal service obliged: Universal service measures are in general supported by the 
big majority of surveyed citizens in the six countries. 
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Table 7.7: Attitudes on universal service aspects 
 Postal Services Local public transport Electricity 
 
Universality - 
frequency/ 
generality of 
delivery 
Universality - 
Post office in 
the neigh-
bourhood 
Reduced price 
for the less 
well-off 
Every village 
must be 
served 
Partly reduced 
price for the 
less well-off 
Same price 
regardless of 
remote 
location 
AT 92% 54% 86% 84% 77% 79% 
BE 98% 64% 86% 89% 84% 83% 
DE 96% 61% 80% 84% 66% 86% 
PL 94% 42% 81% 89% 69% 81% 
SW 92% 49% 59% 69% 37% 90% 
UK 93% 80% 79% 91% 58% 86% 
Source: HIVA-K.U.Leuven, PIQUE survey data. 
Belgian and UK citizens responded most positively to the universality statements, had 
the highest reservations about the introduction of competition and were clearly anti-
privatisation. As these countries can in many aspects be defined as the most and the 
least liberalised countries of the PIQUE sample, the hypothesis could be put forward 
that hopes are raised during the transition period but do not last. Such a proposition, 
however, clearly remains a hypothesis and would need to be confirmed by 
comparative research carried out over a longer time frame and/or including more 
countries. 
Possible positive or negative effects of the macro-processes of ‘liberalisation’ and 
‘privatisation’ are, in other words, not confirmed by the survey results on political 
attitudes. Clearer results could be obtained in the analysis relating to individual 
socio-economic position. The respondents’ socio-economic status seems to have the 
most significant influence on the ‘belief in competition’ attitude variables. For 
instance, for every sector the results clearly show that the higher the respondents’ 
educational attainment or the more satisfied they are with their income, the more 
positive is their attitude towards competition. The ‘higher’ professional categories 
are also more inclined to believe in competition, except with respect to the postal 
sector. Furthermore, it is also clear that price satisfaction is a more important driver 
of the liberalisation attitude than quality satisfaction. Price dissatisfaction (in the 
more liberalised sectors/countries) leads to a lower support for liberalisation. 
The socio-economic ‘haves’ clearly also believe more in privatisation than the ‘have 
nots’, although this attitude is less significant and shows greater sector-specific 
variations than the ‘belief in competition’. 
This leads us to what is perhaps the main conclusion of this attitudinal part of the 
PIQUE survey, namely that it is clearly not only the actual macro situation and/or 
satisfaction with performance (price and quality) of public service(s) in a country 
that solely influences the attitude of citizens towards liberalisation, privatisation and 
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universal service obligations. The socio-economic position also strongly matters. In 
their proposals to regulate liberalisation and privatisation, European policy makers 
certainly also need to keep in mind the effects of socio-political values and socio-
economic differences with regard to these evolutions. 
7.4. ‘Choice’ as consumer attitude and behaviour 
A third and final part of the survey dealt with the ‘choice’ paradigm. For all three 
public services surveyed, the question was included on whether citizens want or do 
not want choice. For the electricity supply sector, additional choice questions were 
asked: on whether the respondents do or do not have choice and what reasons they 
have for (not) having changed their electricity supplier. 
Table 7.8: Wanting choice between different providers, % yes 
Want choice Austria Belgium Germany Poland Sweden UK 
Postal services 21% 37% 32% 88% 35% 37% 
Local public transport 39% 32% 42% 92% 29% 61% 
Electricity supplier 63% 73% 75% 93% 90% 77% 
Source: HIVA-K.U.Leuven, PIQUE survey data. 
Table 7.9: ‘Choice’ behaviour in electricity supply 
 Austria Belgium Germany Sweden UK 
Not possible 32% 20% 19% 12% 10% 
Possible, but not considering or not 
doing 
61% 64% 65% 65% 43% 
Possible, considering or doing 7% 16% 16% 24% 47% 
Source: HIVA-K.U.Leuven, PIQUE survey data. 
The main results of this ‘choice’ question of the PIQUE survey can be summarised as 
follows: The choice paradigm is not a general attitude and, as illustrated by the 
electricity sector, it is currently not a majority practice used in the public services 
under consideration. The results of the Polish sample form an exception in this 
regard: In Poland, there is an overall demand for having (market/provider) choice. 
Based on the different findings by sector and country, we hypothesise that more 
citizens are pushed to acknowledge choice by preceding reforms rather than 
consumers ‘pulling’, or demanding, ‘choice’-based reforms. 
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Table 7.10: What was the main reason for having changed supplier (the last 
time)? 
 Austria 
(n=25) 
Belgium 
(n=63) 
Germany 
(n=74) 
Sweden 
(n=107) 
UK 
(n=229) 
Lower prices 92% 75% 74% 85% 78% 
Better service 0% 14% 5% 1% 8% 
Possibility to buy green power 5% 9% 7% 1% 0% 
Recently moved and had to 
change supplier 3% 1% 10% 12% 14% 
Previous supplier stopped activity 0% 1% 4% 1% 0% 
Source: HIVA-K.U.Leuven, PIQUE survey data. 
When a consumerist attitude or behaviour (in electricity) is detected, it can be 
related to the public choice theory. It is the more critical, well-educated consumer 
that want more choice. When switching electricity supplier, the promise of price 
reductions seems to be the main driver. For some countries, however, the results 
show higher percentages of transaction cost problems (Table 7.11), such as lack of 
information in Belgium and administrative burdens in Austria. 
Table 7.11: Percentage of non-switchers mentioning at least one process 
barrier as reason* 
Austria Belgium Germany Sweden UK 
16% 26% 20% 11% 14% 
* Process barriers: unable to obtain information, unable to compare offers properly, changing is too 
much trouble, not aware of other suppliers. 
Source: HIVA-K.U.Leuven, PIQUE survey data. 
7.5. Conclusions 
The survey, the results of which this policy paper summarises, constituted a major 
phase of the PIQUE research project, which is aimed at assessing the impact of 
liberalisation and privatisation processes in public services in Europe. As part of this 
assessment, the survey looked into the impact of these European Union driven 
processes from a citizens’ perspective, investigating on the attitudes towards 
services of general economic interest and its perceived service quality. 
From a satisfaction perspective 
From a satisfaction perspective, one can conclude that citizens are generally 
satisfied with the quality of services. However, the level of satisfaction can vary 
substantially by sector and country, leaving substantial room for improvement. Price, 
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in this regard, seems to be the main driver of satisfaction and, at present, a major 
cause of dissatisfaction, especially in the electricity sector. 
From a quality perspective 
When looking at the quality components of the public services studied, time and 
reliability issues emerge as key components of these network industries: Postal items 
need to be delivered on time, busses have to be punctual and, with the necessary 
connection possibilities, electricity power cuts have to be avoided. 
From a political perspective 
The surveyed citizen groups show moderate support for the liberalisation policies. 
However, they firmly reject full privatisation and clearly expect the state to 
guarantee a range of universal service obligations in each of the sectors. 
From a market perspective 
We can certainly state that if marketisation is the policy goal, there is still a great 
need to ‘train’ citizens and facilitate consumerism today. The modern ‘citizen-
consumer’ who expects and demands ‘choice’ from these public services is still 
largely a policy fallacy, if we look at the general attitude patterns and the behaviour 
experience in the electricity sector so far. 
From a social perspective 
Throughout the study clear social demarcations were detected between ‘haves’ 
(higher educated, bigger income and higher professional status) and ‘have nots’ 
(lower educated, lower income and lower professional status). 
 The latter show higher rates of dissatisfaction. 
 The former give more importance to the quality/value dimension of a service 
than to its price/money dimension. 
 Policy support is mainly determined by social-political values and socio-economic 
position than by the individual performance assessment of the services. Politics is 
clearly losing support on this matter at the lower end of society. 
 The critical consumer paradigm of ‘choice’ is socially and paradoxically ‘biased’: 
people which show the lowest satisfaction also show the least interest in choice 
behaviour and practice. 
Leading to a final reflection … 
Based on these general conclusions, we want to end this paper by making two final 
policy reflections. 
At the direct policy level of implementation: IF one believes in the market solution 
and IF one subscribes peoples’ right to choose, THEN one also needs state 
intervention taking real consumer attitudes and behaviour into account. In other 
words: competition policies will also need a demand-side pillar involving: a) the 
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design of a consumer-choice architecture as part of market creation; and b) social 
policies as corrective instruments. 
In this regard we could refer to what in some countries is already happening in the 
field of electricity supply. Consumers are beginning to delegate their electricity 
buying decisions to consumer cooperatives or similar organisations because they do 
not have sufficient motivation, capacity (being trained and informed as critical 
consumers) or opportunity (the purchasing power to get a better deal). European 
policy makers could learn a lot from exploring the dynamics of such initiatives in 
order to understand consumer behaviour and create a regulatory environment that 
empowers service user instead of service providers. 
At the more abstract level of policy theory, we can also read the results as a cry for 
safeguarding the public nature of these services. The public nature of services of 
general interest then seems to be less a question of state involvement or state 
ownership but much rather lies in these services’ immanent character: They have to 
be publicly available and universally guaranteed without much private consumer 
decision making. 
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7.7. Annex: Quality components of the services 
Table 7.12: Postal services: How much improvement is needed? 
 AT BE DE PL SE UK Mean 
The time it takes before a letter is delivered 37% 33% 28% 49% 22% 34% 34% 
The frequency of mail delivery 16% 11% 15% 18% 9% 18% 15% 
The reliability of the delivery 21% 28% 20% 31% 21% 30% 25% 
The distance to the nearest mailbox 25% 22% 27% 25% 12% 12% 21% 
The ease to obtain stamps 30% 29% 42% 37% 27% 13% 30% 
The customer service in the post office 23% 36% 30% 35% 43% 21% 31% 
Country mean 25% 27% 27% 33% 22% 21% 26% 
Table 7.13: Postal services: frequency and filing of complaints 
 AT BE DE PL SE UK Mean 
Mail not received 13% 27% 14% 11% 15% 30% 18% 
Damaged mail 13% 21% 13% 9% 17% 21% 16% 
Mail delivered to the wrong address 35% 71% 32% 19% 51% 51% 43% 
Posted mail arriving too late 19% 34% 15% 31% 18% 34% 25% 
Long waiting times, queues in the post office 26% 52% 43% 51% 19% 46% 39% 
Poor customer service in the post office 11% 20% 17% 19% 20% 15% 17% 
Country mean 20% 37% 22% 23% 23% 33% 26% 
Have you filed a complaint in reaction to this 
negative experience? (postal services) 8% 15% 8% 11% 21% 12% 13% 
Table 7.14: Local public transport: How much improvement is needed? 
 AT BE DE PL SE UK Mean 
The timetable (frequency and availability) 42% 46% 45% 48% 45% 41% 44% 
Comfort when travelling 33% 35% 33% 48% 21% 35% 34% 
Punctuality of service (respecting the 
timetable) 34% 43% 48% 44% 30% 39% 40% 
Connection possibilities 45% 44% 49% 38% 43% 40% 43% 
Treatment by the staff 29% 26% 34% 31% 22% 26% 28% 
Decent behaviour of co-travellers 41% 51% 46% 53% 25% 45% 44% 
Information on fares and schedules 42% 33% 51% 47% 29% 40% 40% 
Country mean 38% 40% 44% 44% 31% 38% 39% 
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Table 7.15: Local public transport: frequency and filing of complaints 
 AT BE DE PL SE UK Mean 
Regular delays (more than 10 minutes) 20% 34% 22% 26% 15% 32% 25% 
Vehicle breakdown 22% 18% 28% 25% 13% 18% 21% 
Harassment when travelling 6% 11% 13% 9% 2% 11% 9% 
Overcrowded buses 54% 68% 47% 48% 34% 50% 50% 
Journey cancelled without notice 9% 25% 17% 19% 10% 27% 18% 
Country mean 22% 31% 25% 25% 15% 27% 24% 
Have you filed a complaint in reaction to this 
negative experience? (local public transport) 5% 6% 10% 4% 17% 12% 9% 
Table 7.16: Electricity supply: How much improvement is needed? 
 AT BE DE PL SE UK Mean 
The way electricity is produced in 
environmental terms 61% 74% 70% 66% 65% 64% 67% 
Reliability of the electricity supply 22% 31% 24% 36% 35% 29% 30% 
The technical support (for example in case 
of power cuts) 31% 37% 35% 47% 36% 36% 37% 
The clarity of the electricity bills 43% 45% 48% 38% 51% 30% 43% 
The quality of the customer service 29% 40% 37% 25% 34% 37% 34% 
Information to compare suppliers 49% 59% 54% 60% 60% 43% 54% 
Country mean 39% 48% 45% 45% 47% 40% 44% 
Table 7.17: Electricity supply: frequency and filing of complaints 
 AT BE DE PL SE UK Mean 
Administrative problem or dispute 4% 13% 2% 5% 10% 12% 7% 
Disproportional price increase 20% 18% 33% 17% 14% 27% 22% 
Unacceptable power breakdown 6% 10% 5% 12% 6% 13% 9% 
Harassment by other suppliers in convincing 
to change 13% 28% 15% 0% 20% 46% 20% 
Financial difficulties to pay the bill 3% 5% 4% 13% 4% 8% 6% 
Country mean 9% 15% 12% 9% 11% 21% 13% 
Have you filed a complaint in reaction to this 
negative experience? (electricity supply) 5% 17% 8% 9% 20% 14% 12% 
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8. THE IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT, PRODUCTIVITY AND 
SERVICE QUALITY 
Christoph Hermann and Jörg Flecker 
Forschungs- und Beratungsstelle Arbeitswelt, Vienna 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter summarises the findings of the PIQUE project and integrates them into a 
common conclusion. Following the major research questions pursued in the project, 
the results are presented in terms of changes in markets, ownership and regulation, 
employment, working conditions and labour relations as well as productivity and 
service quality. The chapter ends with a discussion of the users’ perspective on 
liberalisation and privatisation, the role of regulation and with a brief conclusion. 
The evidence presented in the chapter is based on different research methods, such 
as a quantitative survey, secondary analyses of quantitative data, case-study 
research based on qualitative interviews, as well as analyses of existing literature, 
reports and documents. Evidence comes from four sectors (electricity, postal 
services, local public transport, hospitals) and six countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom). 
8.2. Markets, ownership and regulation 
Liberalisation is essentially about the introduction of competition. The main 
argument of advocates of liberalisation is that competition forces alternative 
providers to improve productivity and service quality. It is the trust in the beneficial 
effects of competition that induced policy makers to abandon public-sector 
monopolies in favour of public-service markets. In some countries the introduction of 
competition was combined with the privatisation of public-service providers, but EU 
liberalisation policy formally does not concern itself with the question of ownership. 
With the exception of the United Kingdom, where in several sectors privatisation had 
already started in the late 1980s and early 90s, in most countries and sectors in this 
analysis liberalisation and privatisation did not start before the mid 1990s, and 
liberalisation and privatisation processes frequently gained momentum in the late 
1990s and in the years after 2000. In electricity and postal services, European sector 
directives played a crucial role in orchestrating the liberalisation processes; 
European regulation also had a significant impact in local public transport, while 
regulation in the hospital sector is still mostly determined at national level. 
Accordingly, liberalisation processes in electricity and postal services are more 
consistent across the countries than they are in local public transport and hospitals. 
In electricity liberalisation has been completed insofar as according to existing 
electricity-sector regulation all consumers in the European Union should have the 
possibility to choose between two and more providers (yet the PIQUE survey shows 
that a significant proportion of consumers have the impression that changing 
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electricity providers is not possible). In postal services, Germany, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom, among others, have already fully liberalised postal markets, while 
in Austria, Belgium and Poland post items weighing 50 grams or less are still handled 
exclusively by the incumbent post companies. After 2011 (in Poland 2013) the 
remaining barriers for competing providers must be lifted. In both sectors, markets 
were liberalised in several steps – in the electricity industry depending on the 
amount of electricity consumed by the customer and in postal services depending on 
the weight of post items and the price category of the service. In the hospital sector 
pressures arise from marketisation rather than competition, but there is at least one 
country (Germany) with a systematic shift towards hospital privatisation. Local public 
transport and the hospital sector also differ from electricity and postal services, as 
service providers typically do not compete for customers but for exclusive service 
contracts awarded by funding organisations for a limited period (hence there is 
competition for the market rather than in the market). 
Although the creation of a competitive business environment is the main reason for 
the liberalisation of public services, the evolution towards competitive market 
structures has been moderate (Hermann/Verhoest 2007). Only in a very few sectors 
has liberalisation led to a situation where a large number of providers are in intense 
competition for customers or contracts. Instead, the breaking-up of public 
monopolies and the creation of public-sector markets have frequently resulted in 
concentration processes, often after an initial increase in the number of providers 
(ibid). Reasons include the specific nature of the markets (which was the reason for 
establishing public monopolies in the first instance), the scale of the markets (only a 
few providers can compete on a European scale), and the propensity of companies to 
avoid competition by mergers and acquisitions. In electricity, but increasingly also in 
postal services, several of the companies analysed in the company case studies have 
been involved in merger activities (Flecker/Hermann 2009). In fact only one out of 
six companies studied in the electricity sector has so far not been merged with or 
taken over by another provider. However, the respective company also tried to 
circumvent competition by forming an electricity alliance with other regional 
providers. In the hospital sector two out of four case study hospitals were involved in 
merger processes. Here the main reason was not to avoid competition but to exploit 
economies of scale in a situation of increasingly tight and competitive funding (ibid). 
While the evolution towards competitive market structures was limited, liberalisation 
was more successful in terms of raising the share of private ownership among public-
service providers. In fact public monopolies were often replaced by private 
oligopolies – although in most sectors there is still a significant number of public 
providers or public authorities still own a substantial share in former monopoly 
suppliers (Hermann/Verhoest 2007). Again supporting evidence can be found from 
sector-level analysis as well as from the company case studies. In electricity all 
except one of the case-study companies are meanwhile predominantly privately 
owned and only one out of four post incumbents is still fully in public hands. Even 
public hospitals and local transport providers have been sold to private investors. In 
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several cases the shift towards private ownership was accompanied by an increase in 
foreign ownership. This is particular evident in the electricity sector, where five out 
of six electricity providers included in the PIQUE research are mostly foreign owned. 
In Belgium almost the entire electricity industry is predominantly in foreign hands. In 
postal services it is often the new competitors that are owned by foreign post 
incumbents. In a rather new development, post incumbents are increasingly buying 
up shares of former post monopolists in other countries (Flecker/Hermann 2009). 
Liberalisation and privatisation of public services was closely linked to changes in the 
regulatory systems. Previously, public-service providers were typically publicly 
owned and as such subject to governance by local, regional and national authorities. 
But even where providers operated on a private for-profit or not-for-profit basis, 
they were subject to comprehensive regulations, starting with provisions on minimum 
investment levels and ending with mandatory price regulations. Liberalisation and 
privatisation had a two-fold effect: firstly, public ownership is no longer the 
dominant form of governing public services; secondly, regulation focuses on enabling 
competition, rather than governing the entire value chain (Hermann/Verhoest 2007). 
The assumption is that the ‘free’ play of market forces will create the most 
beneficial outcome for consumers. In the electricity sector, for example, regulation 
focuses on third-party access to electricity networks in order to make sure that 
network operators, many of whom are also active in production and supply, do not 
disadvantage competing providers by demanding monopoly tariffs. Equal access to 
the network is considered to be crucial for the development of an effective supply 
market. Consequently, the newly established regulatory authorities impose tariffs for 
electricity transmission, while matters such as prices for end-consumers or 
investments in infrastructure are autonomously decided by company management. 
In several cases, such as local public transport, new, complex and costly control 
regimes have been introduced to make sure that private contractors meet their 
contractual obligations. In some cases regulation also includes the imposition of a set 
of public-service obligations, yet these typically apply to only one provider in the 
sector, while the others are free to provide the services at their own discretion 
(which, then, raises pressure on the universal service providers to adopt similar 
practices). Given the limited success of liberalisation in creating competitive market 
structures, the emphasis on enabling competition rather than governing the entire 
service value chain entails a number of risks. As the case studies show, companies 
have sometimes responded to liberalisation and privatisation by increasing prices – 
although not equally for all consumer groups (large customers pay less, small 
customers more); cutting back on the amount and scope of services (e.g. the network 
of post offices), worsening some service aspects (e.g. eliminating walk-in service 
centres), as well as by reducing investments (e.g. investments in electricity 
networks).The shift towards private ownership and the increasingly narrow scope of 
regulation are in contrast to the attitude of may public-service users. As the PIQUE 
survey shows, a clear majority of public-service users reject exclusively privately 
owned public services and are in favour of public-service obligations. 
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8.3. Employment, working conditions and labour relations 
8.3.1. Employment 
Liberalisation advocates have not only promised cheaper and better services; they 
have also argued that the reduction in prices will boost demand and thereby create 
more jobs than there were under monopoly regulation. In its 2003 Green Paper on 
Services of Public Interest, the European Commission concludes that the impact of 
market opening on net employment in the network industries has been broadly 
positive: ‘Job losses, particularly amongst former monopolies, have been more than 
compensated for by the creation of new jobs thanks to market growth.’ The findings 
of PIQUE and other recent research point in an other direction. An analysis of sector-
level employment data shows that a large number of jobs in network industries have 
been lost since liberalisation or privatisation. In the electricity industry, between 33% 
and 22% of jobs disappeared between 1995 and 2004 (except for Poland) (Jefferys et 
al. 2008: 4-5).23 Within the EU-15, total losses amount to 246,000 jobs between 1995 
and 2004 (Ecotec 2007).In postal services job reductions amount to between 20% and 
8% (except for the UK). In Austria, Belgium, Germany and Sweden together more 
than 80,000 jobs were lost between 1995 and 2005 (ibid: 5).24 This trend is confirmed 
by the company case studies, which show substantial job losses at the former 
monopoly providers in electricity and postal services. The case studies on new 
competitors in the electricity and post sectors also show that jobs created by new 
providers, emerging on liberalised markets, cannot compensate for the job losses at 
the incumbent monopoly suppliers – especially if counted on a full-time basis. And 
although service providers in liberalised public-service markets have extensively used 
outsourcing as a measure to cut employment and costs, outsourcing alone cannot 
account for the size of job losses in the companies affected (Flecker/Hermann 2008: 
5-6). 
In local public transport and hospitals the situation is different. Local public 
transport shows growing employment numbers (except for Sweden), whereas in the 
hospital sector there are countries with growing, stagnating and decreasing 
employment (Jefferys et al. 2008: 6-7) Findings from the company case studies also 
show a varied picture: some establishments have hired additional workers, while 
others have reduced employment numbers. In any case, the difference to electricity 
and postal services is that in local public transport and hospitals demand is driven by 
public expenditure rather than by falling consumer prices. If anything, the company 
case studies show that competition and marketisation in the two sectors have 
induced providers to cut costs, and they do so, among other things, by cutting jobs 
(Flecker/Hermann 2008: 5-6). 
Despite the dramatic job losses recorded in some sectors and companies, compulsory 
lay-offs were an exception. Instead, employment reduction was mainly achieved 
                                             
23  Data is drawn from the Eurostat Structural Business Survey (for details see chapter 6). 
24  Data is drawn from national statistical sources (for details see chapter 6). 
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through non-replacement of workers who had moved into retirement, and through 
special measures such as early retirement programmes or special bonuses for workers 
who leave the company voluntarily. In the case of a Polish electricity provider, such 
measures allowed the company to cut employment by 30% within six years. Now 
average staffing is below the standard of its Western European parent company. In 
some cases the ‘redundant’ employees who decline to leave the companies (and 
cannot be sacked) are shifted into internal employment agencies. Management 
defends such measures as a possibility to retrain staff and to find them new 
workplaces. In the Austrian post case study, the works council representative assures 
that the internal employment agency (euphemistically called ‘career and 
development centre’) is a dead-end street and no one who is parked there has a 
future in the company. For the workers the situation is extremely depressing. They 
have to show up every morning but are left without anything useful to do until they 
can leave again at the end of their working shift (if they do not show up or leave 
early they risk being sacked for disciplinary reasons). 
However, liberalisation and privatisation were not only accompanied by a reduction 
in employment, they have also led to significant changes in employment contracts. 
Sector-level data show a general increase in part-time employment (Jefferys et al. 
2008). While this reflects a general economic trend, in some sectors, such as postal 
services, the increase in part-time jobs is linked to a reorganisation of the delivery 
networks. If the current trend continues, post carriers who deliver mail and are 
employed on a full-time base will be a thing of the past. In many cities and regions 
mail deliverers will work exclusively on part-time contracts. Yet there is not only an 
increase in part-time work; data from Germany show that the new competitors on 
the German postal market in particular mostly operate with workers on marginal 
part-time contracts or what in Germany are called ‘mini jobs’. These workers only 
work for few hours per week and, if they have no second job, earn so little that they 
qualify for additional funds from German social assistance 
(Hermann/Brandt/Schulten 2008). The company case studies show that in some 
hospitals management has also increased the part-time rate because the flexibility of 
part-time workers allows them to save costs. In electricity, part-time employment so 
far is largely confined to the newly established call centres, where part-time workers 
are used to extend operating hours. 
Rather than employing part-time employees, electricity providers resort to 
temporary and agency workers. The situation is particularly dramatic in Belgium, 
where a substantial part of the workers in the electricity industry work on temporary 
contracts. In local public transport, there is in some countries a tendency to employ 
workers on fixed-term contracts adjusted to the contract between the employer and 
the tendering organisation. In postal services, new competitors not only use marginal 
part-time to lower labour costs, but in some countries also resort to self-
employment. New providers on the Austrian letter market, for example, employ their 
mail deliverers exclusively as self-employed workers paid piece rates. As self-
employed workers they lack any protection through collective agreements or labour 
 92
legislation. As those workers who are employed on ‘mini jobs’ they can hardly live 
from their income. In Vienna and the eastern part of Austria many of these workers 
are therefore asylum seekers or cross-border commuters from nearby Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic (ibid). Hence liberalisation and privatisation not only leads to an 
increase in atypical forms of employment but also to the creation of precarious jobs. 
8.3.2. Working conditions and work organisation 
With few exceptions liberalisation and privatisation have led to an intensification of 
work. In the company case studies management rarely denies that workers today are 
expected to complete more tasks in a shorter amount of time than before the start 
of the liberalisation and privatisation processes. Management, however, argues that 
previously staff in monopoly providers were often under-performing in comparison 
with workers in private-sector companies. Notwithstanding the necessity to improve 
public-sector performance, in some cases management has acknowledged that the 
intensification of work has reached a limit, which makes it difficult, especially for 
older workers, to cope with the growing workloads. 
In electricity and postal services increasing workloads are linked to cuts in 
employment numbers. The cuts went so far that the introduction of new technology 
and changes in work organisation, both of which can be found in the case studies, 
cannot on their own account for the fact that a decreasing number of workers 
produce the same or even a greater amount of output. In postal services, workloads 
were increased through an extension of delivery routes or through an increase in the 
number of delivery points served per working hour. As a result, workers have 
increasing problems completing the routes within their working shifts. Conversations 
with residents, which can be seen as part of a social function of post deliverers in 
local communities, are no longer possible under these circumstances. In the 
electricity industry, employers frequently resort to overtime to compensate for 
increasingly tight staffing levels. In addition workers in some companies complain 
about growing bureaucratic tasks caused by the compulsory demerger of electricity 
companies or by excessive requirements from electricity regulators in connection 
with overseeing the costs of network maintenance. 
Similar developments can be found in hospitals. Hospital workers not only suffer from 
a decreasing patient-to-nurse-ratio; in addition nurses complain about mounting 
administrative work caused by shorter average length of stay of patients (increasing 
the proportion of admission and discharge procedures) and by a transfer of 
administrative tasks to nurses (which allows the hospital to save jobs in 
administration). In local public transport, drivers complain about the elimination of 
slack time and the shortening of breaks. The Swedish local transport case study has 
revealed that drivers sometimes risk dehydration because they drink less in order to 
reduce the frequency of using a toilet. 
Increases in workloads following liberalisation and privatisation are often combined 
with or caused by changes in working hours. Management argues that flexible 
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working hours improve flexibility and therefore efficiency. Partly they help to extend 
operating hours or to cope with unforeseen demand. More often, however, flexible 
working hours are used by employers to reduce labour costs. As mentioned before, 
part-time work plays an important role in postal services and hospitals. The 
proportion of part-time jobs in the health sector is not only the highest among the 
sectors studied here, but it is usually also higher than the national part-time rate. In 
local public transport the part-time rate is still far below the national average. Here 
employers prefer split-shifts to cope with varying demand and to avoid the payment 
of regular wages for breaks between peak traffic periods. While employers in postal 
services, local public transport and hospitals make greater use of flexible working 
hours to avoid the payment of costly overtime supplements, electricity companies 
frequently use overtime to cope with unforeseen problems such as repair field work 
after a storm or an accident. Electricity companies can use overtime because labour 
costs  make up a significantly smaller part of the overall production costs than in the 
other three sectors. 
Technology plays an important role in the transformation of working conditions. The 
use of new technology has the potential to increase productivity without 
deteriorating working conditions. Technology can be particularly helpful in reducing 
the amount of physical strain and routine tasks. In the electricity industry, the 
number of blue-collar workers has been falling for a number of years. Due to the 
application of new technology, but also to the expansion of retailing, trade and IT, 
jobs have become more mentally than physically demanding. Yet the introduction of 
new technology can also have the opposite effect: In postal services the introduction 
of fully automated sorting centres and the use of GPS technology has deprived the 
job of a post deliverer from the more interesting aspects of work. What remains is 
the mere act of delivering mail (following a GPS device, post deliverers do not even 
have to know the area where they are delivering mail). Given the increasing amount 
of mail they are expected to deliver, the job has become not only become more 
monotonous but also physically more demanding. Another aspect of new technology 
is its potential to improve control over work processes and workers. In several cases, 
changes induced by liberalisation and privatisation included the establishment of 
‘flatter’ hierarchies within companies and the introduction of more direct lines of 
responsibility. Workers have welcomed this development because it gives them more 
leeway to make autonomous decisions (whereas in the former ‘bureaucratic’ 
structure they had to ask for permission from a superior for every action that slightly 
deviated from the rule). Yet in part greater autonomy has been complemented by 
enhanced IT-based control efforts. Management in the Austrian post case study, for 
example, constantly monitors the volume of mail handled by a local distribution base 
and immediately cuts back staff numbers as soon as it sees a reduction in the number 
letters. In a similar way, employees working at post counters in post offices or in 
customer-service call centres can easily be controlled through the electronic records 
of their customer interactions. 
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8.3.3. Labour relations 
Public-sector workers typically form strong trade unions that are able to establish 
highly centralised and comprehensive bargaining structures, even if their bargaining 
rights are only informal. Consequently they function as a pace setter in terms of 
enforcing worker-friendly labour standards and working conditions (including, in 
many cases, de facto protections from dismissal). Yet labour standards were not only 
higher than in the private sector, employment and working conditions were also 
more homogeneous. The income differences between the lowest and highest paid 
employees were significantly smaller than in privatesector enterprises 
(Brandt/Schulten 2008). 
Liberalisation and privatisation have caused a far-reaching fragmentation and 
decentralisation of public-sector labour relations. As a general trend, sector-level 
bargaining has been replaced by company-level bargaining and in some cases even by 
negotiations with different groups of workers within the same company. In some 
countries the breaking-up of public service monopolies has resulted in a situation 
where different collective agreements apply in the same sector and/or some 
providers are covered by an agreement while others are not (ibid). Given the 
increasing fragmentation of the bargaining systems, competing providers on the 
newly created public-service markets rarely find a common level playing field. 
Instead the new providers often profit form lower labour standards and thereby 
increase pressure on former monopolists to reduce their labour costs. Given that 
most of these services are highly labour-intensive — labour costs make up 60 per cent 
and more of their production costs — the possibility of reducing costs by automation 
is limited. Employers therefore fall back on cutting wages or increasing the 
proportion of atypical and precarious forms of employment. Belgium and Sweden are 
exceptions in this respect: due to their comprehensive labour-regulation system the 
differences between collective agreements and employing companies are limited 
(ibid). 
Increasing fragmentation and decentralisation of public-sector labour relations is 
mirrored in growing differences in employment and working conditions. Differences 
emerge between ‘old’ and ‘new’ employees within the same company, with the 
latter typically earning significantly less for the same job than their colleagues who 
have been hired before a certain date in the liberalisation and privatisation process. 
Differences also emerge between former monopolists and new competitors, 
especially if they are covered by different collective agreements or if a provider 
declines to join the collective bargaining system (in those countries where this is 
legally possible). Substantial differences also exist between parent companies, 
subsidiaries and outsourced services (Flecker/Hermann 2009: 6-8). In the electricity 
sector, employers in some countries have deliberately exploited new regulation that 
required them to set independent business units for the different value chain 
segments to escape ‘expensive’ electricity-sector collective agreements. 
Workers in independent subsidiaries or in outsourced services usually suffer from 
worse employment and working conditions compared to their colleagues in the core 
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unit or parent company. This is true for call-centre agents working in outsourced call 
centres in the electricity industries, cleaners employed by a private cleaning firm to 
clean public hospitals, self-employed mail deliverers, as well as bus drivers employed 
by a subsidiary of a municipal transport service. The case study on the municipal 
German transport service shows how bad working conditions are passed on within 
outsourcing relationships: the workforce of the subsidiary not only earns less but also 
has to serve the ‘bad lines’ with irregular working hours and long breaks between 
driving periods. Differences not only emerge between core and outsourced services 
but also between former monopolists and new competitors (Flecker/Hermann 2009: 
4-6). In particular, employment and working conditions provided by the new 
competitors on liberalised postal markets are significantly worse than those provided 
by the incumbents. In Austria and Germany, new providers pay only half of the wages 
for mail deliverers paid by the former incumbents (Hermann/Brandt/Schulten 2008). 
Hence what was previously a public service that provided stable jobs and decent 
income could be turned into a low-wage sector if no counter-measures are 
introduced (such the German postal-sector minimum wage). 
In many companies new human-resource management strategies were introduced 
after liberalisation and privatisation. These often resulted in enhanced training 
efforts. Yet the training activities were not evenly spread over the workforce. 
Rather, only a small section of the workers (e.g. younger staff, or workers in the core 
units) benefited, which led to amplified differences among public sector workers 
(ibid: 8-9). New human-resource management strategies often include the 
introduction of management by objectives and performance-based salaries or wage 
components. 
8.4. Productivity and service quality 
Macro-data do not show clear long-term effects of liberalisation and privatisation of 
public services on productivity. Instead, other factors such as GDP-growth or shifts in 
dominant technologies seem to be more important in explaining the ups and downs in 
long-term productivity development. Yet a comparison of the different factors 
driving productivity growth — the reduction in labour input and the expansion of 
output — reveals that for some time after liberalisation and privatisation productivity 
growth time is primarily driven by a reduction of labour input (reducing the number 
of workers) as opposed to an expansion of output (increasing the volume of service) 
(Jefferys et al. 2008: 7ff). This phenomenon can be confirmed by the findings from 
the company case studies. The responses from management, works-council 
representatives and workers suggest that work intensification, reorganisation and the 
introduction of new technology have, indeed, led to an increase in productivity — at 
least for a limited period. Especially in those companies who have significantly cut 
back employment fewer workers now produce the same or a greater amount of 
output than before liberalisation and privatisation. 
Of course, greater productivity at company level does not have to translate into 
greater productivity on the sector level: companies may have become more efficient, 
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but at the same time, due to liberalisation and privatisation, they have also 
duplicated and multiplied certain service components — there are now two and more 
delivery networks in postal services, while electricity companies have created 
multiple retail departments to compete for customers. On the other hand companies 
have also increased productivity by cutting back or streamlining services — e.g. by 
closing-down post offices in rural areas. 
The case studies also reveal that productivity increases have rarely been an objective 
in themselves (Flecker/Hermann 2009: 11-12). Instead, productivity gains are a by-
product of a general attempt to cut production costs. This has two consequences: 
Firstly, productivity increases were frequently combined with other cost-cutting 
strategies that led to a deterioration of employment and working conditions. 
Secondly, improvements in productivity can have negative effects on service quality 
— in particular on quality aspects that depend on large labour inputs (e.g. face-to-
face customer communication) or where the quality of service is closely linked to the 
quality of work (e.g. the care of patients) (ibid). 
This is not to say that liberalisation and privatisation have had only negative effects 
on service quality: the case studies show important improvements in quality through 
the introduction of new technology, which allowed for the speeding-up of service 
processes and greater accuracy in service delivery, as well as better service 
responsiveness and extended availability of customer care. Companies also make 
considerable efforts in overseeing and measuring particular quality aspects. 
However, improvements in quality have only been observed where they do not 
conflict with the aim of cutting costs, and in many cases with the aim of reducing 
employment. In contrast, quality aspects that demand additional labour resources or 
are dependent on high-quality working conditions have more than once been 
compromised as a result of liberalisation and privatisation. 
Hence electricity companies have set up new and centrally operated customer-care 
call centres with extended operating hours, but at the same time they have closed 
down local walk-in centres where customers could talk to an agent face-to-face. Post 
companies deliver a large part of the mail only one day after it has been posted, but 
waiting times in post offices have increased due to cut-backs in post office staff 
numbers. In electricity the aim of cutting costs has caused some companies to reduce 
investment in infrastructure, which in the long-term may have negative effects on 
service quality. 
8.5. The users’ perspective 
The user survey reveals that there is no clear link between the degree of 
liberalisation and privatisation and consumer satisfaction. Consumers can be equally 
satisfied or dissatisfied in sectors with no competition and a large amount of public 
ownership and such with intensive competition and mainly privately owned providers 
(Van Gyes/Vael/Vandekerckhove 2009). In general, service users are quite satisfied 
with the quality of public services and a majority believe that the service quality has 
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not changed in the past five years (except for Poland). However, there is still scope 
for improvement. In local public transport and postal services, users emphasise time 
and time-related reliability issues that can be improved, while in electricity 
customer services do not always meet the standard expected by consumers (in some 
countries consumers complain about being harassed by electricity retailers, who have 
introduced new and sometimes rather aggressive strategies to attract new 
customers). 
The survey also shows that while a qualified majority of respondents are in favour of 
liberalisation and believe that competition has positive effects, a large majority are 
against fully privately owned public services, while only a minority want to have 
choice (except for Poland). In electricity a majority welcome choice but at the same 
time do not consider changing their suppliers (ibid). Although there are important 
differences between countries (Poland especially is an outlier due to the 
simultaneous transformation from a state-communist to a market-based economy), 
the survey also discloses that it is primarily the class position of the respondents that 
explains their attitude towards competition and choice: less well-off citizens are 
generally more critical of liberalisation and privatisation (ibid). Given the diverse 
effects of liberalisation and privatisation on different groups of consumers (through 
the diversification of prices, the cutting-back of services in rural areas etc), this 
should not come as a surprise. In any case, the survey shows strong support among 
service users for universal-service obligations such as equal access to services and 
lower rates for low-income earners (ibid). 
8.6. The role of regulation 
In sum, the PIQUE results do not show a clear relationship between the degree of 
competition and the extent of private ownership on the one hand and changes in 
employment, productivity and consumer satisfaction on the other. Although 
competition and ownership certainly have an impact on company behaviour, the case 
studies show that companies cut back employment and worsen working conditions 
even though they are operating in oligopolistic markets and even though they are 
predominantly publicly owned. And although competition may induce companies to 
cut costs, this does not automatically translate into long-term productivity gains and 
higher consumer satisfaction with the quality of services. Notwithstanding the 
similarities in the transformation of public service provision caused by liberalisation, 
the PIQUE research has also revealed remarkable differences between countries and 
between companies acting in liberalised public service markets. Such differences can 
most plausibly be explained by regulation rather than by market and ownership 
structures. 
The company case studies show that differences in public funding and being subject 
to detailed public-service obligations can make a difference when it comes to service 
quality. Similarly important are employment regulations that make sure that public-
service providers compete on a common level playing field and compete by investing 
in new technology and improving service quality rather than by putting pressure on 
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their workers’ wages. The difference between the Swedish postal sector, where the 
incumbent and the new competitor are covered by similar collective agreements, 
and therefore have to provide similar employment standards, and the Austrian and 
German letter markets, where competitors mainly compete by under-cutting wages, 
speaks volumes. Especially in labour-intensive services where the quality of service is 
closely linked to the quality of work, comprehensive and effective labour regulations 
are indispensable. In some countries the traditional labour-relations systems are able 
to provide a common level playing field in liberalised public-service markets, in 
others they are not. While the European Union has required member states to adopt 
a new regulation that permits competition, it has paid only little attention to social 
regulation. 
8.7. Conclusions 
The PIQUE project has shown that liberalisation and privatisation of public services 
have largely negative effects on employment and working conditions and varied 
effects on productivity and service quality. Positive effects and better performance 
as compared to other countries were mostly the result of superior regulation rather 
than of competition or private corporate initiative. The PIQUE project has also shown 
that liberalisation and privatisation has fuelled inequality — among public sector 
workers who are paid different wages for the same jobs, as well as among consumers 
depending on their consumer power or the place where they live. Not surprisingly, 
the less well-off consumers are more critical towards liberalisation and privatisation. 
These tendencies have been amplified by an increasing fragmentation and 
decentralisation of public-sector labour relations and forms of regulation that focus 
on enabling competition rather than covering the entire service value chain. Where 
companies are subject to public-service obligations these only apply to one provider 
while the others are free to provide the service at their own discretion. Given the 
fact that liberalisation and privatisation were more successful in terms of changing 
ownership structures than in creating highly competitive public service markets, 
existing patterns of public-service modernisation need to be reconsidered. While 
service users are not necessarily looking for choice in public service provision, they 
see a need for improvements in service quality and for a reduction of prices. Hence 
the nature of service provision should not be left to the ‘free’ play of market forces 
but ensured by strong, comprehensive and accountable regulation that makes sure 
that all important quality aspects are met and that the universal character of public-
service provision is retained. In this regard, public ownership combined with new 
forms of service users’ participation should still be considered as a viable and 
efficient form of regulation. 
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9. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Jörg Flecker and Christoph Hermann 
Forschungs- und Beratungsstelle Arbeitswelt, Vienna 
9.1. Introduction 
The European Commission in various documents stresses the role of affordable high-
quality public services, or, in EC terminology, services of general interest, for the 
well being of European citizens and the prosperity of European businesses. In the 
2004 White Paper on Services of General Interest,25 the Commission states that 
‘Community policies have significantly contributed to improving the quality, choice 
and efficiency of a number of services of general interest. The Commission remains 
of the view that the objectives of an open and competitive internal market and of 
developing high quality, accessible and affordable services of general interest are 
compatible. Indeed, the creation of an internal market has significantly contributed 
to an improvement in efficiency, making a number of services of general interest 
more affordable.’ 
The findings of the three-year research project ‘Privatisation of Public Services and 
the Impact on Quality, Employment and Productivity’ (PIQUE) show that the reality is 
more complex and that consequences of liberalisation and privatisation of public 
services are contentious and partly contradictory. Instead of a clear improvement as 
expected by the Commission, the project has found improvements in some aspects 
(e.g. the introduction of new technology that enhances productivity) but 
deterioration in others (e.g. certain quality aspects). In the same vein, some groups 
of customers (e.g. large businesses) may have indeed profited from the restructuring 
of public services while for others (e.g. households) the situation has clearly 
worsened. 
What emerges as a conclusion from the diverse picture of the effects of liberalisation 
and privatisation is that the provision of public services in Europe should not be left 
to the free play of market forces. Instead there is a need for proper regulation of the 
various aspects of the supply process in order to make sure that services are indeed 
accessible and affordable to all citizens, and that not only some but all quality 
aspects are improved. Such regulation, however, should not only protect consumers 
but also public-sector workers, whose working conditions have often deteriorated 
and whose jobs have, in some cases, become truly precarious. High-quality services 
not least depend on high-quality jobs. 
We understand the following Draft Policy Recommendations from the PIQUE project 
as a modest contribution by academics based on their research findings to improve 
the regulatory framework governing the provision of public services in Europe. 
                                             
25  http://ec.europa.eu/services_general_interest/white_en.htm. 
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9.2. Market regulation 
Liberalisation aims at building competitive market structures, in which many 
providers compete with each other in an integrated and easily accessible market. 
The PIQUE research findings show that the evolution towards highly competitive 
market structures has not or only very partially been achieved in most sectors and 
countries under investigation. In most of the sectors and countries there is less 
competition, or the competition is less intense, as could be expected. As a first 
prerequisite for competition, one might expect an increase in the number of 
providers in the newly liberalised public-service sectors. However, the findings show 
that the number of companies has not generally increased and, in some sectors and 
countries, has even decreased. What is more, even an increase in the number of 
supplier companies has not necessarily enhanced competition, as market 
concentration has remained high or has even increased. 
Overall, out the 24 cases of public-service sectors in different countries, only four 
(electricity in Poland and the UK and local public transport in the UK and in Sweden) 
show strong competition and a few others show some progress towards competitive 
markets, while in the majority of cases the progress is very limited. 
In contrast to building competitive markets, the liberalisation process was more 
successful in changing ownership structures and in expanding the share of private 
ownership. While before liberalisation, public ownership was the dominant form of 
regulation in most countries and sectors, liberalisation and privatisation processes 
have amplified differences in the regulatory regimes. In very general terms, the 
focus of regulation has shifted from governing the entire process of service provision 
to regulating only particular aspects of the service supply chain or to partially 
controlling outcome. General trends also include the establishment of formally 
independent regulatory authorities with varying degrees of autonomy and powers to 
discipline or coordinate market participants, the granting of licences and the signing 
of contracts. While there is a universal service obligation for the universal services 
providers in the postal sector, and some similar regulations exist for certain suppliers 
in some countries, we have found many public-service providers that are not 
subjected to any comparable public-service commitments. By contrast, the PIQUE 
survey has shown that European citizens strongly support the notion that public 
services should be universal. 
Notwithstanding the general deficiencies of public-sector markets (e.g. the tendency 
to create oligopolies or information discrepancies) that require a high level of public 
control, the same survey has shown that there is no clear link between the degree of 
competition and private ownership on the one hand and consumers’ satisfaction with 
service provision on the other. Consumers, while generally reluctant to support full 
privatisation of public-service industries, are as satisfied or dissatisfied in sectors 
with many competing private providers as in sectors with one dominating public 
supplier. Hence liberalisation and privatisation, alone does not guarantee accessible, 
affordable high-quality public services. From our company case-study findings we 
assume that it is regulation that makes the difference. 
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9.2.1. Recommendations 
 The European Union and its Member States should put more emphasis on 
monitoring the provision of public services and rigorously and without prejudice 
evaluate the impacts of liberalisation and privatisation. The knowledge and 
experience of consumer protection groups and organisations should be used to 
establish adequate institutions and processes. Both monitoring and evaluation 
should include independent experts from a variety of academic disciplines 
because impacts are not only economic. The output of monitoring and evaluation 
activities should feed in regulation policies and enable policy makers to make 
informed decisions about the future of public services in Europe. 
 The European Union should consider making public-service obligations an 
overarching principle of its regulation policies, rather than leaving it to the 
Member States to make sure that citizens have access to affordable high-quality 
public services. This does not mean that all service providers must be subjected 
to the same service obligations, but is not enough that only one company per 
sector and country operates in the public interest. Regulation must make sure 
that providers operate on similar terms and conditions and that no group of 
providers is advantaged over others. 
 A directive that clarifies the nature and role of public services in Europe would 
certainly be helpful to develop specific sets of public service obligations and to 
differentiate public services from private services. 
 Leaving the regulation of service provision to the forces of the market bears risks 
because, among other things, the liberalisation process was only modestly 
successful with respect to enhancing competition. Instead of focusing on 
particular aspects of the supply chain, regulation should cover various aspects of 
service provision in order to make sure that services are easily accessible, 
affordable and of high quality and to ensure they will remain so for future 
generations (which requires an adequate amount of investments). Regulation 
should guarantee equal conditions for all, in terms of access, quality and price. 
 The independent regulatory bodies which in several sectors have been established 
during the liberalisation and privatisation processes must operate on the interest 
of the various stakeholders involved in the process of delivering public services 
(including citizens/consumers, workers, companies and public authorities) not 
only for particular groups. Their work must be fully transparent and there should 
be a possibility for the various stakeholders to hold them accountable for their 
decisions. 
 Regulatory bodies should not only focus on enabling competition but put more 
emphasis on the protection of consumers and public sector workers. For that 
matter regulatory bodies should receive the necessary powers to intervene in the 
market if necessary. 
 In order to broaden the perspective of public service regulation, consumer 
protection organisations, trade unions, and other stakeholders should have a say 
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in regulation matters and should be empowered to exert influence on national 
regulation authorities. 
 Given the increasingly European dimension of public sectors markets, cooperation 
between national regulatory institutions should be advanced. In some sectors the 
creation of European regulatory bodies should be envisaged. 
 If the aim to provide sustained, affordable, accessible and high-quality services 
to all citizens cannot be achieved under the conditions of changed ownership 
structures and new forms or market regulation, alternative measures to be taken 
into consideration should include a return to public ownership, with high levels of 
accountability and opportunities for citizens’ participation as well as 
performance-oriented incentives for high quality and affordable services. 
9.3. Employment 
Liberalisation and privatisation have been primarily associated with job reductions 
rather than employment creation. At the same time, employment within the target 
sectors has become increasingly part-time, while the number of self-employed and 
perhaps also temporary workers has increased. The reason for this is that cost cutting 
has become the main strategy companies adopt in response to the liberalisation of 
markets. In labour intensive services, this obviously mainly leads to attempts to 
reduce labour costs by reducing employment levels, even though, in most of the 
cases, direct layoffs are avoided. Other consequences include lower wages and the 
spread of precarious employment in some sectors and countries. Most obviously in 
postal services sectors in Germany and Austria, liberalisation is leading to the 
emergence of new low-wage sectors that put social standards under pressure and add 
to the number of working poor. This, in turn, can result in higher costs for public 
authorities forced to top up wages below the poverty threshold with welfare benefit 
payments. 
As a consequence of restructuring and changes in work organisation, the workforce 
employed in public-service sectors is becoming increasingly polarised, both in terms 
of forms of employment and working conditions. 
Company restructuring and changing business strategies have gone hand in hand with 
a reform of human-resource management. Some companies only introduced special 
HRM departments and policies during the process of liberalisation and privatisation 
(while before they only had payroll-accounting departments). As a result, training 
was partly enforced, even though usually not for their entire workforces. In other 
areas, however, training efforts were cut as a direct consequence of privatisation 
and the restructuring of work. As a consequence, access to training in liberalised 
public services is very imbalanced. 
9.3.1. Recommendations 
 The liberalisation of public services should be regulated in ways to make 
companies compete mainly on quality while the focus on cost cutting by means of 
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wage dumping needs to be avoided. Key instruments to achieve this include 
socially responsible tendering, the linking of tendering to the existence of 
collective agreements and the introduction of sector minimum wages or other 
minimum standards. In short: A level playing field in terms of employment 
conditions should be in place when markets are opened to competition. 
Employment forms that cannot be subjected to regulation such as self-
employment should be avoided. 
 There is a need to avoid the erosion of national employment regulation. 
Therefore, measures should be taken to ensure the quality of employment as 
envisaged by recent EU directives on postal services and transport.26 Such 
measures should not only exist on paper but should be implemented and 
compliance should be assured as part of a general public service monitoring 
process. 
 One of the main aims is to safeguard employment and to avoid understaffing, 
which, for instance, is widespread in hospitals. Active labour-market measures 
are needed to support workers who are made redundant through voluntary layoff 
schemes. Human-resource pools and other adjustment measures should be 
monitored by independent bodies with regards to effectiveness and human 
dignity. 
 Measures need to be taken to ensure more equal access to training and lifelong 
learning for different groups of workers in public services. 
9.4. Industrial relations 
Liberalisation and privatisation have far-reaching consequences for established 
labour relations. The creation of new markets and the transformation of former 
public entities into profit-oriented organisations put companies under significant 
competitive pressure. Since many of the sectors concerned, such as postal services, 
public transport and hospitals, are labour-intensive, with labour costs making up two 
thirds of the total production costs, the reduction of labour costs is a core element in 
improving competitiveness. Labour costs can be reduced either by rationalising 
production processes (substituting machines for workers) or by lowering wages, 
extending working hours or using cheaper forms of employment. In order to save 
labour costs, companies have tried to withdraw from the traditional, more expensive 
public-sector labour relations and set up new forms of wage setting. As a result, we 
have seen the emergence of new labour relations. This includes far-reaching changes 
in collective bargaining, wage levels and employment conditions. 
Regarding collective bargaining, liberalisation has usually led to a two-tier system 
with relatively stable bargaining structures at the level of the incumbent and a 
                                             
26  Directive 2008/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/post/doc/legislation/2008-06_en.pdf;  
Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:315:0001:0013:EN:PDF. 
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rather decentralised and fragmented bargaining structure with low bargaining 
coverage at the level of the new competitors. Positive exceptions are found in 
Sweden and Belgium, where labour-relation systems are in place that offer high 
degrees of coverage and coordination. The two-tier systems correspond with union-
density levels that are relatively high within the former public monopolists but often 
rather low within the new competing companies. So unions often simply do not have 
the organisational power to push for new collective agreements. Following this, the 
newly liberalised markets often lack any sector-wide regulation or coordination of 
labour issues that might limit or even prevent competition on wage costs. This lack 
of a level playing field regarding social conditions usually means a competitive 
disadvantage for the incumbent monopolists, who have higher social standards. 
Liberalisation and privatisation has not only led to a decentralisation and 
fragmentation of collective bargaining at the sector level but has also resulted in a 
growing fragmentation of labour regulation within companies. Whereas under public-
sector labour relations, the employees were treated as a relatively homogeneous 
workforce, within privatised companies there is a growing division between ‘old’ and 
‘new’ employees and between the core and peripheral workforce. Additional 
segmentations result from outsourcing practices, which typically increase in the 
course of liberalisation and privatisation and often mean that the workers affected 
are covered by new collective agreements, or even no agreement at all. 
Overall, because of the fragmentation of labour relations and increasing 
discrepancies in wages levels and employment conditions, a level playing field is 
missing. Wage differentials just serve to act as incentives to compete on labour costs 
and are thus likely to bring about a ‘race to the bottom’. 
9.4.1. Recommendations: 
 In general, the liberalisation process needs to be complemented by policies 
aiming at social cohesion not only in the area of access to affordable high-quality 
services but also in the field of employment regulation and collective bargaining. 
 Market regulation needs to be complemented by social clauses which ensure 
acceptable employment conditions in order to make sure liberalisation does not 
result in a ‘race to the bottom’ or contradict the Lisbon goal of better jobs. The 
EU regulation on public transport of 2007, for example, includes provisions, 
according to which public authorities are free to impose certain social standards 
in order to ‘ensure transparent and comparable terms of competition between 
operators and to avert the risk of social dumping’.27 Similarly, the EU directive on 
postal services explicitly stresses that ‘social considerations should be taken into 
due account when preparing the opening up of the postal market.’28 In this 
                                             
27  Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:315:0001:0013:EN:PDF, 17. 
28  Directive 2008/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/post/doc/legislation/2008-06_en.pdf, 16. 
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context, the introduction of a minimum wage in the postal sector in Germany can 
be mentioned as a positive example. Moreover, according to the EU directive on 
public procurement, public authorities are always free to define certain social 
standards in public tenders.29 To ensure a level playing field in liberalised public 
services, it seems necessary to turn this option into an obligation for Member 
States. 
 In industrial relations, the main aim should be to avoid low-wage competition and 
to ensure a level playing field. Measures must be taken to effectively ‘avert the 
risk of social dumping’ (EC Reg. 1370/2007). The PIQUE research findings not only 
confirm that there is such a risk but also show that social dumping is actually 
taking place in some sectors and countries. The averting of ‘social dumping’ 
should be a major objective of the regulatory bodies that have been established 
in course of the liberalisation and privatisation processes. 
 To reach a level playing field and to avoid social dumping, competing companies 
need to be covered by the same labour-relation regimes, including minimum 
standards. In this context, regulation needs to cover the whole value chain while 
collective agreements must be extended to fully cover all companies in a sector.  
 Labour regulation in the newly liberalised markets could take the form of 
statutory minimum standards complemented by autonomous bargaining by the 
social partners. Both minimum standards and collective bargaining require 
coordination at a European level. 
 There is a need to regularly monitor labour relations and working conditions in 
public services. Such monitoring should be based on clear aims, and its results 
should directly inform policy making at European and national levels. 
 Contrary to recent rulings by the European Court of Justice, there is a need to 
ensure that economic freedom does not take priority over social protection. 
9.5. Productivity and Service Quality 
While a long-term analysis of productivity trends in the sectors studied for the PIQUE 
project was not conclusive, there is some evidence that public-service companies 
temporarily respond to liberalisation and privatisation by taking greater recourse to 
employment cuts in order to boost productivity. This is confirmed by the company 
case studies, which show that similar outputs are produced by significantly smaller 
workforces or that, as in the case of some hospitals and local public-transport 
providers, ever-greater demands are handled by the same number of workers. 
However, productivity increases have rarely been an objective in themselves in the 
restructuring processes following liberalisation and privatisation. Instead, 
productivity gains are the by-product of a general attempt to cut production costs. 
                                             
29  Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and 
public service contracts (30.04.2004), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0018:EN:NOT 
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This has two consequences: first, public-service providers in liberalised markets often 
combine an increase in productivity with the lowering of labour costs by paying lower 
wages or using atypical forms of employment (often in combination with outsourcing 
and the creation of independent subsidiaries). Second, many cases showed 
improvements in quality through productivity measures, such as speeding up 
processes, using new technology or enhancing responsiveness in customer care. 
However, measures to enhance quality have only been observed where they do not 
conflict with the aim of cutting costs and employment. Quite on the contrary, quality 
aspects that require additional labour resources have often been compromised as a 
result of liberalisation and privatisation. Hence, for instance, electricity providers 
may extend the operating hours of their centrally operated call centres while at the 
same time they close down the traditional walk-in centres, where customer could 
talk to agents face-to-face. In postal services, the incumbents have put substantial 
effort into speeding up the delivery process. At the same time, however, they have 
significantly reduced the number of post offices and the number of agents working in 
the post offices, making it more difficult and time-consuming for private customers 
to use their services. The tension between increasing productivity and improving 
service quality is particularly apparent in hospitals and local public transport as both 
sectors are highly labour-intensive services. In some cases a negative impact on 
quality may become apparent only in the long term. Lower investment in network 
infrastructures, for instance, may, in the long term, lead to a deterioration of the 
network quality and therefore jeopardize the security of supply. 
The PIQUE survey has shown that consumers, while generally satisfied with the 
quality of service provision, disagree about various quality aspects, indicating that 
there is substantial room for improvement. Case-study research, on the other hand, 
has shown that public-service companies in liberalised markets improve quality very 
selectively. They also introduce different prices for different groups of consumers. 
This partly explains the widespread reservation against competition and the 
simultaneous strong support for choice. Hence, public-service regulations should 
make sure that consumers have a stronger say in determining the nature and 
different qualities of public services, while it should not be assumed that 
competition ensures that consumers get what they expect. 
9.5.1. Recommendations 
 Regulation is required to oblige companies in liberalised and privatised public-
service markets to invest in greater efficiency and higher quality instead of 
cutting wages and using atypical forms of employment. 
 Regulation should also make sure that there is sufficient funding for public-
service companies in order to allow them to provide high-quality services. 
 In those sectors where there are no equivalent measures in place, an 
encompassing catalogue of quality criteria should be developed and enforced (as 
part of a universal service obligation) in order to stop companies from 
compromising quality for cost-cutting. Such catalogues should apply to all 
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providers in a public-service sector and specifically emphasise labour-intensive 
quality aspects. Compliance with the quality criteria listed in the catalogue 
should be monitored on a continuous base. 
 Consumers need to be empowered to monitor and influence the various quality 
aspects of public services in order to make sure that consumers have a greater 
say in public-service delivery. Consumer protection organisations have a vast 
experience in protecting consumer rights. ‘Best practices’ from consumer 
protection activities should be used to empower public service users. In addition 
other forms of participation such as public-service quality advisory boards should 
be installed in order to make sure that users’ voices are already heard in planning 
processes. 
 Regulation should not only focus on actual quality standards. Regulation should 
ensure sufficiently high levels of investment in order to prevent negative long-
term effects on service quality. Where this is not already the case, the ensuring 
of sufficient levels of investment should become a main task of the regulatory 
bodies. 
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